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Abstract 
Groups of companies offer considerable economic and practical advantages 
over other forms of business organizations. However, the phenomenon creates 
a long list of problems in terms of antitrust law, tax law, labour law, corporate 
law, and in the case of international companies, conflict of laws. National laws 
do not provide a complete solution to these problems because groups of 
companies are still governed by traditional corporate law, which is designed to 
govern single independent companies. On the other hand, harmonization of the 
law of corporate groups across Common legal systems is neither feasible not 
advisable. 
The most important problem which has not yet been completely solved by 
Common law systems is the liability of groups of companies for the debts of 
their subsidiaries. This has been described as "one of the great unsolved 
problems of modern company law". The present study aims to analyse the 
solutions provided by Common law systems to this problem and evaluate if they 
provide a solid settlement or whether further safeguards are needed for those 
dealing with corporate groups, namely minority shareholders and outsiders 
including creditors.  
By using a comparative approach with the Islamic law system, the study 
evaluates if the Common law solutions are also applicable in such a religious 
system or whether, due to its unique character Islamic law needs to create its 
own solution.  This comparative approach assesses the possibilities of 
harmonization between Common law and Islamic law systems and promotes 
the Islamisation of modern laws in Islamic countries.  
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Introduction to the Study 
From time immemorial man has endeavored to increase his wealth through 
various means, some of which require him to jointly participate with others to 
achieve his objective.  More often than not, the personal capacity of an 
individual is not enough for him to pursue his dream of amassing assets. He 
may need to invite others to his side so that they can work together in a 
partnership where everyone understands his rights and obligations.  
Partnerships are thus formed in a number of ways with the common objective of 
pursuing certain activities jointly to generate profits, which will be shared 
according to an agreement reached beforehand.1    
1. The Emergence of Companies 
However, the partnership form came to prove inadequate for large scale 
undertakings. As long-distance trade continued to grow, corporations began to 
emerge. They have been around for some centuries. Originally a corporation 
was a social invention of the state which granted a corporate charter, permitting 
private financial resources to be used for public purposes. This initial creation of 
private finance and merchants aided the colonial expansion of states such as 
Britain and served to expand colonial and imperial interests, sometimes 
supporting military adventures. Corporations had therefore the potential, from 
the outset, to become very powerful. Abraham Lincoln recognized this:  
“I see in the near future a crisis approaching that unnerves me and 
causes me to tremble for the safety of my country. ... corporations 
                                                           
1
 Zainal Azam B. Abd Rahman, Islam in the Corporate World, published at www.thestar.com dated 31st 
August 2004.  
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have been enthroned and an era of corruption in high places will 
follow, and the money power of the country will endeavor to prolong 
its reign by working upon the prejudices of the people until all wealth 
is aggregated in a few hands and the Republic is destroyed”.2 
According to Donaldson,3 the evolution of the corporation occurred in four 
stages. The first stage encompassed the medieval period and gave the Church, 
guilds and boroughs corporate status, but failed to do so for purely profit 
making associations. The second stage witnessed the rise of corporations 
whose members shared nothing besides the desire to make money. This 
occurred in the early sixteenth century, when European entrepreneurs 
organized to launch trading voyages to the East. Such corporations, however, 
were a far cry from modern ones. Instead of pooling their capital, members 
financed their voyages individually and used the corporation only to act as a 
bearer for special trading rights.  
The third stage of corporate evolution ushered in the prototypes of modern 
corporations. Beginning in 1612 with the reconstitution of the East India trading 
company, this saw capital being pooled, power placed in the hands of a 
governor and his committees, and liability being distributed amount the 
stockholders. These changes produced the great trading companies. 
The final stage is characterized by the gradual shedding of government 
restrictions upon corporate chartering procedures. From the seventeenth 
century through the first half of the nineteenth, prospective English corporations 
were required to apply to the Crown for charters. In the United States following 
the Revolutionary War they were scrutinized, accepted or rejected, and when 
                                                           
2
 Abraham Lincoln’s letter to Col. William F. Elkins, Nov. 21, 1864, published at http://www.notable-
quotes.com/l/lincoln_abraham.html . 
3
 Thomas Donaldson, Corporations and Morality, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, (1982), p. 4-5. 
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accepted, sometimes burdened with special conditions. This system was the 
target of vigorous criticism. Those unable to receive charters, or to receive them 
under favorable conditions, charged that winners in the system were granted 
monopoly power by corrupt state officials. For a time, especially in the United 
States, losers adopted the strategy of circumventing the chartering process 
through clever legal maneuvers. Finally, as so often happened in the past, the 
law was forced to acknowledge the realities of existing practice. The old system 
of special incorporation with its uncertain review process was junked in favor of 
a general system which assured corporate status to any organization able to fill 
out forms and pay fees.  
The Bubble Companies Act 1825 was the beginning of gradual lifting of 
restrictions that acknowledged for the first time the possibility of the transfer of 
shares in companies from one person to another. Then in 1843, William 
Gladstone took chairmanship of a Parliamentary Committee on Joint Stock 
Companies, leading to the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844, which allowed 
ordinary people to incorporate through a simple registration procedure without a 
royal charter or Act of Parliament. At that time the advantage of establishing a 
company as a separate legal person was mainly administrative, creating a 
unified entity under which the rights and duties of all investors and managers 
could be channeled. The most important development was thus the Limited 
Liability Act 1855, which allowed investors to limit their liability in the event of 
business failure to the amount they invested in the company. These two 
features - a simple registration procedure and limited liability - were 
subsequently codified in the first modern company law Act, the Joint Stock 
Companies Act 1856. This was subsequently consolidated with a number of 
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other statutes in the Companies Act 1862, which remained in force until the end 
of the century.  A series of Companies Acts up to the present Companies Act 
2006 have essentially retained the same fundamental features. 
2.  The Emergence of Groups of Companies 
Although the corporation was first developed in Britain, it was soon outstripped 
by the USA.  In 1889, New Jersey permitted corporations to own equity in one 
another, perhaps as an attempt to attract more business. In 1896 it then passed 
the revolutionary “General Revision Act,” permitting unlimited size and market 
share, removing all time limits on corporate charters, reducing shareholder 
powers, and allowing all kinds of mergers, acquisitions, and purchases. Not to 
be outdone, Delaware passed its “General Incorporation Law” in 1899, which 
set the standard by essentially allowing corporations to write all their own rules 
of governance.4  
The company thus entered a new evolutionary stage of its structural 
organisation. The earlier model of the single corporate entity started to be 
superseded by the more complex model of group of companies, which now 
represents what is, by and large, the dominant form of company organisation in 
the largest world-wide markets.5  
After the Second World War, there was a major move toward the development 
of conglomerates, in which large corporations purchased smaller corporations 
to expand their industrial base. Moreover, electronic commerce makes it easier 
for corporations to contemplate venturing into new markets. As a result of 
                                                           
4
 Lee Drutman, The History of Corporation, Citizen Works Corporate Power Discussion Groups, Published 
at http://www.citizenworks .org/corp/dg/s2r1.pdf. 
5 Jose Engracia Antunes, The Liability of Parent Corporations and their Directors, Paper Presented at the 
Univeridade Autonoma de Madrid, (2004), p.10. 
 Page 14 of 292 
 
globalization, corporations no longer limit their activities to national economies. 
They are increasingly moving from a local or regional base to a global base, 
becoming multinational corporations operating at the interface between 
production, international trade and foreign investment. The scale of 
multinational corporations makes them very powerful and able to influence the 
national policy of many states.6  
However, the power of the multinational corporation is often associated with 
abuse and corruption, especially in the third world.7 This has led scholars to 
question if the current structure of corporate law protects the economy, minority 
shareholders and the creditors of these corporations, especially when they 
operate through groups of companies, since each company is still largely 
regarded as being legally independent and pursuing its own economic interests.   
For these reasons the law on groups of companies has long been the subject of 
numerous reports, studies and analyses especially among scholars of company 
law and insolvency, and especially as regards the liability of groups of 
                                                           
6
 Some statistics indicate the scale of multinational corporations’ influence:  
a. UNCTAD considers that there are about 63,000 multinational corporations, with 700,000 
branches in other countries, accounting for 25% of world economic output, and employing 86 
million people.  
b. Practically 2/3 of world exports of goods and services are accounted for by multinational 
corporations,6 with 33% of exports and 40% of imports being attributable to multinational 
corporations based in the U.S.A.  
c. The foreign direct investments of multinational corporations grew from $180 billion in 1980 to 
$1000 billion in 2000.  
d. In 2002, the stock of foreign direct investments was about $7100 billion, as opposed to $802 
billion in 1982. 
See U.N.C.T.A.D, World Investment Report (2003). See also J Dunning, Re-evaluating the Benefits of 
Foreign Direct Investment, International Thomson Business Press, London, (2003); N Grimwade, 
International Trade: New Patterns of Trade, Production and Investment, Rouledge, London, 2000. 
7
 For example, in March 2003, James Giffen of the Mercator Corporation was indicted, accused of bribing 
President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan with $78 million to help ExxonMobil win a 25% share of 
the Tengiz oilfield, the third largest in the world. In June 2001 a lawsuit against ExxonMobil was filed in the 
District of Columbia alleging that ExxonMobil knowingly assisted human rights violations, including torture, 
murder and rape, by employing and providing material support to the Indonesian military forces, who 
committed the alleged offences during civil unrest in Aceh. Yet the most dramatic example of Multinational 
corporate fraud might be the  Enron scandal of 2001, eventually which led to the bankruptcy of the Enron 
Corporation, an enormous American energy company, and the dissolution of Arthur Andersen, one of the 
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companies, the nature of corporate status, and the protection of the various 
interests involved in insolvent liquidations.8 Yet perhaps the most astonishing 
thing about groups of companies is the lack of a serious debate concerning 
their governance. The topic is absent from or briefly touched on by most 
company law textbooks and treatises on corporate governance, while 
discussion of the problems posed by groups of companies often focuses 
narrowly on insolvency issues rather than governance.9 This may be because 
economic analysis concentrates on the role played by the individual 
entrepreneur in organising production. Classical economists assumed that 
entrepreneurs headed firms which they personally owned; and they could see 
no obvious reason to modify this view when analysing the behavior of the 
modern, large scale business corporation.10   
Groups of companies are regulated by various national laws and also by the 
European Community. Equally, case law, especially in common law countries, 
has gradually sought to address certain issues arising from group relationships. 
However, there is no single legal system governing group of companies either 
nationally or internationally, so that many legal questions related to them 
remain unsolved. One such question is their liability toward subsidiaries and 
their creditors.  Although debates regarding the liability of groups of companies 
have increased in recent decades, no theory is sufficiently developed to offer a 
satisfactory solution to this problem.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
five largest accountancy partnerships in the world. In addition to being the largest bankruptcy 
reorganization in American history at that time, Enron was regarded as the biggest audit failure. 
8
 Harry Rajak, Corporate Groups and Cross-Border Bankruptcy, 44 Texas International Law Journal, 521 
at 545. 
9  Janet Dine, The Governance of Corporate Groups, Cambridge Studies in Corporate Law, (CUP, 2000), 
p. 37.  
10
 J. Scott, Corporate Groups and Network Structure in J. Mechaery, S. Picciotto and C. Docott (eds), 
Corporate Control and Accountability, Clarendon, Oxford, (1993), p.292. 
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3.  This Study 
The liability of groups of companies has been described as "one of the great 
unsolved problems of modern company law".11This may be due the lack of 
understanding of the concept of group of companies in interdisciplinary studies. 
There is a conflict between the understanding of basic features of group of 
companies in legal studies and the socio-economic realities.12  
Given that it has not yet been completely solved by common law systems, 
could one finds a solution in other legal systems such as Islamic legal systems? 
It may be asked why the researcher has selected Islamic legal systems in 
particular?  There are two reasons. First, the researcher aims to use this study 
to participate in the process of the Islamisation of laws in Muslim countries 
known as the ‘Islamic revival’.13 Secondly, it is a response to the increase of 
interest in solutions provided by Islamic law both in the Islamic world and 
outside; especially after the Islamic Banking system survived the financial 
crisis.14  
The aim of this study is to investigate the approaches taken by the Common 
law in respect of liability of groups of companies for the debts of subsidiaries 
with a view to determining whether they might also be applied in Islamic legal 
                                                           
11
 C Schmitthoff, Banco Ambrosiano and Modern Company Law, 363, quoted by Jose Engracia Antunes, 
Enterprise Forms and Enterprise Liability: Is there a Paradox in Modern Corporation Law, Paper presented 
at School of Law  of Iniversidate Autonoma de Madrid, February 27th (2004), p.198  
12
 Muzaffer Eroglu, Modern Organisation of Multinational Enterprises and Liability: Critical Analysis of 
Control Theory, 23rd December 2008, published at SRRN.com. 
13
 Since the 1970s the Muslim world has experienced an Islamic revival which has slowed and even reversed the rush 
towards uncritical westernization. Many Muslim countries have embarked upon a programme of part or complete 
Islamisation of their societies, economies and legal systems. It is obvious that most Muslims want the entire law to be 
Islamized so that they can feel its impact on their lives. There would be very few Muslims who would agree to confine 
Islamic law to personal matters of inheritance, marriage, and divorce, or to a few penalties laid down as deterrents by 
the Lawgiver, which are meant to be applied rarely. They would deem it imperative that Islamic law deal with matters 
covered by the law of torts, contract, taxation, and above all constitutional law and fundamental rights. They would like 
to see Islamic law taking into its fold the laws of business organization and commerce. 
14
 Based on this interest, a considerable number of studies have appeared on Islamic law and jurisprudence. These 
studies have mostly been addressed to understanding substantive Islamic laws – the family law, penal law, civil law, 
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system. I am not aiming to provide a comprehensive solution to the issue, but 
rather look to use the study to galvanise Muslim Scholars and Institutions of 
Islamic Studies to start seriously studying the possibility of initiating a 
comprehensive regime regulating groups of companies. Such a scheme would 
preserve the economic benefits of corporate groups, while mitigating the 
negative impact of misusing the device to the disadvantage of creditors.    
Such a comparative study will not be an easy task because:   
a. There is a great natural difference between Islamic law and common law 
systems. Whereas common law is largely secular, Islamic law is firmly 
based on religion. The sources of Islamic law not only represent the 
foundations of the law, but embody the religion of Islam as well. A 
separation between law and religion is therefore impossible in Islam. The 
religious basis and nature of Islamic law contrasts sharply with the ideals 
of secularism, both in the political and in the legal sphere, that have 
formed the basis of the English legal system in the modern age. There 
can be no doubt that many principles of English law are informed by 
Christian ethics and values, but unlike Islamic law, these origins remain 
unacknowledged. In contrast, Islamic law cannot be understood, and 
cannot be studied, without an appreciation of the religious nature of its 
sources. The study of Islamic law is therefore as much a study of religion 
as it is of law.  
b. The primary sources of English law (i.e. reported case law and 
legislation) are normally supported by a wide range of secondary 
sources, including textbooks on individual subjects, collections of cases 
and materials and academic writing. The primary sources of Islamic law, 
however, namely the Qur’an and the Sunnah, cannot be compared to 
case law or legislation, and it is therefore necessary to go beyond these 
primary sources and to consult other sources in order to understand how 
                                                                                                                                                                          
etc., of Islam. Compared to these, works dealing with Islamic law of corporation are scarce and this study will help and 
might encourage the scholars to respond to the need of more studies in the field of Islamic law of corporations. 
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Islamic law emerged as a complete legal system from these religious 
origins.  
c. The basic principles of Islamic law are not contained in case law but 
were developed by Muslim jurists. For the same reason legislation has 
no role to play in the emergence of these basic principles, and one will 
find that in many modern legal systems Islamic law has not been 
codified. 
d. The study of English law is concerned with law applied by the courts. In 
contrast, the study of Islamic law is not based on the legal systems of 
individual countries but on basic principles of law developed by different 
schools of jurists over a long period of time. Some of these principles do 
form the basis of law in contemporary legal systems. 
e. The common law has developed continuously, creating new concepts to 
allow it to respond to the social and economic issues created by groups 
of companies, while Islamic law was unable to develop for a 
considerable period, for many specific reasons which will be elaborated 
later in this study.  
Some justification should be given for adopting a comparative approach. There 
are two reasons. First, In order to judge a legal system on its merits one has to 
look at the solutions provided by other legal systems. Secondly, and more 
specifically, a comparative study enables the researcher to assess the 
possibilities of harmonization of the rules concerning the subject matter of the 
study.  
4. Plan of the Study 
The Study is dived into 4 Chapters. The First Chapter   will seek to explain the 
phenomenon of group of companies in Common law System by explaining: the 
key legal definitions of the concept; the reasons why corporations form groups 
of companies; the role of groups of companies in the economy; and the 
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relationship between a parent and a subsidiary. Thereafter I will review the risks 
and problems of groups of companies, ending by explaining the problems they 
create for corporate governance. I will proceed to explain how common law 
countries regulate groups of companies, in particular whether a group is treated 
as an unitary economic enterprise, so that the parent company is automatically 
liable for the debts of the companies within the group, or whether each 
company in the group is a separate legal entity with its own rights and liabilities 
even when controlled or wholly owned by another company and collectively 
engaged in the business of the group..       
The Second Chapter addresses groups of companies in Islamic law.  Because 
of the unique nature of Islamic law I must first explain some of its broad 
aspects, such as Islamic commercial law, Islamic law of business enterprises, 
and Islamic understanding of the concepts of corporate personality, limited 
liability, credit and liability. Without this explanation, it would be difficult to 
understand the relevant background. Therefore, I have divided the Second 
Chapter into two parts. The First part provides a brief explanation of the 
aspects, nature, sources and origins of Islamic Law. This is essential to 
understand Islamic Law’s sophisticated methods of interpretation and law 
finding, and how it devises concrete rules capable of solving legal problems. 
Part one will also explain briefly how ‘Islamic jurisprudence’ emerged and how it 
currently works. Part II will deal with the main principles of Islamic commercial 
law to explain which principles will apply to Islamic corporate law. It will explain 
the meaning of corporations in Islamic law, describing the various types and 
considering the possibility of establishing modern forms of corporation in 
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Islamic law including groups of companies. Part II will end with a suggestion for 
the creation of a new model of Islamic corporation.  
The Third Chapter is the heart of the study and divided into two parts. Part I 
aims to investigate how Common law systems allocate the liability of groups of 
Company and the sort of protections given to the creditors dealing with a 
subsidiary. Part II will investigate whether such protections can also be 
accommodated under the principles of Islamic law. It will thus begin with an 
examination of the rationale of debts as developed from the basic principles of 
Islamic Law, then seek to determine whether Islamic law acknowledges the 
concept of limited liability, and whether it offers the possibility of a practical 
solution for the problem of the liability of groups of companies for the debts of 
subsidiaries different from that provided by the Common law. 
In the last Chapter four, I will summarise my findings regarding the Common 
law position, and based on these findings will provide my recommendations as 
to how to allocate liability within corporate groups in Islamic law in a way which 
matches Islamic law unique character. 
I should add that I faced two main obstacles when conducting this study. The 
first is the lack of Islamic legal resources in English, necessitating reliance on 
Arabic resources which are difficult to translate into legal English. Secondly, 
legal opinion in Islamic law is not unified, as there are four main Islamic legal 
schools, who interpret the law differently, sometimes providing different 
solutions. As a general rule, I cannot review such differences in detail, as that 
would make this work over-voluminous and cumbersome. Therefore, I shall 
explain any differences in a very limited way in order to focus on the main 
subject of the study.  
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Chapter One 
The Phenomenon of Groups of 
Companies in Common Law 
 Page 22 of 292 
 
A company is one of the many forms of business organizations. However, it has 
become the most important form due to the large-scale of activities that it 
allows. The company represents a major economic, social, political, and even 
cultural institution. However, it may incur huge losses or even totally collapse, 
bringing down with it the hopes of those who invested their wealth in it, those 
who extended it credit, those who worked for it, and perhaps even of those who 
bought its products and services.  
A company constitutes a legally independent entity, with its own rights and 
duties, its own assets and liabilities. It enjoys its own legal personality, akin to 
that of a human being. The attribution of legal personality to companies leads in 
turn to a clear cut separation between the legal sphere of their owners or 
investors (shareholders) and the legal sphere of the company itself. This 
separation, inter alia, entailed that only the company would be made 
accountable for consequences stemming from its activities. 
A revolutionary rule dealing specifically with the allocation of enterprise risks 
has been consecrated in order to encourage the widespread investment and 
capital accumulation required for the growth of enterprises (i.e. the rule of 
limited liability of the shareholders for their corporate debts). According to this 
rule, the responsibility of corporate investors is limited to the amount of their 
capital investment. This classical statutory model of company, and its attached 
liability regime, has operated satisfactorily as long as the business enterprise 
has indeed been organised and conducted through a single independent 
company. However, companies have increasingly chosen to organise and 
conduct their business operations in the form of a cluster of various separate 
corporations (group of companies) rather than as a single corporate entity.  
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That one company might be a shareholder in another company was well 
understood by the nineteenth century, but was initially viewed with some 
suspicion. In the United States, it was not until New Jersey enacted its first 
general incorporation statutes in 1888-1893 that corporations were permitted to 
own shares in other corporations.15 Since then the company has entered a new 
evolutionary age of its structural organisation. The earlier model of the 
individual company has been superseded by the more complex model of the 
group of companies, which represents the dominant form of company 
organisation in the largest world-wide markets. 16 
To understand the character of this complex form of corporation, it will be 
necessary to appreciate some basic economic and legal facts concerning 
groups of companies: why businessmen elect to conduct their business in this 
form; what its commercial and economic role might be; what sort of control a 
parent exercises over a subsidiary; how groups of companies emerge and why 
parent companies are keen to grant limited liability to its subsidiaries; and 
finally, what would be the proper model of corporate governance for this 
business form. 
1. Reasons for Corporate Groups 
The reasons why a company expands its business must be distinguished from 
the reasons why it establishes one or more subsidiaries – although the two 
may, in some circumstances, be related. There are several reasons for 
company expansion - the possibility of economies of scale in production or 
distribution, or a reduction in transaction costs. Expansion might also result 
from the need to obtain access to new markets or suppliers, or to eliminate 
competition. It may even occur so that managers can increase their personal 
status and power. 17  
                                                           
15
 Harry Rajak, op. cit. p. 522 
16 Jose Antunes, op.cit. p.10. 
17  Ian Ramsay and Geoff Stapleton, Corporate Groups in Australia, Research Report provided to Centre 
for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, the University of Melbourne, (1998) p.14 
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On another hand, a company may establish one or more subsidiaries, so that 
its business is conducted through a corporate group rather than through a 
single company, in order to benefits from the following economic realities:18 
a. Reducing commercial risk, or maximising potential financial return, by 
diversifying an enterprise’s activities into various types of businesses, 
each operated by a separate company.  
b. Attracting capital without forfeiting overall control. A parent may want 
outside investment in only part of its overall business. This can be 
achieved by incorporating that part of the business as a separate 
subsidiary and allowing outside investors to acquire a minority 
shareholding.  
c. A company may want to acquire a business in partnership with 
another party. A convenient way of structuring the acquisition is for 
the respective interests in new business to be represented by shares. 
d. Preserving intangible commercial property of existing companies by 
acquiring the companies themselves to expand an enterprise or 
increase market power.  
e. From an accounting perspective, establishing a subsidiary makes 
sense because in most jurisdictions there are considerable tax 
advantages. The main tax benefit is the ability to offset profits and 
losses of one part of a business against another in tax returns. Some 
states allow subsidiaries to file tax returns only on the profits 
generated within the state's borders as opposed to those generated 
                                                           
18
 D.D. Prentice, A Survey of the Law Relating to Corporate Groups in the United Kingdom, in Eddy 
Wymeersch (ed) Groups of Companies in the EEC, a Survey Report to the European Commission on 
the Law Relating to Corporate Groups in Various Member States, (de Gruyter, 1992), p. 281. 
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by operations in other locations. The same is true for many 
companies that set up shop internationally. Typically, the profits and 
losses of those subsidiaries will be taxed in the county where the 
subsidiary is incorporated and might not be subject to income tax 
where the parent is incorporated. Also, it is frequently preferable, for 
taxation reasons, to acquire companies as a going concern, rather 
than merely their assets.19 
f. A corporate group may wish to continue operating an acquired 
company as a separate entity so as to utilise its corporate name, 
goodwill and public image.  
g. The establishment of subsidiary may allow greater flexibility in debt 
financing,20 For instance, a lender may require that the borrower shift 
specific assets into a separate company incorporated for that 
purpose, thereby ensuring that the lender has a first charge over the 
whole or most of the new company’s property.21 Likewise, a separate 
group company may be formed to undertake a particular project and 
obtain additional finance by means of substantial charges over its 
own assets and undertaking.22 
Eisenberg23 observes that it is very difficult to find economic reasons for the 
formation of wholly owned subsidiary, since any economic goal that can be 
achieved by the creation of a wholly owned subsidiary could equally well be 
                                                           
19H Ford, R Austin & I Ramsay, Ford’s Principles of Corporation Law, Butterworths, 6th Ed., (1992), at 
23,020.  
20 
 D Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, (1991), Columbia Law Review, p. 1614. 
21 P Crutchfield, Corporate Voluntary Administration Law, 2nd ed, Law Book Company Limited,(1997),p. 27. 
22 K Lightman, Voluntary Administration: The New Wave or the New Waif in Insolvency Law, (1994) 2 
Insolvency Law Journal 59 at 84.  
23 M Eisenberg, Corporate Groups in M Gillooly,The Law Relating to Corporate Groups, Federation Press, 
(1993), p.3. 
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achieved by the formation of a division within a single corporate entity. 
Consequently, he argues that the reasons for formation tend to be 
organisational or historical. Organisational reasons may include the fact that 
where a company wishes to concede managerial autonomy to a particular 
business, running it through a subsidiary may be a useful way to emphasise its 
separation and autonomy. Secondly, in the case of a multinational group, the 
law of a country in which the group wishes to do business may demand that 
local business be conducted by a separate subsidiary. Thirdly in some cases, 
there may be a tax advantage to derive from operating through a separate 
subsidiary; while in others it may be possible to limit the influence of regulators 
(e.g. in areas like such as banking or insurance) by vesting that business in a 
subsidiary and leaving the holding company outside the regulatory umbrella. 
The legal motivation includes confining high liability risks, including 
environmental and consumer liability, to particular companies in a group, with a 
view to isolating the remaining group assets from this potential liability. 
2. How Do Groups come about?  
A group will obviously exist where there is a relation of parent and subsidiary 
between two or more companies. Under s.1159 of the Companies Act 2006 a 
parent/ subsidiary relation will be taken to exist if a company:  
a. holds a majority of the voting rights in another,  
b. is a member of the other and has a right to appoint or remove a 
majority of the board of the other, or  
c. is a member of it and controls alone or with the agreement of 
others  the majority of the voting rights in the company.  
Where a company acquires control of another company by share acquisition, 
the relationship of parent and subsidiary will be created between the acquiring 
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company and the target company. If the entire share capital of the target 
changes hands, it becomes a wholly owned subsidiary of the acquiring 
company. Where the target company itself has subsidiaries, the acquisition 
brings into existence a group with three levels (and so on). A group which 
expands by making acquisitions rather than by achieving 'organic' growth of its 
core business may end up with an array of diverse activities under its wing.  
The promoters of a business venture may decide from the start to incorporate a 
parent company and several subsidiaries to carry on different aspects of the 
enterprise. In addition, a company may decide to transfer certain sectors of its 
business to subsidiaries specifically formed for this purpose. Similarly, where a 
number of different businesses are being run under the umbrella of a single 
company, these may be separated out and hived down to subsidiaries.24 At the 
furthest extreme, a holding company may acquire shares solely as investment 
and may not intend to integrate the subsidiary into the group at all, instead may 
leave it as a separate economic entity, exercising little control over its policy.25 
3. The Structure of Corporate Groups  
A Corporate group may have many subsidiaries spread round the world, each 
operating under the law of its country of incorporation, but in practical terms 
they operate in accordance with the economic and managerial policies of the 
group. Therefore, there is a compound structure under which, in law, 
companies are independent, while in economic reality they are entirely 
interrelated. From an economic perspective, two or more companies can be 
associated through corporate mechanisms in several ways. The simplest model 
is where company A owns shares in company B. This model is described 
sometimes as a vertical association between corporations. This association 
                                                           
24 Denis Heshon, International Mergers and Acquisitions, the College of Law of England and Wales, Issue 
6 – 2006 p. 211. 
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 A Hicks & S Goo, Cases and Materials on Company law, 6th ed, (2008) Oxford University Press, p 492. 
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might be extended where, for example, B owns shares in C and so on. A 
horizontal association may exist where corporations A and B each own shares 
in the other. This too might be extended where A and/or B own shares in C, 
which in turn owns shares in A and/or B. In addition to share ownership, an 
association of companies might be established through the mechanism of 
corporate director appointment. Corporation A might be given powers by the 
constitution of corporation B to appoint one or more directors to the board of B 
and vice versa. Also, groups may be formed as, or develop into, 
“conglomerates”, whereby group of companies conduct a diverse range of 
businesses in unrelated fields. Associations of companies may also be 
established by non-corporate mechanisms. The most obvious is by contract 
when company A and B have the same or largely the same shareholders and 
directors; they are likely to create a close association.26 
Some corporate groups may have a primarily hierarchical structure, with 
succeeding layers of parent and controlled companies. Other groups may 
maintain a more lateral structure, with many sibling group companies, often with 
a high level of cross-ownership between them. Of importance in examining the 
structure of groups, is the level within the group at which a subsidiary operates, 
that is, the distance at which sub-subsidiaries are removed from the ultimate 
holding company. This becomes an issue of some importance if the question 
arises as to the liability of a parent company for the obligations of its subsidiary. 
Some company in the chain of companies has to be identified as the parent and 
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it could be the ultimate holding company, or be an intermediate holding 
company.27 
The degree of financial and decision-making autonomy within groups of 
companies can vary considerably. Some companies may be active trading 
entities, with primary responsibility for their own business goals, activities and 
finances. For instance, conglomerate groups may operate under a highly 
decentralised structure, given their involvement in a range of industries. In other 
groups, strategic and budgetary decisions may be centralised. With this 
structure, each company effectively operates as a division of a larger business, 
exercising little independent discretion within this cohesive economic unit. A 
parent company may exercise close control by allocating equity and loan capital 
to its subsidiaries through a central group treasury mechanism, prescribing their 
operational and financial policies, setting their performance targets, choosing 
their directors and other key personnel, and continuously monitoring their 
performance and staffing.28 
The “power centre” of some corporate groups may be the ultimate holding 
company. More commonly, companies in the next step down of the group chain 
may effectively direct a group’s operation, with the ultimate holding company 
owning the key shares, but not having any direct productive or managerial role. 
The degree of economic and organisational integration of different corporate 
groups can be compared according to various organisational, market and public 
image criteria. 
                                                           
27
  Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (1982) Cmnd 8558, p.2. Also known 
as the Cork Committee Report, this was an investigation and set of recommendations on the 
modernisation and reform of UK insolvency law. It was followed by a White Paper A Revised Framework 
for Insolvency Law (1984) Cmnd 9175, which led to the Insolvency Act 1986. 
28 See Corporate Groups Report, Final Report, May 2000, p.2. This is a systematic and comprehensive 
review of the application of Australian corporate law to corporate groups. 
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4. Management of Corporate Groups 
A group of companies may often be managed under a unified management 
policy as a single economic entity. As groups get larger, the directors of 
individual companies may be different, and the unity of management may 
become looser. The organizational structure of corporate groups depends on 
the size of the group as a whole and the geographical location and variety of its 
businesses. Business specialization implies, where the group conducts more 
than one business, that there is a degree of decentralization of management. 
However, the synergies produced by combination are unlikely to be optimized 
unless management is centralized.  An analogy has been drawn between the 
central management team and the external controlling shareholder of traditional 
legal theory, which intervenes to replace directors and officers who are not 
meeting the shareholders’ targets for growth and profitability.29 
The organizational structure for financial management of the corporate group is 
typically more complicated than the business management structure. Banking 
and corporate finance functions are likely to be centralized through the parent 
company’s treasury operations. Budgets and budget projections will probably 
be set on a business divisional basis. Financial reporting must take into account 
the separate corporate entities through which the business is conducted, in 
order to satisfy statutory reporting and income tax requirements. This means 
that some important decisions, including the funding of divisional businesses 
and transfer pricing within the group, are executed at a corporate entity level 
even if arranged at the central management or divisional level. The need to 
satisfy corporate entity requirements as well as business divisional 
requirements in financial management of the corporate group creates a special 
level of complexity and, if the group is not properly managed, can produce a 
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 Robert P Austin, Corporate Groups, in Corporate Personality in the 20th Century, Hart Publishing, 
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chaotic picture of intermingling of the assets of separate entities and insufficient 
financial trails. 30 
5. Risks Related to Corporate Groups 
Hadden31 identifies some techniques which may be used to avoid possible 
hazards facing groups of companies. 
a. The techniques of group control, notably those involving interlocking 
shareholdings and directorships, may be used to entrench the positions 
of incumbent managers against any possible threat from external 
shareholders. 
b. The techniques of integrated financing, notably the freedom to pass 
assets and liabilities from company to company within the group, and the 
creation of complex group structures may be used to conceal the true 
financial position of individual companies or of the group as a whole from 
shareholders or creditors. Both techniques may be used to ensure that 
the interests of shareholders and directors of the group are preferred to 
those of minority shareholders in subsidiaries and to conceal that this 
has been done. The technique of integrated financing may be used to 
avoid taxation by ensuring that maximum profit is generated in forms or 
in jurisdictions which attract low levels of tax.  
c. The creation of separate companies for particular operations, 
supplemented by the techniques of integrated financing, may be used to 
avoid liability to external creditors by relying on the limited liability of each 
constituent company within the group. 
d. More or less complex group structures may be used to avoid the impact 
of regulatory measures on a wide range of matters, such as monopolies 
and mergers legislation, health and safety provisions, employee 
participation and planning requirements. 
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31 T Hadden, The Regulation of Corporate Groups in Australia, (1992) 15 University of New South Wales 
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In additions to these problems, it is widely recognised that corporate groups 
may present specific risks for minority shareholders and creditors at various 
levels.32 In this regard, one must distinguish between vertical and horizontal 
groups. In vertical groups there is an important distinction between wholly 
owned and partly owned groups. In the latter case, the existence of the minority 
shareholding interests creates important issues of shareholder protection, 
whereas in the case of the wholly owned group the focus tends to be on 
creditor protection.33 
5.1 Minority Shareholder Risks 
The form of groups of companies exposes minority shareholders of subsidiaries 
to certain risks, e.g.34  
a. A parent company may operate the affairs of its subsidiary to maximize 
the overall welfare of the group to the prejudice of minority shareholders 
in a particular subsidiary. For example, a subsidiary might be forced to 
sell goods to another group member at less than the fair market price. 
Alternatively, and more subtly, the parent in allocating economic 
opportunities may prefer a wholly owned subsidiary at the expense of 
one that is partly owned. 
b. The group’s interest could override the interests of the subsidiary, and 
this in turn could amount to the majority shareholders’ abuse of the 
minority shareholders’ interests in the subsidiary.  
                                                           
32
 Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulation Framework for 
Company Law in Europe, 4th November 2002, p.94. 
33
 Robert P Austin, op.cit. p. 73. 
34 
 Vassya Prokopieva, Parent Company Liability in Case of Subsidiary Insolvency, Thesis presented for 
the Degree of Master of European Studies, College of Europe, Law Department, Academic Year (2003-
2001)  pp.10-11. 
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c. Transactions between companies in the group can be, and often are, 
conducted on a basis which is not arms length. Assets may be 
transferred between group companies at lower than market value. Loans 
may be made without interest or at less than market rates. One company 
may guarantee another’s obligations for no charge and without reference 
to the interests of the guaranteeing company. Dividends may be paid 
from a subsidiary to the parent without regard to the cash requirements 
of the subsidiary.35  
d. A subsidiary’s assets may be used to cure the financial difficulties of the 
parent corporation.  
e. There may be spillover effects in the event of the insolvency of a parent 
or sister company.  
f. There may be jurisdictional and substantive law problems in case of 
cross-border group insolvency.  
On the other hand, in certain jurisdictions minority shareholders of a subsidiary 
can complain that the conduct of the holding company has been unfairly 
prejudicial to their interests and hence they may petition the court for a 
remedy.36 
5.2 Creditors’ Risks  
One attraction of corporate groups is that the combination of legal personality 
and limited liability enables the controller to separate out an area of activity or 
particular assets, and to control a subsidiary’s legal relationship with the wider 
organisation. There may be an effective shifting of risk from the controllers and 
owners to the creditors of a subsidiary as a result of its separate legal 
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 Cork Committee Report, para.1926. 
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personality.37 The control of shares by another company also brings 
subsidiaries under common management. Here problems may arise, as unlike 
individual majority shareholders, the common management may have a reason 
to direct the subsidiary to act contrary to its own interest, and may even put its 
existence in danger. Therefore, being controlled and managed by a company 
shareholder and especially being open to be interference from other companies 
under a group structure could put the subsidiary’s creditors at risk.38  
Creditors when dealing with corporate groups face three risks. First, such a 
structure might reduce transparency by blurring the lines between the assets of 
group members, commingling assets, and suggesting, often falsely, that the 
entire group or at least the controlling parent company stands behind each 
member’s debt. Secondly, the holding company might assign risky activities to 
a particular company in the group, while not providing it with an adequate equity 
cushion to pay off any potential liabilities, choosing instead to capitalise it with 
loans. Third, the holding company might assign and reassign value within the 
group.39  
Additional risks may arise when a company in a group goes into liquidation. 
There will be a delay while the liquidator sorts out the assets which are 
available for distribution to that company’s creditors. In all probability, several, 
and possibly all, companies  in the group will be in liquidation, and a substantial 
part of the assets which would otherwise have been available to the group’s 
creditors will need to be expended in ascertaining the facts and the applicable 
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law which determines which group creditors may obtain a distribution and which 
may not. The level of complexity which a corporate group’s affairs can present 
for the liquidator, necessarily unfamiliar with the group’s operations before the 
commencement of the winding-up, can hardly be overstated.40 
The risks for creditors may increase where an individual (or a small group of 
individuals) control two or more companies. The cases indicate that there is a 
high level of abuse of the corporate form in this type of situation (normally 
involving private companies), with a common controller misusing the assets of 
one company he controls to benefit another company which he also controls.41  
Finally, it is important to mention that creditors may be at risk if they cannot 
differentiate between companies in the group. However, it is not always 
practical to do so. For example, in Qintex Australia Finance Ltd v. Schroders 
Australia Ltd 42, one of the witnesses who dealt with Qintex stated: 
‘It was not my practice to ask which of the Qintex companies was 
responsible for the deal. I always treated the client as Qintex and did 
not differentiate between companies in the group’. 
The court commented, 
Regularly, liquidators of subsidiaries, or of the holding company, 
come to court to argue as to which of their charges bears the liability. 
As well, creditors of failed companies encounter difficulty when they 
have to select from among the moving targets of the company with 
which they consider they concluded the contract. The result has 
been unproductive expenditure on legal costs, a reduction in the 
amount available to creditors a windfall for some, and an unfair loss 
to others. Fairness or equity seems to have little role to play.43 
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6. The Terminology of Corporate Groups 
The expressions ‘group’, ‘corporate group’ and ‘ group of companies’ are 
commercial and economic expressions adopted through common usage to 
describe ‘a collection of companies associated with each other usually through 
a common ownership or control’.44 It can also be defined as ‘a union of 
companies, which operate under an aim to ensure the profitability of the 
association as a whole’.45 
Eisenberg46 defines a corporate group as ‘two or more corporations that are 
affiliated in a manner that depends in significant part on stock ownership’. At its 
simplest, a corporate group is ‘the operation of two or more companies as a 
single economic unit, despite each having its own legal personality and limited 
liability’.47  
Some scholars48 prefer to use the term ‘enterprise group’ as a wider term 
encompassing incorporated and unincorporated organizations. This term enjoys 
some legal recognition. For example, it been used in the European Union by 
the Ninth Draft Company Law Harmonization Directive (the so-called “Groups of 
Companies Directive”). It was also used by a working group of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law which is trying to achieve 
harmony among member states in handling the problems that arise when one, 
some, or all of the members of an enterprise group suffers bankruptcy. Finally, 
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UNCITRAL itself used the term ‘enterprise group’, defining it as “two or more 
enterprises that are interconnected by ownership or control”.49 
Other commercial terms are used to reflect a relation between two companies. 
For example, ”Associated companies” means companies in which one 
company holds an equity interest in another of at least 10% but less than 50% 
of the other company’s shares.50 The terms “cross-holding” and “circular-
holding” are also used to explain the connection between companies.51 A 
‘cross-holding’ occurs where, for example, three companies ‘with a common 
board of directors or with boards which agree to act in concert’ each have a 
holding of 36% of the votes of each of the other companies. This assures de 
iure control of each company.  Thus, the ‘cross-holding’ enables the companies 
to be operated as a group as long as there is agreement between the directors 
of the three companies. Circular-holdings produce roughly the same effect, 
although in this situation, there is no de iure control. A ‘circular-holding’ occurs 
where company A holds 40 per cent of the ordinary voting shares of company 
B, which holds 40 per cent of the ordinary voting shares of company C, which in 
turn holds 40 per cent of the ordinary voting shares of the company A. The 
effect of this is that, although there is not de iure control of the various 
companies, provided the directors of each company act in unison by which they 
can effectively control the various companies in which the circular holdings are 
held. 
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In addition to definitions provided by jurists, and although there is no single set 
of definitions in national laws,52 a number of laws offer definitions of groups of 
companies and parents/subsidiaries. Not only do all States apply different 
definitions, but within a State one frequently finds several different definitions, 
which adapt the ambit of the rule to the specific needs of the area in question. 
Examples are set out below.  
In this study, the terms “company groups” and “group of companies” are used 
interchangeably. 
6.1 The United Kingdom 
The Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) provides definitions of groups of 
companies for very specific purposes such as a company’s obligations relating 
to accounts. Particular words or expressions sometimes have a single meaning 
within the Act as a whole, but may have that meaning only within a specific part 
of Act. For example, the term ‘quoted company’ has no fewer than three 
separate definitions for the purposes of different parts of the Act.53 
The terms ‘holding company’, ‘subsidiary’ and ‘wholly-owned subsidiary’ are 
defined by s.1159, together with a further two pages of verbiage in Schedule 6 
to the Act. According to this section a company is a “subsidiary” of another 
company, its “holding company”, if that other company:54 
a. holds a majority of the voting rights in it, or 
b. is a member of it and has the right to appoint or remove a majority of its 
board of directors, or 
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c. is a member of it and controls alone, pursuant to an agreement with 
other members, a majority of the voting rights in it, or if it is a subsidiary 
of a company that is itself a subsidiary of that other company. 
A company is a “wholly-owned subsidiary” of another company if it has no 
members except that other and that other’s wholly-owned subsidiaries or 
persons acting on behalf of that other or its wholly-owned subsidiaries.  
Under s.1160, the Secretary of State may amend the provisions of s.1159  and 
Schedule 6  so as to alter the meaning of the expressions “subsidiary”, “holding 
company” or “wholly-owned subsidiary”. 
For the purpose of Part 15 (Accounts and Reports), ‘group’ means ‘a parent 
undertaking and its subsidiary undertaking’, while s. 1162  contains an 
elaborate definition of what constitutes a parent /subsidiary undertaking 
relationship, and s.1173 (1) defines a parent company as ‘a company that is a 
parent undertaking’. 
The Act defines a parent or a holding company in relation to a subsidiary 
undertaking by using the concepts of formal voting control. For accounting 
purposes it adopts the concept of effective control (as set out in the Seventh 
Company Law Directive) by indicating that a company is the parent of another if 
it:  
a. has the right to exercise dominant influence over the subsidiary by virtue 
of its memorandum or articles or by virtue of a control contract (legal 
control); or if it  
b. has a participating interest in the undertaking and actually exercises a 
dominant influence over it, or it and the other company are managed on 
a unified basis (factual control).  
For non-accounting purposes, such as where subsidiaries are barred from 
holding shares in their parents or from giving their parents financial assistance, 
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a corporate group is defined more narrowly in terms of formal control. It is 
therefore identical to the first part of the test used for the accounting definition. 
However, the definition does not encompass natural persons who hold shares 
in several companies even if they may control those companies. Prentice, 
considers the CA 2006 definition of what constitutes a “group” for the purpose 
of consolidated accounts to be the first time that the English legislature has 
tried to define the phenomenon in terms of substance, or economic reality 
rather than legal form. He believes that there is no good reason, should the 
need arise, why the definition  cannot be extended to other areas of the law.55 
 6.2 Australia 
Under s. 46 of the Corporations Act a company A is a holding company of 
company B (and company B is a subsidiary of company A) if company A: 
a. controls the composition of the board of company B (including by 
exercise of any power to appoint or remove all, or a majority of, the 
directors of company B)  
b. is in a position to cast, or control the casting of, more than 50% of the 
total voting shares of company B,  
c. holds more than half of the issued share capital of company B, or  
d.  is the holding company of any holding company of company B (this also 
applies where there are any number of intermediate holding and 
subsidiary companies between company A and company B).  
Section 47 deems the composition of A’s board to be controlled by B if B can 
appoint of, remove all, or the majority, of A’s directors. Section 50 defines 
related companies and this is generally regarded as the legal definition of 
groups of companies.  
It provides that two companies are related if: 
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a. one is the holding company of the other; or 
b. each is a subsidiary of the same holding company 
Section 9 defines the term "holding company" in this way: in relation to a 
particular company A, a holding company is another company of which A is a 
subsidiary. This definition relies on the definition of subsidiary in ss.46 and 47.56 
Mason J has stated that the word ‘group’ is generally applied to a number of 
companies which are associated by common or interlocking shareholdings, 
allied to unified control or capacity to control.57 Murray J  has commented that 
close and common management links, as well as an interlocking web of 
complex mutual shareholdings are features sufficient in de facto terms to 
constitute the various companies in question within the group as being properly 
described as such, being responsive to the needs and interests of each other 
as corporate entities through their management.58  
6.3 New Zealand 
New Zealand legislation defines companies as related where “the businesses of 
the companies have been so carried on that the separate business of each 
company, or a substantial part of it, is not readily identifiable”.59 
6.4 European Law  
The European Company Statute recognizes but unfortunately does not define 
groups of companies. It provides that the national law of the state in which the 
European Company is registered will be the applicable law for this purpose.60 
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With respect to applicable law, the statute points to the national law of the state 
in which the European company (“SE”) is registered. 61 
7. Parent /subsidiary tests 
From the group of companies’ definitions mentioned above it is clear that 
control is the underlining feature of a parent/subsidiary couple,62 as in most of 
the legislation a parent company exercises control over its subsidiary.63 In 
determining the existence of a control in the case of parent/subsidiary 
relationship, accounting standards and company law apply the following tests.  
7.1 The Accounting Standard Test 
According to standard 27 of the International Accounting Standard (IAS),  
“Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements" control is presumed to exist 
when the parent owns, directly or indirectly through subsidiaries, more than half 
of the voting power of an entity unless, in exceptional circumstances, it can be 
clearly demonstrated that such ownership does not constitute control. Control 
also exists when the parent owns 50% or less of the voting power of an entity 
when there is:  
a. power over more than half of the voting rights by virtue of an agreement 
with other investors; 
b. power to govern the financial and operating policies of the entity under a 
statute or an agreement; 
c. power to appoint or remove the majority of the members of the board of 
directors or equivalent governing body and control of the entity is by that 
board or body; or 
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d. power to cast the majority of votes at meetings of the board of directors 
or equivalent governing body and control of the entity is by that board or 
body. 
In the United Kingdom, the group accounts of certain parent companies are 
required to be prepared in accordance with International Accounting Standards 
(IAS) while the group accounts of other companies may be prepared in 
accordance with s.404 of the Companies Act 2006, or in accordance with 
international accounting standards “IAS group accounts” (S. 4.3). After the first 
financial year in which the directors of a parent company prepare IAS group 
accounts ‘the first IAS year’, all subsequent group accounts of the company 
must be prepared in accordance with international accounting standards unless 
there is a relevant change of circumstance. A parent company must prepare 
group accounts on a consolidated basis with respect to its activities as a ‘parent 
undertaking’ with respect to its subsidiary undertaking.  An undertaking can be 
either a body corporate, partnership, or an unincorporated association. The 
accounts must give a true and fair view of the state of affairs as at the end of 
the financial year, and the profit or loss for the financial year, of the 
undertakings  included in the consolidation as a whole, so far as concerns 
members of the company. 
In Australia the Approved Accountant Standard AASB 1024 defines control as 
"the capacity of an entity to dominate decision-making, directly or indirectly, in 
relation to the financial and operating policies of another entity to enable that 
other entity to operate with it in pursuing the objectives of the controlled entity".  
Capacity is defined as “ability or power, whether direct or indirect, and includes 
ability or power that is presently exercisable as a result of, by means of, in 
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breach of, or by revocation of, any of or any combination of the following: (a) 
trusts; (b) relevant agreements; and (c) practices; whether or not enforceable”. 
7.2 Company Law Tests 
A comparable control test is set out in number of company laws, for example 
the Australian Corporation Act states that:64 
a. For the purposes of this Law, an entity controls a second entity if the first 
entity has the capacity to determine the outcome of decisions about the 
second entity’s financial and operating policies.  
b.  In determining whether the first entity has this capacity:  
i. the practical influence the first entity can exert (rather than the 
rights it can enforce) is the issue to be considered; and  
ii. any practice or pattern of behaviour affecting the second entity’s 
financial or operating policies is to be taken into account (even if it 
involves a breach of an agreement or a breach of trust). 
Under US law, the tests focus on the capacity of one company to determine, or 
in some cases influence, the decision-making of another company, and 
therefore achieve a coordinated central direction for the activities of the 
corporate group. For instance, the US Securities Code defines control, inter 
alia, as “… the power, directly or indirectly, to exercise a controlling influence 
over the management and policies of a company … (either alone or pursuant to 
an arrangement or understanding with one or more other persons), whether 
through the ownership of voting securities, through one or more intermediary 
persons, by contract, or otherwise”.65  
There can be difficulties in applying the parent/subsidiary and related company 
tests to corporate groups. For instance, whether one company controls the 
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board of directors of another company turns on a legal, rather than de facto, 
power. Also, the potential liability of an ultimate controlling company for the 
insolvent trading of a group company far removed down the corporate chain 
may turn on whether all intermediate group companies satisfy the 
holding/subsidiary company definition. Therefore, the accounting and 
Corporations Law control tests may better identify de facto control than the 
parent/subsidiary company test. For instance, there is no requirement that 
control depend on shareholding or control of the composition of the board of 
directors. The control tests could be applied to corporate group structures 
employing a series of interlocking shareholdings, each less than the holding/ 
subsidiary company threshold, or vertical corporate groups that do not have 
holding/ subsidiary company continuity. 66 
8. How Do Jurisdictions govern Corporate Groups? 
While groups of companies are mainly governed by company law, other 
branches of law, e.g. labour law, tax law, anti-trust law, market regulation, 
bankruptcy law regulating groups of companies. Jurisdictions tend to adopt one 
of two broad approaches, either relying on traditional company law (including 
insolvency law) or developing a specialized body of law.67 This is considered in 
detail below. 
8.1 UK Law 
There has not been a strong demand in the United Kingdom for the introduction 
of law that would deal in a comprehensive way with the issues and problems 
arising from group activity. This may be attributable to legal culture. UK statutes 
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are extremely pragmatic. Instead of laying down board principles to deal with all 
contingencies, issues are dealt with on an individual and an ad hoc basis.  It 
has been observed, rightly it is submitted, that most UK legislation is drafted in 
the form of specific rules, individual solutions to particular problems.68 This 
emphasis on the particular and specific in the drafting of legislation is motivated 
by a desire to obtain a high degree of certainty as regards the scope of 
legislation. It will also be seen that many of the problems associated with the 
group form are not unique to the group form of trading but arise from the use of 
the limited liability company to carry out trading. Accordingly, these problems 
have been dealt with by principles, which apply to all aspects of company law 
and this has accordingly reduced the need for a special law to deal with 
groups.69 
Although UK law does not possess a specific law of corporate groups, that 
phenomenon undoubtedly exists in the UK. The carrying on of business through 
groups is a salient feature of UK commercial life, and some evidence suggests 
that use of group form may be more widespread in the UK than in other 
comparable economies.70  
UK law facilitates the creation of groups. It is permissible for one company to 
hold shares in another. The statutory requirement that all companies must 
possess at least two shareholders does not preclude the creation of a ‘wholly 
owned subsidiary’, as one of the shareholders can act as nominee for the other. 
And while a subsidiary is forbidden from being a member of its holding 
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company, this prohibition does not apply where the subsidiary holds the shares 
as a personal representative or a trustee. The prohibition is justified in that (i) it 
precludes a parent company from trafficking in its own shares, (ii) it prevents 
the dilution of a parent company’s capital and (iii) where the shares carry votes, 
it prevents the directors of a parent company from using these votes to keep 
them in control.71 
The Companies Act 2006 contains a range of provisions regulating or 
prohibiting certain transactions between a company and its directors. The 
general purpose of these provisions is to prevent abuses. Thus s.197 prevents 
a company from making a loan to a director of its holding company. This 
prohibition extends in the case of a “relevant company” (broadly speaking a 
public company) to the making of loans to persons “connected” with a director. 
The Act contains elaborate provisions as to what constitutes a “connection”, 
which embraces, inter alia, a company with which a director is “associated”. For 
this purpose, a director will be treated as being “associated” with a company if, 
inter alia, he is interested in shares of that company which “carry more than 
one-fifth of the voting power at any general meeting of that body”. The 
significance of this definition is that it defines the relationship of association in 
terms of less than control of half of the company’s voting share capital.72 
There is also a high degree of transparency with respect to the affairs of 
groups. The CA 2006 contains mandatory disclosure rules to protect creditors 
and minority shareholders. For example: 
a. A group’s directors under s.399 have a duty to prepare a consolidated 
group accounts containing the financial statements and the auditors’ and 
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directors report. The consolidated accounts give the creditors and 
minority shareholders an accurate impression of the overall financial 
position of the group.  
b. A parent company must under s.409 provide details of the shares it 
holds in the subsidiaries and the subsidiaries’ name and country of 
activity.  
c. A subsidiary has to name its ultimate parent. Furthermore, the directors 
have to prepare a report containing a fair review of the development of 
the business of the company and its subsidiary undertaking.  
d. Where a person acquires an interest in 3% or more of the ‘relevant share 
capital’ (defined as capital carrying rights to vote in all circumstances) of 
a public company, or ceases to be interested then he must make 
disclosure of such interest, and any alternations to it, within two days of 
the obligation arising. This obligation is extended to cover the interests in 
shares of a person’s spouse, infant child, or a company which a person 
controls. Also, where persons acting in concert acquire shares in a public 
company, disclosure must be made of the shares acquired pursuant to 
the arrangement between them.73 
e. A public company under s.793 has wide powers to serve notice on any 
person whom it has reasonable cause to belief is interested in its shares, 
or was interested in its shares in the three year period prior to the service 
of the notice, to disclose the nature of the interest and to indicate if any 
other person was interested in its shares. If the company does not 
receive satisfactory answer to its enquiries, it can petition the court to 
place a freezing order on the shares which prevents the shares being 
voted, transferred, or any dividend being receivable with respect to them, 
until the relevant information has been received by the company or the 
order discharged. In addition, shareholders holding one tenth of the 
voting capital of the company can under s.803 require the company to 
exercise its power to determine the nature of the interest held by a 
person in its shares.   
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The effect of ss.793 and 803 coupled with the disclosure requirements 
mentioned above results in there being a high level of transparency with 
respect to the identity of the beneficial ownership of shares in an English 
public company. Moreover all group members, even wholly owned 
subsidiaries, are obliged to comply with the Act’s provisions regulating how 
the affairs of a company are to be conducted (e.g. holding of meetings, 
preparation of accounts etc.). Some scholars argue that often there is no 
sensible reason for insisting that these procedures should apply to 
companies that are part of a group, and that, for example, it does not make 
any sense for a wholly owned subsidiary (which will more often than not be 
a private company) to hold an annual general meeting. 74 
The CA 2006 recognizes group relations in a number of other ways. For 
example, where inspectors are appointed to investigate the affairs of a 
company, they can also, to the extent that they consider necessary, investigate 
the affairs of other companies that are related to the company under 
investigation either as a parent company or as a subsidiary.75 Another example 
is that a liquidator who has obtained information pursuant to his power of 
investigation would appear to be able to release it to other companies within a 
group.76 
Outside of company law, special legislation has been introduced in a number of 
areas to deal with the phenomenon of groups, (such as tax, accounting law, 
labour law, criminal law and competition law).77   
8.2 European Law  
The European Union has legislative capacity, in terms of which it may enact 
instruments whose provisions are binding throughout the territory of the EU, as 
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well as instruments that are binding on the governments of the member-states, 
principally so that the latter should take municipal legislative steps to bring their 
own laws into harmony with declared EU ends. Legislation of the former kind is 
usually enacted in a form of legislation known as a Regulation, and the latter 
type of legislation is usually in the form of a Directive.78 
Two initiatives have been taken by the EU in matters of corporate law and 
corporate groups, the first fell within a longstanding EU programme of 
Corporate Law harmonization. Under this programme, the EU issued Directives 
so as to effect harmonization of Corporate Law principles throughout the EU. 
Fifteen Directives have been enacted and implemented by the member-states 
on various Corporate Law issues, such as the regulation of takeovers, insider 
trading, corporate accounts, protection of third party creditors, levels of 
capitalizations, and so on. In 1980, the EC issued a draft of what was proposed 
as the Ninth Draft Company Law Harmonization Directive (the so-called 
“Groups of Companies Directive”) 79. It was intended that this Draft should 
mature into a permanent Directive setting out agreement among all the 
member-states as to the conditions under which an enterprise group would be 
determined as such and the basis on which the group might be treated as a 
single entity. This Directive never got beyond the preliminary draft stage. After 
the failure of this proposal, harmonization of the law relating to corporate 
groups was abandoned. 
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In 1998, principles and proposals for European corporate group law were 
elaborated by the Forum Europaeum Konzernrecht.80 The Forum made 
proposals to the EU and national legislatures for addressing the common 
problem of corporate groups in Europe. Its starting point was that the existence 
of such groups has long been an economic reality everywhere. To cope with 
this, framework rules by both European and national legislators are necessary. 
The Forum produced various recommendations for European corporate group 
law including disclosure requirements; the legal recognition of group 
management subject to certain safeguard conditions; buy-out and withdrawal 
rights; and, ultimately, liability for wrongful trading. The Forum rejected 
complete harmonisation and encouraged instead differentiated regulations 
grounded in part at the European level but more so at a member-state level.  
The recommendations were conceived on a building block basis, so that they 
need not necessarily be adopted en bloc by the EU and/or the Member States.   
On September 2001, the European Commission set up the High Level Group of 
Company Law Experts to make recommendations on a modern regulatory 
framework for company law in the EU. In its First Report of January 2002, the 
group dealt with issues related to the Takeover Bids Directive, which was 
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rejected by the European Parliament in July 2001.  The group original mandate 
was further extend in April 2002 by the Commission following the ECOFIN 
Council meeting in Oviedo to deal specifically with number of corporate 
governance issues.81 
On 4th November 2002, the group issued its final report. It took the view that the 
enactment of an autonomous body of law, specifically dealing with groups, was 
not to be recommended at EU level. It rejected a new attempt to bring about the 
Ninth Company Law Directive on group relations. Rather, it recommended that 
the Commission considered provisions within the existing range of corporate 
law to address particular problems. The areas where intervention could be 
needed were (i) the transparency of group structure and relations, (ii) the 
tensions between the interests of the group and of its parts, and (iii) the special 
problems of pyramid structures.82 
The European Commission, following the High Level Group recommendation, 
now seeks to tackle the issue within the range of existing company and 
insolvency law measures, and takes the view that there is no need to revive the 
draft Ninth Directive. The Commission’s proposal obviously bears resemblance 
to the British approach and similarly to the French ‘dirigeant de fait’-concept. 
First, it aims to enhance financial and non-financial disclosure with regard to the 
group’s structure. This reflects the British approach to facilitate creditor self-help 
through mandatory disclosure rules. Second, it proposes a framework rule for 
corporate groups that will allow groups to adopt and implement a co-ordinated 
group policy, and on the other hand protects creditors adequately. By that the 
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Commission has taken up the French Rozenblum doctrine and shares the view 
of the High Level Group that some Member States, foremost the U.K., do not 
recognise the interest of the group as such, which impedes business efficiency 
and competitiveness. 83 
8.3 International initiatives 
In 1966, The UN established the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in express recognition of the disparities between 
national laws governing international trade and the extent to which these 
disparities create obstacles to the flow of trade. UNCITRAL was thus 
established as a vehicle for exploring and, where appropriate, recommending 
changes in order to create greater harmony within the legal systems of the 
member-states in matters of international trade law. 
It has made a huge contribution to the current attempts to harmonize 
bankruptcy procedures where the debtor’s business stretched across 
international boundaries. In 1997, UNCITRAL completed and published the 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency and Guide to Enactment.84 The nature 
of a Model Law is that, while not binding on any state, individual states will 
implement it as far as possible in the form in which it was drafted, and thereby 
bring wide international legislative uniformity. 
Some sixteen countries have implemented the Model Law on Cross Border 
Insolvency, including the United States, U.K., Australia, New Zealand, South 
Africa, and Japan.85 It was followed by the adoption by UNCITRAL and the UN 
General Assembly in 2004 and the publication in 2005, of the Legislative Guide 
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on Insolvency Law,86 which was designed to encourage member-states of the 
UN to adopt effective business insolvency regimes. Both these initiatives are 
essentially concerned with traditional single debtor insolvency, but the 
Legislative Guide references the issue of group insolvency. Moreover, the topic 
of Corporate Groups in Insolvency was referred to UNCITRAL’s Insolvency 
Working Group (Working Group V), and the Working Group is nearing the end 
of its discussions, following which it will publish its list of recommendations. 
It is thus too early to say anything substantive about this initiative in the matter 
of the insolvency in enterprise groups. Nevertheless, it may be helpful to recite 
the initial approach of the Working Group—in effect, the mandate that the 
Working Group saw itself inheriting87: 
a. It was indicated that the structure of corporate groups could vary greatly 
and be especially intricate, in particular, in the case of transnational 
corporate groups. Recent developments added further elements of 
complexity, for instance, in case of special forms of intra-group control, 
such as special purpose entities and joint ventures, as well as in the case of 
agreements for the temporary control of one company over another. It was 
added that economic activities, which were traditionally subject to a 
separate discipline, such as banking and insurance, were also increasingly 
performed in the context of corporate groups, thus adding an additional 
layer of complexity to their discipline. 
b.  It was confirmed that, while most jurisdictions refrained from offering a 
general definition of corporate groups, such definitions often existed for 
special purposes, such as tax and accounting rules. In the insolvency field, 
the “separate entities approach” was prevalent, but certain instruments 
were available, under given conditions, to trigger the cross-liability of the 
companies belonging to the same corporate group. 
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c. In some jurisdictions that had recently reformed or attempted to reform their 
insolvency law to recognize the notion of corporate groups, it was observed 
that difficulties were encountered in the definition of that notion because of 
the need to achieve a balance between ensuring predictability and 
transparency and reflecting economic reality. It was suggested that 
reference to the notion of ownership, typically in terms of percentage of 
shares owned by the parent company, would provide a more certain basis 
for the definition of corporate groups. On the other hand, reference to the 
notion of control, while based on less objective parameters, would give 
more flexibility in addressing the diverse economic realities expressed by 
the operations of corporate groups. 
d. The view was expressed that corporations served many important social, 
commercial and legal purposes. The provision of limited liability, in 
particular, facilitated the raising capital for business purposes, enabled 
creditors to rely on the assets and liabilities of the corporate entity with 
which they dealt, and provided certainty in commercial relations. It was 
noted that those purposes were baseline commercial and legal principles in 
many nations, and that to interrupt reliance and the expectations that arose 
from those principles would require some extraordinary rationale. It was 
further suggested that the circumstances for disregarding those principles 
rarely occurred. 
The Working Group changed the title of the concept from Corporate Groups to 
Enterprise Groups. Although it has divided its deliberations between Domestic 
and International issues, there is a substantial overlap between these two 
categories. Some of the issues in which this overlap occurs include the COMI of 
the group, post-commencement financing, procedural coordination, substantive 
consolidation, the appointment of a single insolvency representative, the 
reorganization of two or more group members, the approval of a single 
reorganization plan, avoidance proceedings, and equitable subordination.88  
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9. How are Corporate Groups regulated? 
Regulation of corporate groups in common law countries is generally based on 
one of two approaches, or a combination of them: the separate entity approach 
and the single enterprise approach. According to the former approach, each 
company in a corporate group is a separate legal entity with its own rights and 
duties, even when controlled or wholly or partly owned by another company and 
collectively engaged in the business of the group. This approach achieves the 
most important advantage of the group structure that it enables the parent 
company to create bulkheads, which prevent the whole group from sinking if 
one member is flooded. Under this approach, debts incurred by a company are 
debts of that company, not of the controllers of that company or of the corporate 
group collectively and the assets of the group cannot be pooled to pay for these 
debts.  
By contrast, the single enterprise approach treats the corporate group as a 
unitary economic enterprise and hence the parent company is liable for all the 
debts of its insolvent controlled companies, whether or not wholly owned. 
These approaches are elaborated below.  
9.1 The Separate Entity Approach 
Corporate law in common law countries has developed from the separate entity 
approach. In essence, this involves three inter-related principles, originally 
developed for single companies, but subsequently applied to corporate groups, 
namely:  
a. separate legal personality (corporate autonomy),  
b. limited liability of the shareholders of each company in a group, and  
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c. the directors of a company in a corporate group owe fiduciary duties to 
that company and not to other entities in that corporate group.  
A. Separate Legal Personality  
One distinct feature of a company is that it exists as a legal entity separate from 
its members. From this it follows that a company can sue and be sued in its 
own name; has its own right and duties; can enter into contractual relations of 
its own accord; and own property itself distinct from its shareholders. The 
landmark case that affirmed separate legal personality principle is Salomon v. 
Salomon and Co. Ltd.89 Mr. Aron Salomon had for years carried on business as 
leather merchant and boot manufacturer. He decided to convert his business 
into a company with limited liability. In order to maintain complete control over 
the company he restricted the membership of the company to himself and to six 
other members of his family. All seven thus subscribed to the memorandum for 
one share each, and he appointed two of his sons as directors. The company 
entered into a contract with Mr. Salomon in order to purchase Mr. Salomon’s 
business. The purchase price was fixed at £38,782, which was apportioned 
amongst the various assets that made up the business. It was to be paid in 
cash, except for £16,000, which was to be satisfied by issuing debentures. The 
company had £40,000 in £1 pound shares as its nominal capital, with 20.000 of 
these shares allotted to Mr. Salomon. £10,000 of debentures was also issued to 
him. The company floated by Mr. Salomon did not make a profit in the market, 
and had to be wound up within a year. At this point, the company had 
outstanding debts to the extent of about £7,733. It was the contention of the 
official liquidator that the company was simply a sham designed by Mr. 
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Salomon in order to be able to limit his own liability; and that this should not be 
allowed as the creditors would be adversely affected while Mr. Salomon would 
have little to lose. The liquidator thus proposed that Mr. Salomon be made 
personally liable for the debts of the company as the company was nothing 
more than Mr. Salomon himself wearing a mask; and that the debenture debt to 
him by fulfilled only after all the other creditors of the company were satisfied. 
The trial court agreed with the liquidator on the basis that the sole purpose of 
Mr. Salomon in forming the company was to use it as his agent in running the 
business, and therefore by the principles of agency, Mr. Salomon should be 
held personally liable. The Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion 
though on the different ground that though the incorporation of the company 
itself was not invalid, the purpose for which Mr. Salomon had formed the 
company was unlawful. However, the House of Lords unanimously reversed the 
decision of the two lower courts. The Lords pointed out the motive for becoming 
a shareholder cannot be a field of enquiry, and neither can any assumption be 
made on the basis of who the shareholders are or the number of shares each 
holds. According to their Lordships, as long as the company was formed in 
accordance with the legal requirements it would have to be treated as separate 
legal entity, distinct from its individual shareholders.  
Thus the issue of limited liability and separate corporate personality were finally 
settled by the highest judicial body in the United Kingdom. Salomon established 
the separate legal personality of a company. The case along with such cases 
as Asbbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. v. Riche90 and Trevor v. 
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Withitworth,91 made clear that incorporators of a company could structure its 
capital so as to minimise their risk of the company’s failure by taking some form 
of secured debenture.  
The separate legal personality doctrine meant that a corporation’s members are 
not liable for its debts, and that when a company acts, it does so in its own right 
and not just as an alias for its controllers. Similarly, shareholders are not liable 
for the company’s debts beyond their initial capital investment, and have no 
proprietary interest in the property of the company. 
As applied in Salomon’s case, the consequence was that while the creditors of 
his business had claims against the company which conducted the business, 
neither they nor the company had any direct claim against Mr. Salomon, who 
was entitled to rely on the security granted by the company to him for the debt 
which it owed him.  
Applied to a corporate group context, this reasoning entails that creditors who 
contract with a subsidiary have no claim against other companies within the 
group, or against the parent company. 92 The extension of the separate 
corporate personality doctrine to group of companies has often been supported 
by courts in common law countries. For example, in the Australian case of 
Briggs v James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd93 the court stated:  
“The proposition that a company has a separate legal 
personality from its members survived the coming into 
existence of the large numbers of fully-owned subsidiaries of 
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 Robert P Austin, op.cit. p.71.  
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companies and their complete domination by their holding 
company …”  
Likewise, in Adams v. Cape Industries plc94, the English Court of Appeal stated 
that:  
“Our law, for better or worse, recognises the creation of 
subsidiary companies, which though in one sense the creatures 
of their parent companies, will nevertheless under the general 
law fall to be treated as separate legal entities with all the rights 
and liabilities which would normally attach to separate legal 
entities”.  
Equally, the High Court of Australia in Hobart Bridge Co. Ltd. v. Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation95, rejected an invitation to disregard the corporate 
entity lying between the investor and the business, stating that, 
“It is said that this was ‘machinery’, but that is true of all 
participations in limited liability companies. They and their operations 
are simply the machinery, in an  economic sense, by which natural 
persons, who desire to limit their liability, participate in undertakings 
which they cannot manage to carry on themselves, either alone or in 
partnership, but, legally speaking, this machinery is not impersonal 
though it is inanimate. Between the investor, who participates as a 
shareholder, and the undertaking carried on, the law interposes 
another person, real though artificial, the company itself, and the 
business carried on is the business of that company, and the capital 
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employed is its capital and not in either case the business or the 
capital of the shareholders. Assuming, of course, that the company is 
duly formed and is not a sham (of which there is no suggestion 
here), the idea that it is mere machinery for affecting the purposes of 
the shareholders is a layman’s fallacy. It is a figure of speech, which 
cannot alter the legal aspect of the facts.”  
The application of the corporate autonomy doctrine to corporate groups has 
various consequences, including:  
a. The debts incurred by each company are exclusively its debts, not of its 
controllers or of the corporate group collectively. The assets of the group 
cannot be pooled to pay for these debts.96  
b. Parent companies are not automatically parties to contracts entered into 
by other group companies with external persons.97  
c. A parent company cannot take into account the undistributed profits of 
other group companies in determining its own profits. However, there is 
no restriction on the right of a subsidiary company to pass on profits to 
its holding company via a distribution to shareholders.98 
d. A group company may breach its obligations to an external party if it 
passes confidential information about that party to its parent company.99  
 
 
                                                           
96  Walker v Wimborne, [1976] 137 CLR 1 at 6-7. 
97  Pioneer Concrete Services Ltd v Yelnah Pty Ltd, [1986] 11 ACLR 108. 
98
 The New Zealand Court of Appeal said that ‘there is no principle of company law precluding at a wholly-
owned subsidiary from paying over its profit reserves to the parent company by some act which it has 
capacity to perform, provided that this does not improperly prejudice the interests of its creditors.’ 
Corporate Groups Report, Final Report, May 2000, p.16.  
99 Bank of Tokyo v Karoon [1986] 3 All E.R. 468 at 476. 
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B. Limited Liability   
Limited Liability means that shareholders of a company are not personally 
liable, as shareholders, for the debts incurred or wrongs committed by the firm. 
If the firm fails, a shareholder’s losses thus are limited to the amount the 
shareholder initially paid to purchase his or her stock. In other words: unless 
otherwise provided in the article of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation 
is not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation unless that he 
becomes liable by reason of his own acts or conduct.100 
The principle of limited liability was originally introduced by the UK’s Limited 
Liability Act 1855. The invention of limited liability has greatly influenced the 
economy and the legal environment, to the extent that President Nicholas 
Murray Butler of Columbia pronounced in 1911: “I weigh my words when I say 
that in my judgment the limited liability corporation is the greatest single 
discovery of modern times... Even steam and electricity are far less important 
than the limited liability corporation, and they would be reduced to comparative 
impotence without it”.101  
Hicks102 describes the benefit of limited liability, stating that ‘to be a sleeping 
partner without limited liability would be exceedingly dangerous’. Accordingly 
persons will invest in a firm with unlimited liability only where they can control 
the riskiness of the firm’s activities and also monitor the wealth of their co-
adventures. Indeed, if there were no limited liability, such investments would 
have hardly be made at all, except in the public sector. Thus, it is not surprising 
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that the building of railways was historically connected with the coming of 
limited liability. 
Limited liability achieves various economic goals based upon principles of 
economic efficiency:103  
a. It decreases the need for shareholders to monitor the managers 
of companies in which they invest because the financial 
consequences of company failure are limited. Shareholders may 
have neither the incentive nor the expertise to monitor the actions 
of managers. 
b. It provides incentives for managers to act efficiently and in the 
interest of shareholders. 
c. It assists the efficient operation of the securities markets because 
the prices at which shares trade does not depend upon an 
evaluation of the wealth of individual shareholders. 
d. It permits efficient diversification by shareholders which in turn 
allows shareholders to reduce their individual risk. If a principle of 
unlimited liability applies so that a shareholder could lose his or 
her entire wealth by reason of the failure of one company, 
shareholders would have an incentive to minimise the number of 
shares held in different companies and insist on a higher return 
from their investment because of the higher risk they face. 
Consequently, limited liability not only allows diversification but 
permits companies to raise capital at lower costs because of the 
reduced risk faced by shareholders. 
e. It facilitates optimal investment decisions by mangers and 
provides incentives for shareholders to hold diversified portfolios. 
Under such circumstances, managers should invest in project with 
positive net values and can do so without exposing each 
shareholder to the loss of his or her personal wealth.  
                                                           
103 F Easterbrook and D Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Harvard University Press, 
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f. It facilitates the transferability of shares, and greatly cuts down the 
cost of carrying on business in a collective form, in that 
shareholders will not need to monitor the wealth of the fellow 
shareholders which they otherwise would be in a regime of 
unlimited liability.104 
In terms of groups of companies, Blumberg105 argues that number of 
justifications for limited liability have either limited application or no application 
to holding companies and their wholly-owned subsidiaries for the following 
reasons:  
a. In the context of corporate groups, the reduction of monitoring argument 
is valid mainly where shareholding in a particular group company is 
widely dispersed. It would be impractical, as well as unduly costly, to 
impose any monitoring obligation on shareholders in those 
circumstances. However, this argument is less convincing where a group 
company is effectively controlled by its parent company. The parent can 
use its shareholding to control the decisions of any wholly-owned 
subsidiary or otherwise monitor the activities or financial performance of 
other controlled companies. Limited liability can operate in this context 
as a disincentive for a parent company to closely monitor its group 
companies.  
b. The market efficiency argument is relevant to listed group companies 
whose shares are publicly traded. It has no application to closely or 
wholly-owned subsidiaries whose shares are not tradable. Nor is the 
equity diversity argument relevant where shares in a group company are 
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 Dan Prentice, Corporate Personality, Limited Liability and the Protection of Creditors, in Corporate 
Personality in the 20th Century, Hart Publishing, (1998), p.101. 
105 P Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, (1986), Journal of Corporation law 573, at 623-26.  
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issued primarily to control that company, rather than to invest equity 
capital in it.  
c. Possibly the strongest argument for limited liability in the corporate group 
context is its role in facilitating enterprise. Without limited liability, 
controlling shareholders of wholly- or even partly-owned subsidiaries 
may risk all or much of their wealth through the activities of these 
subsidiaries. Nevertheless, permitting parent companies, as controlling 
shareholders, to rely on limited liability can increase the risk of “moral 
hazard”, or displacement of business risks to outsiders, in some 
circumstances.  
d. If limited liability is absolute, a parent can form a subsidiary with 
minimum capitalization for the purposes of engaging in risky activities. If 
things go well, the parent captures the benefits. If things go poorly, the 
subsidiary declares bankruptcy [to the detriment of its outstanding 
unsecured creditors], and the parent creates another [subsidiary] with 
the same managers to engage in the same activities. This asymmetry 
between benefits and costs, if limited liability is absolute, would create 
incentives to engage in a socially excessive amount of risk activities.  
The above argument provides general support for rethinking some aspects of 
limited liability in the context of corporate groups. The full effects of application 
of limited liability were not clear at the time of its emergence, since limited 
liability was not an essential characteristic of corporate law. Theories supporting 
limited liability ignore contemporary economic realities because parent 
companies and their subsidiaries are collectively conducting a common 
enterprise. Thus limited liability, being designed to protect shareholders not 
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enterprises themselves, does not aid economic efficiency in the case of 
corporate groups. Moreover, there is a significant tension between the legal 
principle that a company is a separate legal entity and therefore desiring of 
limited liability, and the fact that many corporate groups operate as a single 
entity because of the economic benefits that result from the integration of 
activities.106  
C. Directors’ Duties 
Since the separate legal entity approach treats a company as a separate and 
distinct entity, so that its interests cannot be submerged with those of the parent 
or with other members of the group, a director of a particular company is not 
entitled to sacrifice its interests. The interests of other group companies may be 
taken into account only to the extent that this furthers the interests of that 
company. A director would breach his fiduciary duties if he sought to put the 
interest of the corporate group above that of the company. Thus the orthodox 
common law is that a director of a company in a corporate group owes fiduciary 
duties to that company and not to other entities in that group, even though he is 
appointed by the parent company or may even be a director of the parent 
company. Likewise, the directors of a parent company will owe no fiduciary 
duties to the subsidiary.107  The Cork Committee assumed this principle in 
stating that ‘the present law (and however much it may be ignored in practice, it 
remains the law and enforceable as such) is that the directors of each separate 
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group company owe duties to that separate company and must consider that 
separate company’s interests’.108   
This principle was confirmed by the courts. For example, Mason J in Walker v. 
Wimborne,109 stated that: 
“the director of a company which is a part of large group must adhere 
to the fundamental principle that each of the companies is a separate 
and independent legal entity, and that it is the duty of the directors to 
consult its interests and its interests alone in deciding whether 
payment should be made to other companies”. 
Thus there is a breach of duty where the directors of a company which is a part 
of a group act on the instruction of the parent company, failing to consider the 
interests of the subsidiary. There will be also situations where it will not be 
possible to equate the interests of an individual company in a group with those 
of the group, and it will be improper for the directors of such a company to act 
to further the group’s interests if this is not also in the interests of the that 
company. 
Although each company in a corporate group must be treated as having its own 
interests, different tests have been expressed by courts regarding the extent to 
which directors, when performing their duties, are able to consider the interests 
of other companies within the corporate group. In Charterbridge Corporation 
Ltd. v. Lloyds Bank Ltd110, Pennycuick J had to consider whether directors of a 
company (C) has acted in its interests when they had it guarantee payments of 
a debt owed to a bank by an associated company. The judge found that the 
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directors looked to the benefit of the corporate group as a whole and did not 
give separate consideration to the benefit of C. In this situation, the judge 
proposed the following test for whether directors have breached their duties: 
“The proper test, I think, in the absence of actual separate 
consideration, must be whether an intelligent and honest man in the 
position of a director of the company concerned, could, in the whole 
of the existing circumstances, have reasonably believed that the 
transactions were for the benefit of the company”. 
However in Equticorp Finance Ltd v. Bank of New Zealand,111 the Australian 
Court of Appeals stated that the preferable test is that where directors have 
failed to consider the interests of the company and instead have consider the 
interests of the corporate group they should be found to have committed a 
breach of duty. If, however, upon an objective assessment, the transaction 
could be said to be in the interests of the company, then no consequence would 
result from the breach of duty. 
A director’s duty to look to the interests of his company rises a difficult question 
what those interests may be, particularly when one is dealing with a wholly 
owned subsidiary. The answer to this question will vary with the context.112 
Where a company is insolvent, the interest of the company normally taken as 
those of its shareholders. Thus in Brady v Brady113 it was stated that: 
“The interests of the company, an artificial person, cannot be 
distinguished from the interests of the persons who are interested in it. 
Who are those persons? Where a company is both going and solvent, 
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first and foremost come the shareholders, present and no doubt future 
as well.  How material are the interests of the creditors in such a case?  
Admittedly, existing creditors are interested in the assets of the 
company as the only source for the satisfaction of their debts. But in a 
case where the assets are enormous and the debts minimal it is 
reasonable to suppose that the interests of the creditors ought not to 
count for very lose much. Conversely, where the company is insolvent, 
or even doubtfully the solvent, the interests of the company are in 
reality the interests of existing creditors alone”.    
So where a company has substantial creditors, then they will have prior claims 
and the interests of the company will not be those of the shareholders. In fact, if 
the company is insolvent, the shareholders will cease to have any continued 
interest in the company. 
The rule against fiduciaries placing themselves in a position where their own 
interests conflict with those of the person to whom their fiduciary obligations are 
owned is very strict. However in certain situations, courts and legislatures have 
found ways of relaxing this role to accommodate the realities of modern 
commerce in relation to companies within corporate groups.  An example of 
parliamentary intervention in this regard is s.131(2) of the New Zealand 
Companies Act 1993, which provides that directors of a company that is a 
wholly owned subsidiary may, if expressly permitted to do so by the constitution 
of the company, act in a manner which they believe to be in the best interests of 
the holding company even though it may not be in the best interests of the 
subsidiary. Where the subsidiary is not wholly owned, s.131(2) further requires 
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that the directors must obtain the prior agreement of the shareholders (other 
than the holding company) of the subsidiary.114 
Another example is s.187 of the Australian Corporations Act. According to this a 
director of a corporation that is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a body corporate 
is taken to act in good faith in the best interest of the subsidiary if (a) the 
constitution of the subsidiary expressly authorises the director to act in the best 
interests of the holding company; and (b) the director acts in good faith of the 
best interests of the holding company; and (c) the subsidiary is not insolvent at 
the time the director acts and does not become insolvent because of the 
director’s act. Obviously, s.187’s operation is confined to directors of wholly 
owned subsidiary companies and does not extend to the directors of companies 
that are members of a group in any other way. Prior to the introduction of s.187, 
the Australian courts developed a concept of ‘derivative benefits’ in relation to 
companies within a corporate group.  
Mason J in Walker v Wimborne115 acknowledged that a company‘s best 
interests may sometimes be bound up inextricably with what is best for the 
group of which it is a member. The example he cited was that of an intra-group 
loan: in such a case the payment of money by company A to company B to 
enable company B to carry on its business may have derivative benefits for 
company A as a shareholder in company B, if that company is enabled to trade 
profitably or realize its assets to advantage. Mason J observes that directors 
might properly act in the interests of a subsidiary company of their own 
company where ‘derivative benefits’ will flow to their own company from so 
                                                           
114
 Ian M. Ramsay, Allocating Liability in Corporate Group: an Australian Perspective, Connecticut Journal 
of International Law, Vol 13, 329 at 350. 
115
 137C.L.R.1 (High Court of Australia) (1976). 
 Page 71 of 292 
 
acting. This statement draws attention to the fact that such “derivative benefits” 
will flow due to the position of the directors’ own company as a shareholder of 
the subsidiary. The statement can also be interpreted to permit the making of 
decisions by directors of a subsidiary that are for the primary benefit of their 
holding company, again due to the shareholding that links the companies 
together.  
How can the directors of a company A conclude that A will gain “derivative 
benefits” from an action that is ostensibly in the best interests of companies A 
and B as a whole, or simply in the best interests of company B, where 
companies A and B belong to the same corporate group? The answer to this 
question was laid down in Charterbridge Corporation Ltd v Lloyds Bank Ltd.116 
When considering whether directors of a company have acted in the best 
interests of that company in a situation where it appears that they have in fact 
acted in the best interests of a group of companies or in the best interests of 
another company within the group of which their own company is a member, 
the court might consider whether an intelligent and honest man in the position 
of a director of the company concerned could, in the whole of the existing 
circumstances, have reasonably believed that the transactions in question were 
for the benefit of the company.  
From the above, the obvious conclusion is that office holders of the subsidiary 
company, who will have been appointed by the parent company with the aim, 
whether explicit or implicit, to serve its interests, face the challenge of dealing 
with conflicting fiduciary and statutory duties to the parent company and the 
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subsidiary and they need to aware of both risks and responsibilities of such 
situation. 
9.2 Evaluation of the Separate Legal Entity Approach 
The separate legal entity approach for groups of companies has been strongly 
criticised as not compatible with commercial practice especially in the case that 
the affairs of companies within a group are conducted in the overall interests of 
the group. Thus the Cork Committee Report states (at Para. 1926):  
 “In practice, however, the affairs of companies in a group are often 
conducted by management by reference to the interests of the group 
as a whole. The control, which the parent company has over the 
composition of the board of each of the subsidiaries and the series of 
common directorships which this often entails mean that, transaction 
between companies in the group can be, and often are, conducted 
on a basis which is not arms length. Assets may be transferred 
between group companies al lower than market value. Loans may be 
made without interest or at less than market rates. Guarantees may 
be given by one group company of another group company’s 
obligations for no charge and without reference to the interests of the 
guaranteeing company. Dividends may be paid from a subsidiary to 
the parent without regard to the cash requirements of the subsidiary.”  
The major weakness of the approach is that it takes no account of intra group 
liability problems. This is because it considers matters from the standpoint that 
the separateness of the constituent corporations in a group is the normal rule, 
with cases where the courts deemed justifiable the disregard of such 
separateness as exceptions. However, there is no consistent basis for 
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determining when such exceptions should exist. Thus cases which are virtually 
identical on their facts see the courts reaching completely contrary results.117 
Blumberg suggests that "this is a jurisprudence of epithet and metaphor”. The 
formalism of this approach is also inconsistent with the implementation of the 
legal policies underlying the concrete liability issue at stake. Its undifferentiated 
character often prevents the achievement of the objectives pursued by the 
law.118 It is likely to be the source of important economic inefficiency with regard 
to the management and organisation of polycorporate enterprises themselves. 
While the limited liability rule is often praised as supporting higher economic 
and social efficiency regarding all corporate actors involved (shareholders, 
managers, creditors), its automatic extension to the field of polycorporate 
groups seriously increases the risk of moral hazard, which notoriously 
generates inefficient allocation of business risks and inevitably jeopardises the 
interests of both creditors and minority shareholders.119  
9.3 The Single Enterprise Approach 
Despite the policy reasons for protecting limited liability, some commentators 
have noted an “alarming trend to disregarding the corporation in situations for 
which no predictable basis can be ascertained”.120 One doctrine that has been 
heavily criticized as an improper and unwise criticism of this doctrine, but has 
become more prominent as courts have increasingly recognized it as an 
acceptable basis for “piercing the corporate veil” is the single business 
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enterprise theory. This approach treats the corporate group as a unitary 
economic enterprise, functioning to further the interests of the group as a 
whole, or those of its dominant corporate body. It may more closely reflect the 
economic functioning and organisational structure of those corporate groups 
that operate under a highly centralised governance system. It may also better 
reflect the expectation of creditors dealing with a corporate group, who have 
been led to believe that they are doing business with the group as a whole and 
can rely on the creditworthiness of the overall group rather than that of an 
individual group company. 
In contrast to the separate entity approach, a single enterprise approach adopts 
the following governing principles: 
a. the dominant company in a group is entitled to operate the group 
companies it controls for the benefit of the corporate group 
collectively, even if this is contrary to the interests of particular 
controlled companies or their minority shareholders. 
b. directors of group companies owe their fiduciary loyalty primarily 
to the parent company or to the corporate group collectively, not 
to their individual group company. 
c. the parent is liable for all the debts of its insolvent controlled 
companies, whether or not wholly-owned. 
This doctrine allows courts to impose joint liability on two corporations when 
they are not operated as separate entities and their resources are used for a 
common purpose. In particular, courts have frequently been asked to determine 
whether a corporate parent should meet the liabilities of its subsidiary if the 
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parent exercised considerable control or dominion over the subsidiary. Faced 
with this issue, in Berkey v. Third Avenue Railway Co121 a US court stated: 
‘The whole problem of the relation between parent and subsidiary 
corporations is one that is still enveloped in the mist of metaphor. 
Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices 
to liberate thought; they end often by enslaving it. We say at times 
that the corporate entity will be ignored when the parent corporation 
operates a business through a subsidiary which is characterized as 
an ‘alias’ or a ‘dummy’. All this is well enough if the pictures queness 
of the epithets does not lead us to forget that the essential term to be 
defined is the act of operation. Dominion may be so complete, 
interference so obtrusive that by the general rules of agency the 
parent will be a principal and the subsidiary an agent. Where control 
is less than this, we are remitted to the test of honesty and justice….’ 
The single enterprise approach has important economic shortcomings. By 
exposing parent corporations to potential liability for the defaults of each 
subsidiary and thus to a permanent threat of a group insolvency, such a system 
is likely to force group networks to adopt inefficient, hierarchically and 
centralised-oriented organisational structures as to avoid risk exposure. 
Moreover, it is also likely to fall short from the viewpoint of the protection of 
shareholders and creditors of affiliate corporations. Operating virtually as a sort 
of liability insurance against subsidiary default risk, it provides minority 
shareholders with a sort of windfall for which they have not paid. In addition, it 
gives extra protection against the defaults of corporate debtors originating from 
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purely fortuitous market or casual circumstances, from which creditors of 
independent corporations under similar circumstances do not benefit at all. 122  
According to the supporters of this approach, because shareholders or parents 
will always control, or at least have the potential to control, their corporations, to 
hold a shareholder liable merely because it controlled a corporation’s affairs 
would eviscerate the notion of limited liability, and thus piercing the corporate 
veil under such circumstances, without more, would be inappropriate.  
Contrary to the above, some Scholars find single enterprise approach uncertain 
and overly rigid for the following reasons:123 
a. The vagueness of the central concept of a “group of companies” is likely 
to create an uncertain legal environment for the operation of 
polycorporate enterprises. This is particularly serious for parent 
corporations, exposing them to a permanent threat of unexpected liability 
is hazardous for the entire group's financial and economic stability, 
whose fate would ultimately depend on the idiosyncrasies of 
jurisprudential construction.  
b. As a result of the various presumptions which support the concept of the 
group, in the overwhelming majority of cases it should be enough for 
creditors of a subsidiary to prove the existence of the legal or factual 
instrument from which stems the possibility of the parent exercising a 
dominant influence over the subsidiary, in order to set in motion a 
system of unlimited liability for the parent.  
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c. By imposing indiscriminately a uniform solution to all types of corporate 
groups, it fails to provide a flexible and differentiated regime able to 
accommodate the diversity of organizational and governance structures.  
However, the implementation of separate entity approach raises main critical 
question, better to be addressed here, do creditors require protection or should 
they be expected to contract to protect themselves?  
Most creditors of most companies are eventually paid, and commercial life goes 
on as usual. In addition, most creditors who are not paid sums due will 
eventually take some form of legal action, other than winding up, to obtain 
judgment and, if need be, execution.124 However, the existence of corporate 
groups may exacerbate problems for creditors. The creation of complex group 
structures may be used to conceal the true financial position of individual 
companies from creditors. It has been noted that, where a company in a 
corporate group is in financial difficulties, managers may move assets from that 
company to other companies in the group that have a better chance of 
survival.125 This will be at the expense of the creditors of the company in 
financial difficulty. 
The creditors’ risk increases upon corporate insolvency, where 
shareholders have an even more powerful incentive to engage in risky 
investments. In addition to such risks, the uncertainty of the law and the 
discrepancies between the law and commercial reality threaten the 
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creditors’ interests. Rogers C.J highlighted these discrepancies in Qintex 
Australia Finance Ltd. V. Schroders Australia Ltd,126: 
“As I see it, there is today a tension between the realities of 
commercial life and the applicable law in circumstances such as 
those of the present case. In the everyday rush and bustle of 
commercial life in the last decade it was seldom that participants to 
transactions involving conglomerates with a large number of 
subsidiaries paused to consider which of the subsidiaries should 
become the contracting party . . . it may be desirable for Parliament 
to consider whether this distinction between the law and commercial 
practice should be maintained. This is especially the case today 
when many collapses of conglomerates occasion many disputes. 
Regularly, liquidators of subsidiaries, or of the holding company, 
come to court to argue as to which of their charges bears the liability 
. . . [C]reditors of failed companies encounter difficulty when they 
have to select from among the moving targets the company with 
which they consider they concluded a contract.”  
The above-mentioned risks and the natural conflicts of interest between a 
company’s shareholders and creditors have led some commentators to call for 
protection for creditors, as it is unfair that they should suffer loss because a 
holding company operated a subsidiary to which they loaned money without 
realising that it was insolvent127.   
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Other commentators argue that the creditors are not entitled to special 
protection because:  
a. Creditors when dealing with companies are fully aware that the principle of 
limited liability will preclude recovery from members of the company, and 
therefore they should set the terms of the bargain with the company so as 
to ensure compensation for this risk.  
b. Creditors should contract so as to protect themselves against the prospect 
of not being paid. For example, the interest rate on any loan negotiated 
between the creditor and the company can be expected to reflect the risks 
that the creditor faces. Moreover, the contract may contain restrictions on 
the activities of the company. For example, it may restrict the amount that 
the company can pay out in dividends. There may also be restrictions on 
the company incurring debt of a similar or higher priority. These types of 
restrictions are common in debenture trust deeds. 
c. There are enough constraints upon companies which operate to protect the 
interests of creditors. There is the maintenance of share capital doctrine.128 
Creditors accept the risk that a company whose members enjoy limited 
liability may lose money in the ordinary course of its business. But they are 
entitled to protection against reduction of the company’s net assets in other 
ways such as return of paid-up capital to shareholders either by way of 
purported but improper dividend, by unregulated buying- back of shares 
before a winding up, or by giving its assets away in a manner not incidental 
to its business.  
d. An additional constraint that operates to protect creditors’ interests is the 
reputations of the shareholders and the managers of the company with 
which the creditors are contracting. Shareholders and managers will be 
reluctant to undertake actions which harm their reputations and which may 
make it difficult to raise capital in the future.129  
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In the context of corporate groups, creditors have to take special precautions. 
The onus should lie with the creditor to ascertain which company in the group 
he is dealing with, and to ensure that the contract documentation reflects that 
understanding. 130 If creditors expect to be able to select the most wealthy 
corporate group entity as the entity to be made accountable for their debt, they 
have an unrealistic expectation which the law should not be required to satisfy’. 
131
 On this view, the key issue will be whether a creditor has sufficient 
information about companies and their creditworthiness to negotiate effectively 
with the correct entity.  
Although the theory that creditors should be obliged to protect themselves is 
interesting, it has two main weaknesses:132 
a. The theory that creditors charge different interest rates for different levels 
of risk does not work where the costs of the creditor acquiring adequate 
information about the level of risk are disproportionate to the value of the 
transaction. The theory also does not work in the case of involuntary 
creditors (such as tort claimants). Moreover, dispersed creditors face a 
collective action problem and may therefore lack appropriate incentives 
to undertake joint action to prevent opportunistic behavior by the 
company that threatens payment to them. Finally, even sophisticated 
creditors cannot foresee all contingencies and contract for protection 
against them. Significant corporate restructuring, such as leveraged 
buyouts, have seen transfers of wealth from sophisticated creditors 
(namely some bondholders) to shareholders. The result has been a 
vigorous debate concerning whether directors should owe fiduciary 
duties to bondholders as a means of protection. 
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b. The effectiveness of the legal rules underpinning the maintenance of 
share capital doctrine applies only when the present value of maintaining 
the company as a going concern exceeds the value of the benefits 
derived from taking action that adversely affects creditors (for example, 
the payment of excessive dividends). A final constraint is that, although 
shareholders may want to take actions which adversely affect creditors, 
the shareholders may lack effective control over the management of the 
company because of a separation of ownership and control.’ However, 
whether the separation of ownership and control adequately protects 
creditors is open to question. First, as managers increase the percentage 
of shares that they own in the company, their incentive to act in the 
interests of shareholders increases. Second, there is evidence that the 
ownership concentration of companies is increasing.  
9.4 Position in Common Law Countries 
In most common law countries corporate law has traditionally applied the 
separate entity approach to corporate groups. It does not permit the controllers 
of a corporate group to treat the group as a single enterprise for the purpose of 
their entrepreneurial activities. Instated, the separate legal personality of each 
company must be maintained. Limited liability in corporate groups is a common 
characteristic of common law countries and is usually supported by the courts. 
For example in Radaszewski V. Telecom Corp133 the US Court of Appeals 
stated that: 
“The doctrine of limited liability is intended precisely to protect a 
parent corporation whose subsidiary goes broke. That is the whole 
purpose of the doctrine, and those who have the right to decide such 
questions, that is, legislatures, believe that the doctrine, overall, is 
socially reasonable and useful. We think that the doctrine would 
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largely be destroyed if a parent corporation could be held liable 
simply on the basis of errors in business judgment.” 
Nevertheless, sometimes the single enterprise approach is seen in common 
law countries. Examples are discussed below. 134 
A. Australia: 
The separate entity doctrine was overridden in the following cases:  
a. Consolidation of corporate group accounts: A company must prepare 
consolidated accounts for itself and any controlled entity. That company 
must also list in its annual report the entities that it controls.135 These 
requirements seek to enhance the ability of users of financial reports to 
assess the overall performance and financial position of corporate 
groups, rather than having to rely on the accounts of individual group 
companies. They also seek to ensure that the true financial position of 
various group companies cannot be concealed by intra-group 
transactions designed to artificially create profits or conceal losses in 
particular group companies, or otherwise manipulate the balance-sheet 
of individual group companies. However, each group company must, in 
addition, maintain its own accounts concerning its assets and 
liabilities.136 For instance, one group company cannot lawfully declare a 
dividend based on profits generated, and held, by another group 
company.  
b. Related party transactions: A public company is prohibited from giving a 
financial benefit (including any intra-group loan, guarantee, indemnity, 
and release of debt or asset transfer) to a related party unless that 
transaction has been approved by the fully-informed disinterested 
shareholders of the public company or is otherwise exempt.137 These 
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provisions are designed to protect shareholders of public companies 
from the possibility of their company’s assets being eroded, or its 
financial position otherwise undermined, through undisclosed intra-group 
dealings.  
c. Cross-shareholding: Companies are generally prohibited from acquiring, 
or taking a security over, the shares of any controlling company or 
issuing or transferring their shares to any controlled company.138 Also, 
there are controls over a group company providing financial assistance 
for the acquisition of shares in its holding company.139 Some of these 
provisions are designed to prevent entrenchment of control in a holding 
company through indirect self-acquisitions (by a controlled company 
holding shares in a controlling company) or group controllers using group 
assets to influence the market price of shares in particular group 
companies.  
d. Insolvent trading: The Corporations Law has sought to reduce the “moral 
hazard” problem of corporate group structures being used to displace 
entrepreneurial risks to outside creditors. It provides that a holding 
company which ought to suspect the insolvency of its subsidiary can be 
made liable for the debts of that subsidiary incurred when it was 
insolvent.140 The rationale for this rule is that the ability of a holding 
company to control the affairs of its subsidiary should give rise to some 
positive duty of the holding company to prevent harm to the subsidiary’s 
creditors.  
B. The USA 
US laws affecting corporate groups increasingly employ single enterprise 
principles. Blumberg141 points out that “American statutes of specific application 
to corporate groups that use enterprise principles substantially now include the 
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great federal statutes regulating the banking industry, the savings and loan 
industry, securities, investment companies, employer sponsored pensions, 
export controls and foreign trade. Enterprise concepts also play an important, 
though less pervasive, role in federal labour relations, employment, and anti-
discrimination legislation … Through reliance on the concept of ‘control’ or the 
‘integrated enterprise’ doctrine, numerous federal and state statutes of specific 
application regulate major industries in American society by extending the 
statutory program to include the corporate group as a whole rather than 
restricting the statutes’ scope to the component corporation of the group that 
actually conducts the regulated activity”.  
US courts have also selectively introduced single enterprise principles into US 
corporate law. This evolution has been possible primarily because these courts 
have held that controlling shareholders owe duties of fairness to minority 
shareholders. The rationale for these duties is that, just as directors of a 
company are bound to act in the interests of the company and its shareholders 
collectively, any shareholder who, in effect, can control the board’s actions 
should be subject to equitable duties. Thus, for instance, in the corporate group 
context, a parent company which is a controlling shareholder has a “fair 
dealing” obligation in any transactions with its controlled company or the use of 
its controlled company’s information.142  
C. The United Kingdom 
In the Companies Act 2006 provisions that define the parent/subsidiary 
company relationship for various purposes generally form an exception to the 
principle of separate personality, since they recognise that a separate company 
should be treated as having a connection with another body or person, which 
itself is usually a company.  Other example is the publication of accounts. S.405 
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requires holding and subsidiary companies to publish consolidated financial 
statements. If at the end of a financial year the company is a parent company, 
the directors, as well as preparing individual accounts for the year, must 
prepare group accounts for the year unless the company is exempt from that 
requirement. Section 404 (1) defines Group accounts as: 
a. a consolidated balance sheet dealing with the state of affairs of the 
parent company and its subsidiary undertakings, and 
b. a consolidated profit and loss account dealing with the profit or loss of 
the parent company and its subsidiary undertakings. 
This provision treats all the members of the group as a single enterprise.143  
D. New Zealand 
New Zealand has introduced some single enterprise principles into its corporate 
legislation. In some instances, directors of wholly or partly-owned subsidiaries 
may act in the interests of the holding company rather than their subsidiary 
company,144 while nominee directors appointed to group companies may pass 
on otherwise confidential information to their nominators.145 In addition, New 
Zealand legislation provides for streamlined corporate group mergers,146 and 
permits courts to make contribution orders (whereby a solvent group company 
can be directed to contribute towards the debts of a related insolvent group 
company in liquidation), or pooling orders (whereby the assets and liabilities of 
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corporate group companies in liquidation can be pooled for the general benefit 
of their unsecured creditors)147 
In conclusion the tensions between the separate entity and the single 
enterprise approaches to groups of companies have given rise to a number of 
legal questions. The most important is the circumstances under which a parent 
company may be held liable for the debts of its subsidiary. The question still 
inspires debate among scholars and lawyers all over the world.  
10. Corporate Groups and Corporate Governance 
With the collapse of Worldcom, Enron (with a network consisting of over 3000 
entities) and a number of scandals in the EU, it was clear how companies could 
use their subsidiaries and special purpose vehicles to manipulate balance 
sheets and hide losses. Such scandals have strongly affected public confidence 
in the operation and governance of large entities trading their shares in 
organized capital markets.  
10.1 The Situation of Groups of Companies 
 
Despite the concerns mentioned above, there is a lack of debate concerning 
the corporate governance of groups of companies. The topic is absent from or 
briefly touched on in most company law textbooks and treatises on corporate 
governance. Discussion of the problems posed by groups of companies often 
focuses narrowly on insolvency rather than governance issues.148  
The European Commission reacted by issuing an Action Plan on Modernizing 
Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the EU on 21 May 
2003. The Action Plan contained a number of measures, which the Commission 
wanted to implement over the period up to (until 2010). The key issues in the 
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Action Plan concern corporate governance, capital maintenance, 
recapitalization as well as decreasing capital, groups of companies, 
international corporate restructuring and the introduction of a new legal form of 
incorporation. The fact that the big rating agencies have begun to rate the 
corporate governance performances of major companies, can well be seen as a 
further indicator that good corporate governance has an important concern for 
managers, shareholders and for policy makers.149  
In terms of the governance of group of companies, some questions are looking 
for answers. Which powers should be devolved by the board of the parent 
company to the boards of the subsidiaries? Should subsidiary boards have 
autonomous boards with independent, non-executive directors? Do traditional 
control techniques still work? And how can a parent board delegate decision 
rights in a system of networked, mutual independent subsidiaries?150 The 
challenge is to extend sound corporate governance practices and policies 
downstream to the subsidiaries.  
A parent company can use the following tools in order to guarantee proper 
implementation of corporate governance in its subsidiary:    
a. Subsidiary board composition should be given similar care and scrutiny 
that of the parent board. There is a need for a uniform guideline on board 
composition and better guidance for directors.  
b. Depending on the size and nature of the business, it is important that 
directors bring the right skills to the table to offer effective oversight. For 
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increased objectivity, it may be advisable to have a director from outside 
the business unit. Improved corporate governance now means that the 
majority of every board should consist of outside directors. Moreover, the 
company should have a number of directors who are connected neither 
with corporation or any significant shareholder, fairly reflecting the 
investment in the corporation by other shareholders.  
c. The parent board is responsible for the stewardship of the subsidiary and 
owes a duty to act in its best interest with due regard for the interests of 
the parent, the ultimate shareholder.  
d. An internal support structure, including a director’s guide should be 
provided to support internal directorships. Not only will this serve as a 
reference tool for them, but it should also spell out their obligations, risks 
and corporate indemnification policy.  
On the other hand, with higher public and institutional expectations regarding 
parent/subsidiary governance, and the resulting complexity of the relationships 
among corporate directors, companies have an immediate practical need for 
accurate and readily available information on their directors and the directors of 
their subsidiaries. One compelling reason for such information is that 
interlocking directorships may give rise to a conflict of interest. For example, in 
Canada, a director of one corporation who is also a director of another 
corporation engaged in a similar business must ensure that he acts in the best 
interests of both corporations. The decision in Abbey Glen Property v. 
Stumborg151 suggests that a director may breach his or her fiduciary obligation 
to the corporation merely by acting as a director of the second corporation. The 
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case implies that no actual conflict is necessary but that the potential for conflict 
is enough to create a breach of fiduciary duty. Therefore, laws currently require 
corporate directors to disclose all of their corporate directorships.  
In addition, the 2008 financial crisis represents a political as well as substantive   
challenge to policy makers that can be compared with the challenges that 
followed the collapse of Enron/Worldcom and the Asian financial crisis of 1997. 
The national and international response to the 2008 financial crisis has been 
characterized by widespread calls for further regulation and re-regulation of not 
only the financial services sectors but also for other sectors.  
The financial crisis can be to an important extent attributed to failures and 
weaknesses in corporate governance arrangements. When they were put to a 
test, corporate governance routines did not serve the purpose of safeguarding 
against excessive risk in many financial services companies. A number of 
weaknesses have been apparent. The risk management systems have failed in 
many cases due to corporate governance procedures rather than the 
inadequacy of computer models alone. Information about exposures often did 
not reach the board or even senior levels of management, while risk 
management was often activity rather than enterprise-based. These are board 
responsibilities. In other cases, boards had approved strategy but then did not 
establish suitable metrics to monitor its implementation. Company disclosures 
about foreseeable risk factors and about the systems in place for monitoring 
and managing risk have also left a lot to be desired, even though this is a key 
element of the Corporate Governance Principles. Accounting standards and 
regulatory requirements have also proved insufficient in some areas leading the 
relevant standard setters to undertake a review. Last but not least, 
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remuneration systems have in a number of cases not been closely related to 
the strategy and risk appetite of the company and its longer term interests.152 
The 2008 financial crisis revealed severe shortcomings in corporate 
governance. When most needed, existing standards failed to provide the 
checks and balances that companies need in order to cultivate sound business 
practices. Therefore, in 2008, the OECD153 launched an ambitious action 
plan to develop a set of recommendations for the improvements of its 
Corporate Governance Principles.  On June 2009, the OECD Steering Group 
on Corporate Governance issued a report explains the finding and lessons from 
the financial crisis. 154 The report addresses four areas of corporate governance 
that considered closely linked to the financial crisis and that also formed the 
basis of a global consultation. These areas are: remuneration/incentive 
systems; risk management practices; the performance of boards; and the 
exercise of shareholder rights.  
Nevertheless, the Group found that the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance provided a good basis to adequately address the key concerns 
that have been raised and that there was no urgent need for them to be 
revised. Rather, a more urgent challenge for the Steering Group was to 
encourage and support the implementation of already agreed international and 
national standards, including the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. 
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To this end, the Steering Group decided to issue a set of conclusions and 
emerging good practices that together seek to assist companies and policy 
makers to implement the OECD Principles more effectively. The conclusions 
and emerging good practices was published on 24th February 2010 as a 
complementary to OECD Principles and as recommendations to help 
companies and governments to overcome corporate governance weaknesses 
and support a more effective implementation of the OECD Principles. In some 
instances, the complementary develops the implications of individual principles 
that are important in the current situation and in others develop further the 
existing annotations in the light of the financial crisis and emerging good 
practices.155 
10.2 The Response to Calls for Proper Corporate Governance: 
A response to the calls for proper corporate governance for group of companies 
is presented by the UK Corporate Governance Code (formerly the Combined 
Code)156. The Code sets out standards of good practice in relation to board 
leadership and effectiveness, remuneration, accountability and relations with 
shareholders. For example: 
a. The Code requires all companies with a Premium Listing of equity shares 
in the UK under the Listing Rules to report on how they have applied the 
Code in their annual report and accounts. 
b. Listed companies are required to report on how they have applied the 
main principles of the Code, and either to confirm that they have 
complied with the Code's provisions or - where they have not - to provide 
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an explanation. Some of the provisions of the Code require disclosures 
to be made in order to comply with them.  
c. Companies have to provide clear and meaningful explanations when 
they choose not to apply one of the provisions of the Code, so that their 
shareholders can understand the reasons for doing so and judge 
whether they are content with the approach the company has taken. 
The new edition of the Code was published in September 2012 and applies 
to reporting periods beginning on or 1 October 2012.  Companies reporting on 
reporting periods beginning before 1 October 2012 should continue to report 
against the June 2010 edition of the Code, although they are encouraged to 
consider whether it would be beneficial to adopt some or all of the new 
provisions in the revised code earlier than formally expected. 
11. Conclusion of Chapter I 
There can be no doubt concerning the benefits resulting from the formation of 
groups of companies. Hence, the law on groups of companies has since long 
been the subject of numerous reports, studies and analyses especially among 
scholars of company and insolvency laws.  However, the problems of group of 
companies do not related to formation or freedom of incorporation. The problem 
is that there is no unified law dealing with the legal problems such as the liability 
for the holding company to the debts of its subsidiary. More importantly, there is 
a lack of a serious debate concerning the governance of groups of companies. 
The topic is absent from or briefly touched on by most company law textbooks 
and treatises on corporate governance. Therefore, and in order to prevent the 
repetition of the financial crisis, I would call for greater use of regulation over 
what are considered to be self regulating “codes and standards”. In addition, 
jurisdictions have to review regularly the capacity of their supervisory, 
 Page 93 of 292 
 
regulatory and enforcement authorities and to promote forward looking 
capacities. 
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Chapter 2 
Groups of Companies in Islamic Law 
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Islamic Law (Shari’ah), writes Joseph Schacht, is ‘the epitome of Islamic 
thought, the most typical manifestation of the Islamic way of life, the core and 
kernel of Islam itself. This description might have an element of exaggeration; 
nevertheless, there can be no denying that law occupies a distinctively 
important position in Islam. This position drives some scholars to state that If 
Islam is submission to the will of ALLAH (God), then Islamic Law is the path by 
which submission is enacted,  and hence, for many Muslims, Islam is the 
Shari’ah  and Shari‘ah is Islam. 
Islamic law is a complex and rich system, which is much wider than the normal 
understanding of ‘law’, encompassing aspects of belief and religious practice 
which would not be considered ‘law’ elsewhere. It includes rules relating to 
belief, prayer, fasting, making Hajj (Pilgrimage), giving Zakat (the compulsory 
charity tax) and other religious matters. In addition, it governs the Muslim way 
of life from political government to the sale of real property, from hunting to the 
etiquette of dining, from sexual relations to worship and prayer. It also regulates 
commercial transactions, and regulates the governing of the Islamic state and 
its relationship with non-Muslims within the state as well as with foreign 
states.157  It follows that the Islamic conceptual framework is quite unlike that of 
the Common law. It developed in a very different context, and its solutions are 
sometimes very different because Islamic law is based on religion, while both 
Common law and Civil law are secular in origin.158 Therefore, although it would 
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make no sense to refer, for example, to ‘Christian commercial law’, it is 
meaningful to speak of ‘Islamic Commercial Law’.159  
Because of the unique nature of Islamic law, it will be difficult to investigate 
Islamic law’s position on groups of companies without firstly appreciating the 
unique nature of Islamic law, its aspects sources, origins and, most importantly 
how “Islamic jurisprudence” provides interpretation, law finding and the 
mechanism for providing concrete rules capable of solving legal problems. 
Such appreciation is presented briefly in Part I of this Chapter.   
After understanding the nature of Islamic law, Part II examines the main 
principles governing corporations in Islamic law to find if it allows the formation 
of modern corporations including group of companies. Part II will end with a 
justification for the creation of a new model of Islamic corporation.  
At the outset, it is important to dispel confusion regarding certain Islamic law 
terms which can be found in some English sources. Many writers use the term 
‘Islamic law’ to translate both ‘Fiqh’ and ‘Shari’ah’, although these terms are not 
synonymous in Arabic. 160 
A. Shari’ah and Fiqh 
The literal meaning of Shari’ah is the path or road to water; i.e. the path which 
directs mankind to the right way as regards to their faith in ALLAH (God). 
Shari’ah is the whole divine law and values as given by God. It refers to the 
sum total of Islamic commands as recorded in the Qur’an as well as deducible 
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from the Prophet’s divinely guided life (the Sunnah).161 Shari’ah is the constant, 
unchanging, basic dimension of Islam. It defines not just the relationship of man 
to man, but also the relationship of man to God and of man to the cosmos. As 
such, it is all embracing and its dimensions are infinite.162 
The term fiqh literally means “understanding”. It implies an understanding of 
Islam in a general way or what a prudent person is likely to conclude from 
obvious evidence. It is the knowledge of the legal rules pertaining to conduct 
that have been derived from their specific contexts. It is the study and science 
of the Shari’ah, but includes also jurists’ interpretation of the two sources of the 
Shari’ah (the Qur’an and the Sunn’ah).  
A jurist or scholar who specialises in law is called “Faqih”. He understands and 
is skilled in interpreting the Qur’an and the Sunnah. The goal of the Faqih is to 
determine reliably, given a set of circumstances—including time, place, identity 
of the legal agent, and so on—the legal status of particular possible acts. The 
Faqih also explains or decides points of law in the absence of the binding text 
of the Qur’an and the Sunnah.163 Muslim jurists devote themselves to seeking to 
determine God’s intentions concerning the specific obligations of believers on 
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 Michael J.T. McMillen, Islamic Shari’ah Compliant Project Financing: Collateral Security and Financing 
Case Studies, (2004) 48 Fordham International law Journal 4. 
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the basis of available evidence. It should be kept in mind that the opinions and 
verdicts of a Faqih are not infallible. The Faqih is human and is prone to make 
mistakes, even when he has given his utmost to find out the truth. 
While many writers use the two terms interchangeably164, the concepts of 
Shari’ah and fiqh are clearly different. The term Shariah has a wider meaning, 
including both fiqh and knowledge of the tenets of faith. The real distinction is 
that Shariah is the law itself while fiqh is knowledge of that law-its 
jurisprudence.165 
B. Fiqh and Usul al fiqh 
Another confusion needing to be cleared up is that between fiqh and usul al-fiqh 
(the roots of law). The two are separate disciplines. The main difference 
between them is that fiqh is concerned with the knowledge of the detailed rules 
of the law in its various branches, where usul al-fiqh is concerned with the 
methods that are applied in the deduction of such rules from their sources. In 
other words, usul al-fiqh is the methodology of the law or the indications and 
methods by which the rules of fiqh are deduced from their sources. Usul al-fiqh 
has been called Islamic legal theory by analogy with modem law. Like legal 
theory, it answers questions such as "what is law?" and "how do judges 
discover and apply the law in hard cases? Yet the analogy ends here. While 
legal theory analyzes what judges do, Usul al-fiqh lays down the methodology 
that must be used for discovering and applying the law. Legal theory attempts 
to understand and record the nature of the judicial process, Usul al-fiqh governs 
it. Thus, there is a difference in function and approach. The role of Usul al-fiqh 
is much wider than that of legal theory. Usul al-fiqh has been assigned different 
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 Bilal Philips, The Evolution of Fiqh, International Islamic Publishing House, (2006), p.2. 
165
 Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, Theories of Islamic Law, Islamic Research Institute, Islamabad, 3rd printed 2009, p 26. 
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titles by different writers, to attempt to understand what it really stands for. It 
has been called ‘Islamic Jurisprudence’, ‘Islamic legal theory’, and ‘the 
methodology of Islamic law’, besides other things. There is nothing wrong with 
this, though, and all these titles are essentially correct.166  
In this study, the term ‘Islamic Law’ will be used to mean the laws of Shari’ah 
and the laws of Fiqh combined. The term fiqh and Shari’ah will be used where a 
distinction seems necessary.  
Finally, it is important to highlight that in this study I cannot hope to do complete 
justice to the richness and complexity of Islamic Law. Rather, I would like to 
provide a basis from which to explore it further by concentrating on the 
principles at the core of this study.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
166
 Nyazee argues that Usul al-fiqh and Western jurisprudence study the same subjects. Western jurisprudence has 
come to be divided into two major areas: general jurisprudence and particular jurisprudence. Institutions of legal 
learning in countries like Pakistan are still occupied solely with particular jurisprudence, while the Western world has 
moved away from it toward general jurisprudence. Particular jurisprudence deals with legal concepts that cut across 
different branches of law, that is, concepts like right, property, and duty. This is the area of jurisprudence examined by 
writers like Salmond a long time ago. General jurisprudence, as the title implies, deals with broader questions - the 
nature and concept of law itself: what is law? Why do we obey it? What is the nature of obligation? How do judges 
discover and apply the law? how are laws validated? What constitutes a legal system? What role has morality to play in 
a legal system? These and other questions of legal philosophy underlie this field that continues to dominate the work of 
Western legal philosophers. A study of the works of legal philosophers like Hart, Fuller, Raz and Dworkin reveals that 
general jurisprudence is the same thing as usul al-fiqh, though the legal materials it operates on are secular in nature, 
while the materials for the latter are divine in origin. Nevertheless, both are legal materials. What is surprising is that the 
issues faced by Western legal philosophers today were approached by Muslim jurists more than a thousand years ago. 
It is true that the language used by Muslim jurists was different, while some of the sophistication found in modem legal 
systems was lacking in those days, but the basic questions answered are the same. See ibid p.1. 
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Part I 
Introduction to Islamic Law 
Before Islam, Arabs inhabited tribal communities who followed animistic 
religions. That community was the focal point for the individual, and survival 
outside the community was difficult if not impossible. The tribes themselves 
developed their own sets of customary laws that were binding on all members. 
Besides the tribal communities, there were trading communities in Makah and 
Medina who enjoyed commercial relations with areas outside the Arab region. 
The merchants and traders developed their own set of mercantile laws.167  
This situation had been changed after the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) 
received his message (in approximately 610 AD). He acted not only as the 
messenger from God, but claimed the leadership of the Islamic society. During 
his life legislation derived from two sources - the ‘Holly Quran’ and his own 
words, deeds and practice (the ‘Sunnah’). These are not only the basic textual 
sources of the Shari’ah but the principal religious texts of Islam. After the death 
of the Prophet (PBUH) and in the early phase of Islamic expansion and unified 
political control under the Caliphs ‘Alrashidun’ (the rightly guided ones) it had 
been possible to achieve a consensus about the contents of Islamic law. 
However, during the rule of the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties, the true 
nature of Islamic law had been clarified and schools of Islamic law began to 
develop. During these years, Islamic Law developed sophisticated methods of 
interpretation and law finding, offering solutions in cases where the main 
sources of Shariah was silent.  
                                                           
167
 Tribal communities largely converted to Islam and gradually Islamic codes of conduct and law modified 
or replaced tribal customary law. In many instances, Islamic law did not completely replace tribal 
customary law but merely modified it. This can be seen most clearly in the law of homicide and the law of 
marriage, both of which have retained substantial elements of pre-Islamic tribal law. 
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The following chapters offer a brief appreciation of the aspects, nature and 
sources of Islamic Law as a necessary introduction before addressing the main 
topic of the study. 168  
1. Sources of Islamic law  
The sources of Islamic Law mean the types of evidence that the Lawgiver sets 
down as valid proof of the relevantly rules. Jurists have classified these as 
primary and secondary sources. This classification is of the utmost importance 
because it determines how the commands of God are discovered, and the 
sources to which the Shari’ah gives weight. 
1.1 The Primary Sources 
The first stage in the development of Islamic law covers the era of the Prophet 
Muhammad (BPUH) during which the only source of Islamic law was divine 
revelation in the form of either the Qur’an or the Sunnah. The Qur’an 
represented the blueprint for the Islamic way of life, and the Sunnah provided 
detailed explanation of the general principles outlined in the Qur’an, as well as 
a practical demonstration of their application. The Holly Qur’an and the Sunnah 
are the primary sources of Islamic Law. 
The Holly Qur’an contains a considerable number of verses with legal 
significance, but is far from being a comprehensive code. It is supplemented by 
the ‘Sunnah’. Yet even this combination does not provide enough detail to deal 
with all commonly occurring problems. Therefore jurists treat Ijma’ (consensus) 
and Qiyas (analogy) as among the primary sources of Islamic Law mainly are. 
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 For detailed information and studies concerning the sources and origin of the Islamic law, see Martin 
Lau and Doreen Hinchcliffe, Introduction to Islamic law, External Programme: University of London 2005; 
Kamali, M.H. Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, Islamic Texts Society, 1991 2nd edition;  Zafar Ishaq 
Ansari, The Contribution of the Qur’an and the Prophet to the Development of Islamic Fiqh’, (1992) 3 
Journal of Islamic Studies141; Bilal Philips, op. cit.. 
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No scholars have challenged the authority of these four sources over other 
subordinate sources. 
A. The Holly Qur’an 
In the Islamic legal system where the hierarchy and order of priority of sources 
are carefully maintained, the Holly Qur’an enjoys the highest position as the 
most primary source in the Shari’ah from which Islamic legal rules are derived, 
and through which the purposes of Shari’ah are to be achieved. The Holly 
Qur’an, being the words of God, serves as a source of divine commands, 
knowledge and fundamental guidance for humankind. It is the duty of every 
Muslim to submit him or herself to these commands. The Holy Qur’an was not 
delivered to the Holy Prophet as a complete book, but was revealed to him 
piece by piece through the Archangel Jibrail (peace be with him) during the last 
23 years for the Prophet’s life. The authoritative text of the Qur’an is the Arabic 
text.169  
After the death of the Prophet (PBUH), many ‘suras’ were reduced to writing, on 
materials ranging from leather to pieces of board. The Qur’an was collected in a 
unified hard copy during the reign of the third Caliph, Othman, in about 650 
AD.170 All copies of the Holy Qur’an which exist in the world today are true 
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 Over the years, the Qur’an has been translated into many languages, but translations must be used 
with caution, since the meaning conveyed by a particular word or phrase in Arabic may convey a 
considerably different meaning in another language, and thus lead to misinterpretation of the text.  
170 The Arabs being a race of illiterates, there were very few in Mecca who could read or write. There was 
no paper, and pens and inkpots were scarce. It was a most difficult task to get the revelations written down 
as they came. But the arrangement was made. A few of those who knew the art of writing embraced 
Islam. The verses of the Holy Quraan were inscribed on palm-leaves and leather sheets. Some of the 
Companions were specially charged with the duty of learning portions of the Quraan as they were 
revealed. Persons were specially selected from among the Companions who would take lessons from the 
Holy Prophet (peace be with him!). Each lesson consisting of ten verses of the Holy Quraan. They would 
learn by heart those verses, their meanings and interpretations as taught by the Holy Prophet, and teach 
the same to others. Then came the time of the Migration to Medina. The Muslim group had been growing 
gradually. At Medina it was knit into a functioning community. Among other things, the Holy Prophet made 
the arrangements whereby a larger number of Companions could learn to read and write. The work of 
writing down the revelations of the Quraan continued with the fullest exertion. Its compilation in the form of 
a scripture was entrusted to Zaid bin Thabit, a freed slave who was one of those Companions assigned 
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copies of that manuscript. It exists not only as a written text, but also in the 
brains of hundreds of thousands of Muslims, which makes it impossible for 
anyone to change even a comma.171  
The Qur’an contains 6,219 verses, collected in 114 chapters called ‘suras’. A 
number of Quranic verses are direct answers to the questions raised by both 
Muslims and non-Muslims during the era of prophethood. Many of these verses 
actually begin with the phrase “They ask you about,” For example,  
(They ask you about wine and gambling. Say, there is great evil in 
them as well as benefits to man. But the evil is greater than the 
benefit.. ) (Qur’an 2:219). 
Much Islamic legislation found in the Sunnah also results from answers to 
questions, or consists of pronouncements made at the time that particular 
incidents took place. The reason for this method of legislation was to achieve 
gradation in the enactment of laws, as this approach was easily accepted by 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the task of writing down the Quraan. The revelations continued to come, and they were not only preserved 
in writing, but the Holy Prophet, under Divine guidance, would fix up the chapters and would instruct the 
scribes to insert a certain revelation at a certain place in a certain chapter. Gradually, the delivery of the 
Word of God reached completion and, at the Farewell Pilgrimage, in the plain of Arafat, came the 
revelation: “This day I have perfected your religion for you and completed my favour upon you and 
have chosen for you Islam as your religion.” (V:4) Not only was the arrangement of the verses and the 
arranging of chapters done by the Holy Prophet, but he also fixed the serial arrangement of the chapters, 
and all that he did under Divine instructions. To carry the work to its logical finish, Abu Bakr the Truthful, 
Islam’s first Caliph, rendered the service of giving the separately written chapters the form of a 
consolidated compilation. 
Different portions of the Quraan written by different people continued to remain, however, in their 
possession. The people of different places also continued to follow their local pronunciations of Quraanic 
verses. Then came the period of the third Caliph, Osman (God be pleased with him!). Islam was no more 
confined to Mecca and Medina, but had crossed the boundaries of the Arabian Peninsula and had entered 
Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Iraq and Iran. People were entering the fold of Islam in ever-growing numbers. 
The interest in Quraanic recitation was becoming universal. Large numbers of people had only portions of 
the Quraan in their possession. Misunderstandings could arise that only such and such a portion formed 
the whole Quraan, and that the other portions were not part of it. Hence, Caliph Osman got several copies 
made of the manuscript compiled during Caliph Abu Bakr’s regime and sent those copies to the different 
centres of the Islamic empire. The copy which Caliph Osman himself used for study and on which, it is 
said, the drops of his blood fell at the time of his martyrdom, remained preserved first at Medina and was 
later transferred from there to the Imperial Library at Istanbul by the Turkish Sultans.  
171
 Muhammaad Abdul Aleem Siddiqui Al Qadri, The History of the Codification of Islamic law cultivation of 
Science by Muslims, ،او م ا نا  !ارز ،و#$ا ر, (1935), p 13. 
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Arabs who were used to complete freedom. It also made it easier for them to 
learn and understand the laws. 
Within the Qur’an verses, no more than 600 verses deal with specifically legal 
rules and injunctions172, which can be classified under four headings:173 
a. Concise injunctions: these are precise commandments but the Qur’an 
does not give detailed rules about how they are to be carried out. 
Examples include prayer, fasting, payment of zakat. 
b. Concise and detailed injunctions: these are commandments given in 
the Qur’an but about which further details may be discovered from the 
Sunah and other recognised sources, e.g. rules about relations with non-
Muslims. 
c. Detailed injunctions: the Quran gives complete details about those 
commandments and nothing further is required or may be sought, e.g 
punishment limits. 
d. Fundamental principles of guidance: these principles do not have 
clear cut definitions and the way to put them into effect must be 
determined through ijtihad (use of personal reasoning), e.g. principles 
such as freedom, equality, the public interest and justice. 
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 Martin Lau & Doreen Hinchcliffe, op. cit. p.18. Various commentators suggest that there are anywhere 
from 80 to 600 verses of the Qur’an which have content that can be called legal. For instance, while 
Kamali states that the Qur’an contains 350 legal verses, some scholars consider 500 or 600 of the over 
6,000 verses in the Qur’an to be legally oriented. However, most of those verses deal with worship rituals, 
leaving about 80 verses that deal with legal matters in a strict sense. Other scholars point to 350 verses 
with legal content, 140 dealing with devotional issues; 70 dealing family matters - marriage, divorce, the 
waiting period, revocation, mahar, maintenance, custody, fosterage, paternity, inheritance and bequest, 70 
dealing with commercial transactions, 30 dealing with crimes and penalties, 30 dealing with the rights and 
obligations of citizens, and 10 dealing with economic matters. See : Mohammad Hashim Kamali, 
Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 3rd ed, Cambridge, Islamic Texts Society, 2003; Abdullahi Ahmad An-
Na’im, Towards an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and International Law, Syracuse 
University Press, (1990).  
173
 Jamila Hussain, op. cit. p.31. 
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The verses in the Qur’an which are of a more general nature, eschewing evil 
and seeking good, however, have also proved to be foundations for principles 
of the Shari’ah. For example the verse which says ‘Muslims abide by their 
stipulations’ may be considered as the basis of the Islamic law of contract, 
while the verse which says ‘There is no harm in Islam’ as the basis of the 
Islamic law of tortious liability. 
Another way of classifying Islamic legislation in the Qur’an is in terms of the 
variety of acts which have been enjoined by divine decree on mankind. These 
acts form basic categories with regard to the parties involved in the acts: 174 
A. Dealings between God and man: These are the religious rites which 
are not valid without correct intention. Some of them are purely religious 
forms of worship, like prayer and fasting; while others are socio-
economic forms of worship, like Zakah (compulsory charity) and yet 
others socio-physical forms of worship, like Haj (pilgrimage to Makah). 
These forms of acts of worship are considered the foundation of Islam 
after faith. 
B. Dealings among men: The laws governing these dealings may 
themselves be divided into four sub-sections relative to the subject 
matter of dealing: 
i. Laws ensuring and defending the propagation of Islam. These are 
embodied in the codes of armed or unarmed struggle. 
ii. Family laws for the development and protection of the family 
structure. These include laws concerning marriage, divorce and 
inheritance. 
iii. Trade laws governing business transactions, leases … etc. 
iv. Criminal laws governing business transactions, leases and 
various crimes. 
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 Strzyzewska, Bozena Gajane, The History of Islamic Law, (1980), pp. 34-35. 
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Since the Qur’an has no secular, earthly source, none of it can be altered by 
any human agency or institution.  
B.  The Sunnah 
The word ‘Sunnah’ literally means a beaten track, and thus an accepted course 
of conduct. Among the Arabs before Islam, it meant the traditional practices of 
the community. Gradually, in Islamic thought, it came to mean all the acts and 
sayings of the Prophet as well as everything he approved. The Sunnah is 
considered the second source of revelation based on God’s statements in the 
Qur’an. It is, next to the science of the Qur’an, the most important source for the 
development of Islamic law. 
The authority of Sunnah comes from many Qur’an verses, including the 
following verse whereby God clarifies that whatever originated from the Prophet 
(PBUH) does not come from his own desire, but it is an inspiration from God.  
‘ Nor does he say (ought) of his own desire. It is no less than 
inspiration sent down to him’. (Qur’an 53: 3-4) 
This directly indicates the role of Sunnah as the type of revelation from God to 
his prophet (PBUH). It is important to mention that within the Sunnah the only 
thing of a legal nature held to form part of the Shari’ah, the personal practices 
of the Prophet (BPUH) are not considered to form part of the law.  
As the time-line from the Prophet increased, it became necessary to collect, 
sort out and pass on his traditions. This was the beginning of the science of 
“ahadith sing.-hadith” (oral communication traced back to the Prophet). 
Although, collections of ahadith came into existence a few centuries later, the 
tradition of passing on ahadith was continuous and active throughout the 
interim period. Each ‘hadith’ consists of two parts. The first chart describes the 
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chain of communication of the sayings of the prophet from the first to the last 
informant. The status and the credibility of a hadith depend therefore to some 
extent on the status and the credibility of the informants.175 The second chart 
concerns the formal content of the practice or the saying of the Prophet itself.  
The Prophet (BPUH) used several techniques to declare Islamic law. 
Sometimes he would explain the intent of the Qur’anic text by making a 
statement, sometimes he would do so by an act, and sometimes he would do 
both. He also encouraged his Companions to make legal rulings in order to 
prepare them to carry on the application of the Shariah after he left them. 
The Sunnah is used by the jurists for the following purposes in ascertaining the 
law:176 
a. to confirm the law which has already been mentioned in the Qur’an; 
b. to give an adequate explanation of matters mentioned in general terms 
only in the Qur’an; 
c. to clarify verses in the Qur’an where this proves necessary; 
d. to introduce new rules not mentioned in the Qur’an. 
Thus the Sunnah was an exposition of the Qur’an by which its generalities were 
clarified and its intended meaning specified. Consequently, everything in the 
Sunnah is addressed in the Qur’an, either by inference or by direct reference. 
The address may be so general as to include the whole as in the case of the 
verse: 
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 Islamic jurisprudence developed a sophisticated science of tradition to verify whether or not a hadith 
can indeed be traced back to the Prophet (PBUH) or one of his companions. Hadiths are accordingly 
classified by hadith scholars depending on the reliability with which this chain of communication could be 
established. The highest grade of transmitted material is ‘sound’; next comes ‘good’; with the lowest grade 
of credibility being termed ‘weak’. 
176
 Jamila Hussain, op. cit. p. 32. 
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(… Whatever the messenger gives you take it; and whatever he 
forbids you, leave it…) (Qur’an 59:7). 
Alternatively, the address may indicate generally defined laws, the details of 
which are left to the Sunnah. Hence, the Sunnah may explain the methodology, 
reasons, requirements and location, or it may explain the inclusion which could 
not be logically deduced. The Qur’an takes priority over the Sunnah as a source 
of law, and jurists should resort the Sunnah for legal guidance only when no 
clear guidance can be obtained from the Qur’an. It is a fundamental principle 
that the Qur’an and the Sunnah can never contradict each other. 
C. Ijma (consensus) 
Ijma or the consensus of scholars has been technically defined as the 
consensus of jurists over a certain period on a religious matter. Jima should be 
based on consultation between jurists and the use of juristic reasoning, taking 
into account what guidance is giving by the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Ijma 
cannot violate the Quran or the Sunnah. The authority of Ijma is based on the 
prophet’s statement that ‘My people will never agree on an error’. As such, the 
agreement of the scholars of Islam on any religious matter is a source of law.  
The scope for Ijma is wider than just providing binding interpretations of the 
Qur’an and the Sunnah. Questions not covered by the Qur’an and the Sunnah 
may also be answered by Ijma. Nevertheless, the principle of Ijma does not 
mean that the masses could somehow collectively agree on a certain course of 
action. Only those interpretations, forms of worship and legal practice are 
approved by consensus are authoritative and binding on the ummah (the 
community of believers) and once a certain legal principle or a certain 
interpretation has been established by the consensus of the jurists, it cannot be 
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repealed or deviated from. The reason for this is simple Ijma represents the 
truth, since God would not allow His followers to err collectively. There can be 
no reason why the right principle, once established, should become wrong at a 
later stage.  
A good illustration for the principle of Ijma occurred right after the death of the 
Prophet. The election of Abu Bakr to the post of Caliph by the votes of the 
people was the first manifestation of Ijma. During the development of Islamic 
law certain qualifications became to be regarded as essential for deciding who 
would be allowed to participate in the process of arriving at a rule of law on the 
basis of Ijma. Minors and lunatics were excluded, as were non-Muslims, and 
eventually the power to participate in Ijma was confined to those learned in the 
law (i.e. Islamic jurist-theologians of a given period). Only their consensus was 
capable of establishing a binding rule of Islamic law. The practical value of Ijma 
became in the course of time very limited since it was impossible to obtain a 
consensus on a given problem by just asking all those jurists. There was no 
organisation that represented all jurists and as a result Ijma has come to be 
determined by looking into the past; for instance if there is doubt about a certain 
interpretation of the Qur’an it is possible to look into the past and to find that a 
certain interpretation has become accepted through Ijma, because all jurists 
had agreed on that particular interpretation and it had been followed for a long 
time.  
D. Qiyas (Analogy) 
Unlike the other main sources, which are based more or less directly on the 
divine commandments, qiyas depends on the judgment of man. Qiyas means a 
comparison between two things with the view of evaluating one in the light of 
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the other. It is the extension of a Shariah value from an original case to a new 
case, because the latter has the same effective cause as the former. Quiyas 
may be resorted to discover the law on a certain matter only if no solution can 
be found in Qur’an or Sunnah, or in cases covered by Ijma. Qiyas also means 
that the search for an analogy to the case in point is not restricted to any 
particular legal provision contained in the Qur’an or the Sunnah but can include 
the examination of the totality of law in order to find a solution which is most 
closely aligned to the general spirit of Islamic law. An example of a legal ruling 
developed through qiyas is the case of drugs. The Qur’an and Sunnah prohibit 
drinking alcohol (the original case) because it intoxicates. Now narcotic drugs 
(the new case) are prohibited because they also intoxicate. So the law 
prohibiting alcohol is extendable to narcotic drugs. The Agreement of Jurists 
upon this conclusion leads to an Ijma. 
1.2 Secondary Sources  
In medieval times jurists developed various interpretive methodologies that 
balanced the need for authority, legitimacy and discretion in a way that ensured 
a just outcome under the circumstances. They extended scriptural rules through 
analogy, balanced competing precedents in light of larger questions of justice 
(istihsan), and legislated pursuant to public policy interests where scripture was 
otherwise silent (maslaha mursala), they also observed the public interest 
(istislah), the presumption of continuity (istishab) and blocking means to evil 
(sad al-dharai).  
There are a few other secondary sources of Islamic law that depend upon 
transmission and not on methods of reasoning, for example, a companion’s 
opinion (Qawl al-Sahabi). A companion is someone who saw the Prophet 
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(PBUH) and associated with him for some time so that he could understand 
something of the ways of the Shariah from him.  Another secondary source of 
the same kind is Urf (the custom of a particular locale). Jurists recognize that 
urf may serve as the basis of law as long as it does not contradict other legal 
principles. Custom has played a particularly important role in commercial 
arrangements, which varied widely from one area of the Muslim world to 
another. In the following chapters, I will provide a short explanation of the 
secondary sources in order of their importance.177 
A. Istihsan (Legal Preference):  
On a particular matter there may be two qiyases. One may be harsh and 
inconvenient, while the other may be good and useful to the society. The former 
is called open qiyas and the latter is hidden qiyas. Jurists accept the latter and 
reject the former in order to achieve the public interest. They base their action 
on the verse of the Qur’an:  
‘Allaah wants ease and comfort and not hardship’ (Al-Bakara 185) 
For example, Waqf (religious endowment) may be compared with sale or lease 
to transfer of property. In fiqh, one of the conditions of a valid sale is that the 
object of the sale must be clearly stated in the contract. For lease this is not the 
case. If Waqf is compared with sale anything related to the object not clearly 
mentioned in the Waqf deed cannot be a part of the Waqf. This qiyas is against 
the public interest and will defeat the purpose of Waqf, which is to serve the 
public benefits. On the other hand, the purpose is upheld if it is analogised with 
lease.178 Another example is the acceptance of modern forensic evidence as 
proof in criminal cases. Under classical Islamic law, oral evidence was 
considered the best and most reliable type of proof and was given precedence 
over all other types of proof. However, with the development of modern 
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 For more explanation of the secondary sources, see Bilal Philips, op. cit. pp.82-119. 
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 Md Anowar Zahid, op. cit.  p.23. 
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accurate methods of proof through forensic science, istihsan allows a departure 
from the established rule in the interest of discovering the truth by the best 
method possible.179 
B. Istislah (Welfare): 
Istisldh simply means seeking that which is more suitable. It deals with things 
which are for human welfare but have not been specifically considered by the 
Shari'ah. An example of Istisldh is found in Caliph Ali's ruling that a whole 
group of people who took part in a murder were guilty even though only one of 
the groups had actually committed the act of murder. The legal texts of 
Shari'ah covered only the actual murderer. Another example is the right of a 
Muslim leader to collect taxes from the rich other than Zakah if the interest of 
the state demands it, whereas in Shariah only Zakah is specified.  
C. Uruf (Customs):  
Local customs were accepted as a source of law in a given region. Any long 
standing practice of the people may be accepted as a source of Islamic law 
subject to certain specific conditions, the most important being that it shall not 
conflict with the letter or spirit of Shari’ah. Examples of accepted customs by 
Shariah are found in Diyah, and Dowry and rental custom. Diyah (blood money 
as compensation in case of unintentional killing), was practised in Arab society 
from long before the Prophet. As this was good, it was therefore accepted by 
Islamic law. A dowry must be agreed upon as part of a marriage contract but 
there is no set time for payment. It is the custom of Egyptians as well as others 
that a portion of it must be paid before the marriage ceremony, while the 
remainder is only required to be paid in the case of divorce. These 
arrangements are acceptable to the Shariah as a valid custom. 'Urf can be seen 
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also in rental customs. Islamic law does not require the payment of a price until 
the thing leased has been delivered completely, however, it is an accepted 
custom that rent is paid before the rented place or object has been used for the 
agreed time period. 
 D. Istis-hab - (Linking) 
Istis-hab literally means seeking a link, but legally it refers to the process of 
deducing laws by linking a later set of circumstances with an earlier set. It is 
based on the assumption that the laws applicable to certain conditions remain 
valid so long as these conditions have not altered. If, for example, on account of 
the long absence of someone, it is doubtful whether he is alive or dead, then by 
Istis-hab all rules must remain in force which would hold if one knew for certain 
that he was still alive. 
E. Pre-Islamic Shari’ahs:  
Islamic is a monotheistic religion. It is the last in the chain of preceding religions 
that propagated the faith of one God such as Judaism and Christianity. There 
are some pre-Islamic rules which the Qur’an and Sunnah clearly ordain for the 
followers of Islam. With regard to fasting the Qur’an says, ‘O who believe! 
Fasting has been ordained upon you as it was ordained on the people before 
you.’ This is an explicit acceptance of pre-Islamic law by the Qur’an. There are 
some commands which are implicitly approved. For example, law of retaliatory 
punishment ordained in Judaism is mentioned in the Qur’an without abrogation 
or condemnation. 
F. Opinions of Sahaba (the Companions):  
Muslim jurists accept, in general, the opinions of the Companions of Prophet 
Muhammad as a source of law. Since they were with the Prophet, they had 
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direct knowledge from him. Therefore, their opinions carry special value in 
Islamic jurisprudence. The opinion of the Sahaba either as a group or 
individually is thus an important source of law. If the Sahaba opinion unified it 
will be converted to Ijma, where if they had a different opinions on a single 
issue, each opinion was referred to as personal opinion of the relevant Sahabi. 
All the above mentioned secondary sources of Islamic law allow the law to 
remain socially responsive without undermining its traditional authority.180 
2. How is Islamic Law Made? 
In the Islamic legal system, a rule of law in order to be valid has to be derived 
from the sources of Islamic law. Therefore jurists looking for Islamic law position 
on a certain case will seek the solutions from the sources of Shari’ah. They will 
seek first in the Qur’an and Sunnah because the lawgiver has omitted nothing 
for which a rule has not been laid down. The basis of this principle is in number 
of verses in the Qur’an: 
“We have neglected nothing in the Book (of our decrees)”. (Qur’an :38) 
“And we have sent down to the Book explaining all things, a Guide, a 
Mercy, and glad tidings to Muslims”. (Surah al Nahl 89) 
Nevertheless, there are many things in the modern world for which explicit rules 
cannot be found in the Qur’an or the Sunnah, and for which it is difficult to 
derive a rule on the basis of strict analogy. In such cases jurists believe that the 
principle that nothing has been left out means that, even when the rule has not 
been expressly stated, it still exists implicitly and has to be discovered in the 
sources. How the jurists do this and what methodology do they use? 
If the two main sources of the Shariah have not mentioned the matter at all, or if 
they have pronounced but still need further interpretation, Jurists have to strive 
to discover the law form the texts through all possible means of valid 
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interpretation. This is called “Ijtihad” (effort). It is a struggle, to discover the law 
from the texts and to apply it to the set of facts awaiting decision. 
When Jurists need to make law on any particular issue, they turn first to the 
Qur’an and Sunnah. If the law in this respect is clear and is free from ambiguity, 
they follow it and avoid ijtihad. There is no ijtihad within an explicit rule in the 
texts. This implies that when the rule stated in the texts is so clear that only one 
meaning can be derived from it, jurists are prohibited from undertaking ijtihad in 
it.181 On another words, if a meaning is given in these texts, it becomes the 
legal meaning and is to be followed, irrespective of its conformity with the literal 
meaning of the word. When no explanation is available, a jurist looks for literal 
meanings and uses his own reasoning and judgment to arrive at the 
appropriate answer. In this case the literal and technical meanings would be the 
same.182 
When the set of facts awaiting decision is not covered by literal meanings and 
implications, jurists will proceed by analogy. The form of analogy used here is 
very strict and goes by the name of analogy of cause (quiyas al-illah). This 
entails the extension of the meaning to a new case from a single text of the 
Qur'an or the Sunnah with a specific meaning on the basis of a common 
underlying cause. Should this method fail to solve the problem, jurist 
undertakes the extension by considering the texts collectively, that is, by 
looking at the spirit of the laws. Jurists use the general principles of the law by 
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referring them to the purposes of the Shariah (maqasid al-shari'ah) and 
checking them against these purposes.183 
Jurists may end with different interpretations and even solutions because there 
are several schools of Islamic law. The theories of the jurists can only be 
understood by appreciating the detailed principles preferred by each school. 
This diversity does not confuse Muslims, as they have the freedom to follow the 
opinion or interpretation which they believe is right. Lawyers, judges and 
scholars are free to base their interpretation on the opinion of any jurist, 
whatever his affiliation. They may even follow rules of interpretation adopted by 
a particular school in one context, and those adopted by a different school in 
another rule. Questions of internal analytical consistency are ignored by the 
proponents of such a view. A multiplicity of theories of interpretation in no way 
indicates discord or tension within the Muslim community. On the other hand, it 
indicates an unparalleled richness and variety in a system of law that 
accommodates a large number of distinct races, cultures, and geographical 
regions.184 
It is worth mentioning that from the earliest days of Islamic law the roles of 
jurists and rulers were clearly defined. Jurists focused on that part of the law 
that was derivable directly from the text, whereas rulers generally dealt with 
new situations using the general principles of the Shariah available in the Quran 
and Sunnah. This separation between the activity of the state and the writings 
of jurists was intentional, because of the structure of Islamic law and the design 
of the Islamic legal system, and it was carried out under the principle of 
separation of functions in a spirit of cooperation. 
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The aforementioned primary sources of Islamic law namely the Qur’an, 
Sunnah, Ijma’ and Qiyas are the main fountains of Shari’ah. Jurists either find 
ready law there in the first two or extend that law by analogy to new cases. This 
part of Islamic law is small and relatively fixed. It includes the laws of worship, 
inheritance, marriage, dower, divorce and fixed punishment. Beyond this 
remains a vast area of law which is flexible. It is an Islamic State’s responsibility 
to legislate, with the aid of Jurists, in this area given the needs of the time. 
Jurists, engaged by the State, may make law in this sphere resorting to any of 
the abovementioned subsidiary sources.185 Nevertheless, the jurists derive 
general principles to be used by the rulers in creating Islamic law for certain 
matters. More elaboration of these principles follows. 
3. The Principles of Islamic Law: 
A principle is an authoritative starting point for legal reasoning from which we 
seek grounds of decision by deduction. In modern law, principles are said to 
come into operation in "hard cases." These are cases where the text of the 
statute fails to provide a direct answer. A judge in such a case would search for 
a general principle that would cover the particular set of facts. Eisenberg 
suggests that principles are explanations for rules, in the sense that we 
commonly invoke general propositions to explain those that are more specific. 
However, the force of principles is not merely explanatory. Principles, like rules, 
are binding legal standards, and often determine results without the mediation 
of rules. 
In English common law, principles are laid down by court decisions. These 
principles have usually been refined over the years by later judgments. 
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Whenever a judge needs a principle he looks for it in such judgments. In Islamic 
law both general principles and rules are laid down in the Qur'an and the 
Sunnah or could be constructed from the general words. Islamic law principles 
according to the great jurist “Al-Ghazali”, who converts the discovery of the 
general principle into a theory, are of three kinds, and each of these is 
discovered in a defined way. 
A. Principles stated explicitly in the texts:  
The first category of principles are those stated explicitly in the texts of the 
Qur'an and the Sunnah, e.g. the prohibition of riba (interest) emerging from the 
Qur'an and its supplementary principles stated in the Sunnah. The principle 
stated in the text of the Qur'an is read by the jurists as implying: "All sales are 
permitted, except those bearing riba" Another example is that "eligibility for 
profit is based on a corresponding liability for bearing loss."  Principles stated 
explicitly in these texts must be followed even when they do not conform to the 
purposes of the law. Such principles are nevertheless limited.  
B. Principles Derived from the Underlying Wisdom of the Texts  
This category includes principles not explicitly stated in the texts, but which 
that have been derived directly therefrom, as being derived from the wisdom 
related to an underlying cause. An example is the "minority" concept which 
was generalized to yield the concept of "incapacity”. Through this the rule of 
guardianship was extended from minors to all persons who were unable to 
look after their own affairs, e.g. insane persons. This was further generalized 
to yield the principle of "necessity", so that guardianship could be extended to 
cases of financial mismanagement. 
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 C. Principle Introduced by Jurists  
These principles are not derived from the texts by generalization, but seek 
authenticity through conforming to the purposes of the law and consistency 
with the rest of the law. These principles have to meet the following conditions:  
a. They should not be alien to the law, but conform analytically to other 
propositions and principles of the law,  
b. They should not clash with the text, and  
c. They should not attempt to alter the implications of the texts, i.e. the 
general propositions and principles of the law.  
We will use some of these principles in supporting our argument when 
proposing a solution to the liability of the shareholders to the debts of their 
subsidiaries.  
4. The Development of Islamic Law 
Islamic law has a history whose normative foundations and development 
stretch from the 7th century to the present, which illustrates that legal rules 
were often the product of Muslim jurists utilizing their analytical discretion in 
light of cultures, institutions of education, precedent, principles, and doctrines. 
Therefore, the development of Islamic law cannot be appreciated without 
studying the history of fiqh, as it is the foundation of Islamic civilization and was 
the cement for its stability through the turmoil of centuries. As long as the 
process of fiqh was dynamic, creativity and ideas flowed from Islam to other 
civilizations. When this process became static and stagnant, historical Islam 
increasingly turned inwards and became marginalized in the global struggle of 
humankind. 
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Islamic law passed through six major stages of development:  
a) The Foundation: the era of the Prophet (PBUH) (609-632CE).  
b) The Establishment: the era of the Righteous Caliphs, from the death of 
the Prophet (PBUH) to the middle of the seventh century CE (632-661).  
c) The Building: from the founding of the Umayyad dynasty until its decline 
in the middle of the 8th century CE.  
d) The Flowering: from the rise of the  Abbasid dynasty in the middle of the 
8th century CE to the beginning of its decline around the middle of the 
10th century CE.  
e) The decline of the Abbasid dynasty from about 960 CE to the murder 
of the last Abbasid Caliph at the hands of the Mongols in the middle of 
the 13th century CE.  
f) Stagnation and Decline: from the sacking of Baghdad in 1258 CE to 
the present. 
While the details of the history and development of Islamic law lie out with the 
scope of this study, I can only highlight its most important features.186 During 
the life of the Prophet (PBUH), he was the only source for Muslims to know and 
understand the Shari`ah. His example was necessary and sufficient for the 
guidance of the community. The Qur’an presents the doctrinal principles and 
ethical underpinnings of the Shariah and the Prophet (PBUH) clarified, 
substantiated and implemented these principles. However, he did not leave this 
world until after the edifice of the Shari`ah was completed and its basis and 
general principles were fully outlined. Yet he did not leave a fully codified Law, 
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but a collection of principles and general rules along with a number of specific 
injunctions and judicial verdicts.  
Therefore, his death presented a challenge to his Companions to continue the 
process of realizing God’s orders in the matrix of human affairs. The first 
generation of Muslims rose to this challenge. Where God’s orders were explicit 
or where the Prophet had given clear direction, they followed that direction. 
Where the Qur’an and the Sunnah provided general principles but no directive 
for explicit implementation, they used the process of consultation and reasoning 
to find solutions to the pressing problems of the day. Over time this 
methodology developed into a broad tradition practised by the first four Caliphs 
- the ijma (consensus) of the Companions. Such consensus was sometimes 
universal. At other times, it was the consensus of only some of the 
Companions. The Companions created history with their deeds, leaving others 
to follow in its trail. It was left to later generations to study, understand and 
argue about what they had done.  
Further challenges emerged with time. As the Companions passed away, 
intellectual leadership of the community passed on to the Tabeyeen (those who 
had followed or learned from the Companions). This was the second generation 
of Muslims. Eventually this generation too passed away presenting a great 
challenge, especially as the Islamic empire extended worldwide187 to include 
Arabs, Persians, Egyptians, Africans, Spaniards, Afghans, Turks and Indians. 
The people of the empire needed answers to the issues that faced the vast and 
diverse world of Islam. Arab and non-Arab jurists fed these needs, presenting 
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fruitful values and new choices to Islamic law. These choices were modulated 
and transformed by Islamic history. Muslim society was in a state of flux, and 
the pent up tensions brought by new peoples and ideas were soon to erupt like 
a volcano, giving birth to great Muslims scholars who systematized the science 
of fiqh.  
In the early years of Islam, the cities of Madina and Kufa were two of the prime 
centers of learning. Madina was the city of the Prophet and its people had close 
access to Prophetic traditions. However, Madina as the heart of the Islamic 
Empire was insulated from the challenges of ideas from neighboring 
civilizations. The Madinite School was much more orthodox in its approach to 
fiqh. Kufa, on the other hand, located at the confluence of Arabia and Persia, 
was a melting pot and more susceptible to foreign ideas. It was from Kufa that 
the Umayyad188 ruled Iraq, Pars (central and southern Persia), Khorasan and 
western India (today’s Pakistan). The Kufans had somewhat less access to the 
traditions of the Prophet, but were at the forefront of the challenge of ideas from 
the neighboring Greek, Persian, Indian and Chinese civilizations.  
It was only natural that Madina and Kufa would become the earliest centers of 
schools of jurisprudence, and the earliest developments in fiqh centered on 
these two cities, creating had two schools of fiqh, the Madinite and the Kufic. 
The first and foremost scholar of the Kufic School was Imam Abu Haneefa 
(d.768) whereas the first and foremost scholar of the Madinite School was 
Imam Malik bin Anas (d. 795).  
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The period of the Abbasid dynasty189 saw great support for Islamic scholarship. 
Fiqh developed as an independent Islamic science, compilations of hadith and 
fiqh were made, and great scholars debated theological matters and 
disseminated their ideas throughout the Empire. The process of commentary 
and analysis of Shariah provided by the Imams and their jurist followers 
stretched over a period of three hundred years, throwing up at least nineteen 
schools of jurisprudential thought (called in Arabic madhahib, literally way of 
going). Over time, the number of madhahib diminished, to the extent that there 
are now only four remaining Sunni schools and three Shia schools.190   
The four Sunni schools are: 
a. the Hanafi madhhab, named after Abu Hanifah (d. 768) 191;  
b. the Maliki madhhab, named after Malik b. Anas (d. 795)192;  
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 The Turks loved the egalitarian disposition of Imam Abu Haneefa, as well as the creative aspects of the Hanafi Fiqh. 
When they embraced Islam, they became Hanafis and its arch defenders. The Seljuk Turkish dynasties in the 11th and 
12th centuries as well as the Ottomans endorsed the Hanafi Fiqh. The Timurids, Turkomans as well as the Great 
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although as we shall elaborate later, for reasons rooted in geography, the Maliki and Shafi’i Schools are also well 
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 The Maliki School spread through Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Morocco through the Hajj. The North Africans visited 
Mecca and Madina and learned their fiqh from the Madinites. They had little reason to visit Kufa and Iraq and therefore 
had only occasional contact with the Hanafi School. The cultural affinity between the unsettled Berbers of North Africa 
and the Bedouins of Arabia also contributed to the acceptance of the Maliki School in Libya and the Maghreb. From 
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c. the Shafi’i madhhab, named after Muhammad b. Idris al-Shafi’i (d. 
820)193; and 
d. the Hanbali madhhab, named after Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 855).194  
The schools were formed, it has been claimed, in an attempt to maintain 
autonomy from the Caliph, and exclude dogmatic theologians and sectarian 
groups from religious authority. The Schools had no charters, patents, or 
membership lists; their organization was informal. Nevertheless, by the mid-
tenth century, it became impossible to study or teaches Islamic law without 
belonging to one of the established schools.195 
The four Sunni schools are not sects. Each is organized around a theory for the 
derivation of law that it upheld and practised. Each has an individual and 
independent system of interpretation, which is internally consistent and thus 
must be followed as a whole or not at all. An attempt to merge or combine two 
systems of interpretation would lead to a new theory of interpretation. This 
would be permissible only if the new theory is developed as a whole and is also 
internally consistent. Such attempts have indeed been made, though the jurists 
advancing their theories have rarely claimed that they were proposing new 
theories outside their schools. There is no restriction, however, and there has 
never been one, on the formulation of new theories by competent jurists. Today 
qualified jurists may advance fresh theories, if such theories are needed.  
The schools played a crucial role in shaping legal interpretation and the 
transmission of legal knowledge, while providing a strong element of continuity 
and homogeneity in Islamic society over space and time. The schools differ in 
various respects, including the way they arrive at a legal decision, but accept 
                                                                                                                                                                          
North Africa, the Maliki School spread to Spain and was the only official School sanctioned by the Umayyad dynasty in 
Cordoba. As Islam spread from the Maghreb into sub-Saharan Africa through trade routes, the Maliki School also 
spread to Mauritania, Chad, Nigeria and other countries of West Africa. Most Africans today follow the Maliki School. 
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 The Shafi’i School spread to Egypt, the Sudan, Eritrea, East Africa, Malaya and the Indonesian Islands. Like the 
Hanafi School, the Shafi’i School produced many brilliant scholars. One of them, the great Abu Hamid al Gazzali (d. 
1111), not only influenced the development of fiqh, but also changed the course of Islamic history through his brilliant 
dialectic. 
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 The Hanbali School flourished in Arabia and western Iraq until the Wahhabi movement in the 18th and 19th centuries 
supplanted it. Because it was considered disruptive of accepted practices, it came into conflict with the Ottomans in the 
18th century. After the Wahhabis captured the Hijaz from the Ottomans in 1917, the Hanbali fiqh became the official 
jurisprudence in the Arabia (later known as Saudi Arabia). 
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Learning in Islam and the West, Edinburgh University Press, (1981). 
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each other as orthodox. The schools recognize each other’s traditions as 
legitimate and their opinions on disputed legal questions as equally valid. It is 
important to know that all schools have contributed in different degrees to the 
development of fiqh, and that no single school can properly be claimed to 
represent Islam or Islamic law in its totality. In other words, fiqh is not 
determined by any one school of thought acting alone. All schools have been 
important instruments for the clarifications and applications of the Shari’ah.196  
The work of a school founder was continued by his disciples, and over the 
centuries several widely used handbooks of law were composed by famous 
scholars, which supposedly laid down all what was needed to be known about 
the law for all generations. These books come to be regarded as authoritative 
legal texts in their particular schools. The writings in Law for every school 
passed through different styles, from commentaries on original texts, to 
summaries and abridged works, and then to the legal encyclopedias. 
Thereafter, writings began to define general axioms of Islamic Law, including 
comparing and grouping injunctions according to evident patterns. The fields of 
comparative law and legal theory also developed, as well as the codification of 
definitions, and the formulation of formal legal codes.  
The oldest extant legal compendia show that the study of the law was already 
quite sophisticated. There are indications that its systematic formulation dates 
back to the first half of the eighth century in Iraq. By 900 CE, all the main 
genres of legal literature had been established, including extensive legal 
compendia, epitomes of the points of law, collections of model legal documents, 
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collections of model court records, manuals for judges, collections of response, 
and manuals of jurisprudence, legal method and interpretation.  
By the late eighth and early ninth centuries C.E., from which date the earliest 
extant compendia of the points of law, such as the Book ‘al-umm’ of 
Muhammad b. Idris al-Shafi'i (d. 820), Islamic law was already a sophisticated 
science with a substantial tradition behind it. In such works, the law was 
organized into chapters in a more or less standard order, falling into three main 
sections:  
a. (ibadat) devotions, including ritual purity, prayer, almsgiving, fasting, the 
pilgrimage, and related topics;  
b. (mu'amalat) transactions, contracts, including sales, debt, rental, 
pawning and mortgage, partnership, loans, inheritance, marriage, 
divorce, slavery, gifts, endowments, etc.; and  
c. (ahkam) verdicts, including payment of indemnity for injuries, criminal 
punishments, and court procedure.  
Obviously, the law includes not only topics directly related to religious devotions 
and rituals but also general topics of family, commercial, and criminal law.  
Closely related to the madhahib was the institution of the madrasa, or college of 
law, which began in the eleventh century in Baghdad in 1067 and subsequently 
spread throughout the Muslim world. The madrasa was usually a building that 
provided space for teaching large classes as well as lodging for students, often 
on an upper story.  
The colleges of law were supported by a perpetual endowment (Waqf) that 
generated income from the produce of agricultural land or the rent from a row of 
shops, for example. These funds paid the salaries of the overseer of the 
endowment, the professor of law, and other staff, as well as student stipends, 
repairs, and other expenses. Generally, the madrasa was devoted in the 
endowment deed to the law of one of the madahhib and had one professor who 
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taught the law of that madhhab. Stipends were also provided for students who 
studied the law of that particular madhhab.  
Madrasas soon became the most important institutions of learning in the 
Muslim world. They tended to exclude the teaching of the Greek sciences, 
including philosophy, medicine, astronomy, and so on, relegating their teaching 
to private settings, but to accept the teaching of other religious sciences, such 
as Arabic grammar, rhetoric, hadith, scriptural commentary, and so on, but as 
ancillary to the study of the law.197 Certainly by the thirteenth century, but 
possibly earlier, the completion of legal study was recognized by the conferral 
of a diploma granting the status of law teaches to its carrier. A diploma was 
granted by a master jurist to his student. 
In the early years, a considerable amount of flexibility in opinion was accepted, 
but towards the end of the Abbasid period the schools became more formalised 
and inflexible, until gradually the rule was made that Muslims had to follow a 
one school only and there could be no interchange between them. They 
became Sunni, Shi’a, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, Hanbali, ... etc. With time, 
stagnation set in and what was once a bridge to the future became a bridge 
only to the past. The schools became ossified. Heredity, official sanction, 
political events, tribal and national loyalties all played their historical part in this 
process.  
By the 11th century, Islam had become a city-based civilization. People longed 
for a break from controversies. A broad consensus developed that the existing 
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 The system of legal education that developed in conjunction with the madhhab and the madrasa 
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study of the legal tradition of the madhhab; and advanced study on the disputed questions of the law. 
Disputation and dialectic were major foci of the advanced law student’s training; they played an important 
role in the elaboration of the law. 
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schools of fiqh were sufficient to meet the challenges of the day. Islam had 
successfully withstood the onslaught of Greek thought and had successfully 
accommodated the spiritual challenge from eastern religions. It appeared that 
the interfaces between Islam and its sister civilizations of the day had been well 
defined. It was now time to rest the case. The door to ijtihad was therefore 
closed and people were required to copy or follow the work of pervious jurists 
(taqleed). Faced with the possibility of extinction, Islamic civilization increasingly 
turned inwards to its own inner soul. The close of Ijtihad made the fiqh fixed and 
inflexible and prevented it adapting to modern times. 198 
After the fall of the Ottoman Empire and during the period of Western 
expansion between the 16th and 20th centuries, most Muslim countries came at 
some time under the commercial and political domination of one of the major 
European colonizing powers.199 In such countries the Shari’ah was replaced 
with European-style legal systems, except for areas of law such as family law 
and inheritance, which were of little significance to the colonial power. Even in 
countries which were not directly colonized by European power, such as the 
Ottoman Empire, there was a tendency to “modernize” by adopting Western 
legal systems. New court systems were accompanied by legal education 
programmes that focused on European principles. Shari’ah courts were 
amalgamated with European concepts in unified court systems. The fusion of 
the two systems diluted Shari’ah, creating confusion and fostering limited 
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knowledge of Islamic law among Muslim lawmakers, jurists and lawyers in 
affected countries.200 
By the middle of the 20th century at one extreme certain Muslim countries had a 
mixed legal system, while at the other extreme Saudi Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan 
and Sudan retained an almost complete and traditional Shariah legal system. 
5. How Islamic Law Is Now Made  
The idea of closure of the gate of ijtihad was not accepted by many influential 
earlier Scholars201 who maintained that despite the decline in the fortunes of 
Islamic civilizations under Western colonialism, ijtihad was still possible and 
should continue to be exercised. Modern scholars argue that the four great 
Islamic schools and their founders never claimed infallibility or finality for their 
interpretations of the Shariah. Moreover, it is a false and unhistorical view to 
assume that the compilations of the great jurists of the past are a fixed and 
categorical body of law which must be accepted as divine. The decisions of 
these jurists were the product of human reasoning and the reasoning of men in 
a patriarchal era. Therefore some principles can and must be changed with 
changing circumstances, so that it is a necessity and a duty for qualified 
Muslims to re-exercise ijtihad in the present time.202 
The call to re-open the gate of ijtihad is supported by the fact that recent 
substantial political, economic and technological change has made urgent the 
need to find solutions in Islamic law to new problems and to reassess some old 
rulings in the light of new knowledge. This will not be achieved unless scholars 
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 Such as Ibn Taymiyah in the 14th century, Mohammad Iqbal in Pakistan, and Al-afghani and Mohamad 
Abdu in Egypt. 
202Jamila Hussain, op. cit. p 18. 
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are free from the doctrine of taqlid, exercising ijtihad in order to formulate new 
legal rules from a new interpretation of the Shariah. This means going back to 
the original sources to consider whether interpretations other than the 
traditional are ones possible.  
Since there are specialized areas where a religious scholar alone would not 
have sufficient technical knowledge to be in a position to give a proper opinion, 
there is a necessity for what has recently been called “collective ijtihad”, which 
may be obtained through the formation of councils of religious and secular 
scholars who are specialists in their chosen fields (such as finance, insurance 
… etc). Such councils have already been formed in many Muslim countries 
even in Europe.203  
In addition to the efforts to revive ijtihad, various Muslim countries have 
attempted to modernize and “westernize” their legal systems by re-interpreting 
the Shariah text. Such modernization is done by different tools such as 
Takhayyur and Talfiq. Takhayyur means making a choice from the variety of 
legal opinions offered by the eminent jurists of the past. If a satisfactory solution 
to a problem cannot be found within the opinions of the school predominant in a 
certain area, a solution may be adopted from the opinion of another school. 
Similar to this is the doctrine of Talfiq, which means combining part of the 
juristic opinion of one school with part of the opinion of another school or jurist 
in such a way as establish new legal rules. 
Another aspect of Shariah modernization is codification of Shariah. Modernists 
argue that it is in the public interest that the government should promulgate 
comprehensive codes of law so that modern interpretations of law could be put 
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into effect clearly and comprehensively. Such a method is more certain and 
convenient than searching through juristic treatises of the appropriate opinion in 
each case. 
6. Implementation of Islamic Law in Muslim Countries  
The wide spread of Islam has meant that many legal systems have either 
incorporated some elements of Islamic law, which govern Muslim citizens of 
these countries, as in South Africa and Nigeria,204 or are to a large extent 
completely based on classical Islamic law, as in Saudi Arabia.  
Countries with majority Muslim populations are officially Islamic states, and their 
constitutions contain provisions to the effect that Islam is the state religion and 
that all laws should be in conformity with Islamic Shariah. This applies for 
instance to both Iran and Pakistan. However, Islamic law is not only relevant in 
countries with majority Muslim populations. The legal systems of many non-
Muslim countries allow Muslims to be governed in the area of family law by 
Islamic law, e.g. India.205 
In many Arab countries, Islamic Law still forms the basis of the legal system, 
though in many instances it has been reformed and codified. The constitutions 
of some Arab countries provide that the Shariah is [a] or [the] principal source 
of law and some have enacted statutes based on the Shariah.206 However, this 
is different from the Shariah being the law. In the first case, it is no more than 
                                                           
204
 In recent years, some of the states in Northern Nigeria not only apply Islamic law in matters of personal 
status such as marriage, divorce, custody of children and succession on death, but also to criminal 
offences. The aim in these Muslim states of Northern Nigeria is to apply the Sharia in its entirety. 
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  Malaysia, which has a Muslim majority, is another example of a mixed legal system. Islam is the 
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 See, for example, Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution states that Shari’a principles are the main 
source of law; Article 2 of Kuwaiti Constitution, stated that the Shari’a is a main source of law. 
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a/the source; in the second, one of its essential attributes, its ultimate authority, 
has been altered, from Allah to the state. In Saudi Arabia, the Shariah is the 
law, but even there it is supplemented by numerous regulations enacted by the 
government. 
In terms of adherence to Shariah for commercial transactions, Islamic countries 
can be grouped into four categories:207  
a) countries that are highly observant of the Shariah (like Saudi Arabia, 
Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan);  
b) those who have made serious attempts to revive traditional Islamic 
jurisprudence  (like Jordan and the United Arab Emirates);  
c) those whose legal systems have been influenced by that of France (like 
Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, and Egypt); and  
d) Those which have completely abandoned traditional Islamic law and 
adopted instead western-style codes (like Turkey).208  
Adherence to the Shariah also varies depending upon the area of law. The 
rules of marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance are still strictly 
followed in the Muslim world. On the other hand, Islamic rules of crime and 
punishment are not always followed. In most Muslim countries imprisonment 
has replaced cutting off the hand of a thief, while the death penalty for apostasy 
has been abolished.209  
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7. Conclusion: Islamic Law is a Growing Tree: 
Nyazee describes Islamic law as an ever-growing tree. Its seed was sown in 
the hearts and minds of men fourteen hundred years ago by the Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH). Since then it has taken root, grown, and spread its 
branches on all sides. With each passing century, it grows in size, its evolution 
and growth never ceasing Its spreading branches cast their shade on all sides 
covering different cultures, peoples, and races. Like the trunk of this tree, 
Islamic law has a part that is fixed, and like its branches and leaves, the law 
has a part which changes shape and color every season. The fixed part of this 
tree is closer to the roots and cutting this part is likely to damage the tree itself. 
Like the trunk of this tree, the fixed part of Islamic law has grown directly from 
its roots or sources. Changing this fixed part will affect the nature of the legal 
system. Like the branches of the tree, the flexible part of the law has been 
changing with the times, sometimes yielding abundant fruit, sometimes less.  
When the branches of this tree are cut off, its cool shade is missing, but its 
strong trunk continues to guide and protect those who cling to it in storms and 
times of crisis. Thus, when the state does not let the branches of Islamic law 
provide their shade, it is the fixed part that continues to keep the Muslims on 
the right track. For those Muslims living in secular states, the fixed part of the 
tree is the only guide, and this is all they are obliged to follow, except for certain 
parts that are beyond their power to implement. Tending the trunk of the tree, 
the fixed part, has always been the task of Muslim jurists. They have looked 
after it with loving care for fourteen centuries. Their labour has made the trunk 
so strong that ceaseless attacks against it have failed to budge it. Not only this, 
many attacks on its roots have also failed. When the tree was young, its stem 
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was tended jointly by the state and the jurists, as then there was no distinction 
between the fixed and the flexible part. It was later, when the tree reached a 
mature stage of development, that the fixed part could be distinguished from 
the changing part with ease. At this stage the jurists left the care of the flexible 
part in the hands of the imam or the state, while they devoted themselves to 
the strengthening and refinement of the fixed part of the law. The only condition 
that the jurists imposed upon the inulin for developing the flexible part of the law 
was that he is a qualified jurist, that is, he should employ a valid methodology, 
either directly or through delegation, for developing this part of the law.  
Rulers in some ages did care for the branches of this tree, while in others they 
did not. On occasion some rulers cut off the branches that had grown in earlier 
ages and started all over again. This discouraged the development of firm 
offshoots from the tree, that is, the development of legal institutions and 
practices that could be developed further in later ages. After some centuries, 
when the Muslim empire split up, the branches of the tree were divided into 
different segments on different sides, with each ruler looking after the branches 
on his own side of the tree, as it suited his wisdom. Some took interest in this 
law while others did not. Thus, for example, the Ottoman rulers tended these 
branches in their own way in the Ottoman Empire, while Awrangzeb Alamgir 
developed the law in his own fashion in India.  
The period of these rulers was followed by violent storms around this tree, and 
alien winds struck it destroying the branches on all sides. On some sides the 
Muslims pulled down the branches themselves. The age of colonization left 
nothing but the solid trunk of the tree, which could not be uprooted with ease, 
thanks to centuries of dedicated work by Muslim jurists. When the storms were 
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over and the Muslims were left alone to take care of the tree, all they could see 
was the trunk of the tree with no branches or leaves. In their confusion they 
started blaming the jurists for not having looked after the branches, and having 
fallen prey to taqiid. They failed to distinguish between the fixed part and the 
flexible part. They did not realize that it was certain rulers and not the jurists 
who were to blame for not having established lasting institutions. Some even 
tried to bring branches from other alien trees to hang on their own tree, least 
realizing that these would rot one day. Today, some Muslim states are trying to 
look after the tree in their own way and on their own side, while others are busy 
trying to cut down the tree and even dig at its very roots. Nevertheless, 
branches have begun to sprout and it will not be too long before they start to 
bear fruit. Indeed, they must bear fruit, because the culture, history, life, and 
the very identity of Muslims are associated with this tree.  
A question may be asked here as to what we mean by the "fixed" part of the 
law. Very simply, the law that is stated explicitly in the texts, the Qur'an and 
Sunnah, or is derived through strict analogy (qiyas), is more or less fixed. The 
rules relating to ibadat are fixed; the rules relating to inheritance are fixed; the 
rules relating to marriage and divorce are fixed; and the rules relating to the 
hudud penalties are fixed. These laws are not likely to change over time. In 
comparison, if we make laws about income-tax, traffic, new forms of crimes, 
and other areas in accordance with the shari'ah, we might change them 
through fresh ijtihad in a later age, because these rules are not stated explicitly 
in the texts.  
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Nyazee210 stated that Islamic law is not only a stable tree patiently waiting for 
its fruit to be picked. It may also be compared to a giant river that has moved 
very rapidly in some stages, while in others it has slowed down, spreading out 
into the plains consolidating, depositing its fertile silt, and then moving on, 
sometimes bursting out again through the dams that have been constructed to 
block its path, threatening to wash away all that stands in its way. 
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Part II  
Groups of Companies in Islamic law 
Islamic Jurisprudence (fiqh) has certainly addressed commercial transactions. 
When jurists classify fiqh into akhlaq (morals), ibada (religious observance) and 
mu’amalat (transactions) they paied special attention to commercial 
transactions due to their importance and complexity. Fiqh books contain special 
sections for sales, leasing, partnership, transfers, mortgage and other topics 
related to commercial and business transactions. Moreover, Islamic commercial 
law has often been singled out as the most important area of contemporary 
research in relevant Islamic studies, and has been given an even higher rating 
than research in applied sciences and medicine. This is due to the critical 
importance of commercial transactions in the generation of wealth and the 
prospects of productivity in contemporary Muslim countries.211 
The concept of commercial law has special features in Islamic law compared to 
Western systems. These features give rise to two main differences between the 
two regimes212: 
a. Commercial law in Western regimes works on the assumption that 
different attitudes are needed for commercial as opposed to non-
commercial transactions, since business people need less protection 
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than ordinary individuals and different moral standards apply. Islamic law 
applies the same principles of morality to all situations. A Muslim should 
not behave in one way at home and another way in his business. 
Therefore, consistently with its overarching values in other areas, Islamic 
law emphasizes a moral approach to commercial and business 
transactions, based on values of justice, equality, and fairness, and any 
definition of Islamic commercial law must be read in the light of this 
consideration.  
b. Within Western systems, Commercial law’ in the Common law tends to 
cover transactions, rather than institutions such as partnerships and 
companies, whereas Civilian law encompasses both.213 These 
considerations do not apply to Islamic law where the distinction between 
transactions and institutions is not relevant. 214  
Islamic commercial law provides a framework for commercial transactions 
based on two main general principles, firstly freedom of trade and contract so 
far as the limits of Shari’ah allow, secondly in Islam everything is ‘Halal’ 
(allowed) unless it has been declared ‘Haram’ (forbidden). 215 A transaction will 
be considered ‘Haram’ if it includes one or more of the following forbidden 
actions; ‘Riba’ (usury), ‘Gharar’ (uncertainty), ‘Qimar’ (gambling), or if it involves 
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prohibited products or services such as alcohol, pork-derived foods, or 
pornography. 216  
What follows from these two general doctrines is that the forces of the market 
should be protected from unfair manipulation such as inflating the price of 
commodities by creating artificial shortages or concealment of vital information 
in a transaction from the other party. Speculative activity of any kind is also 
banned. In general, exploitation of any kind is expressly forbidden, including 
any attempt to capitalize on the other party’s poor negotiating position. 217 
The structures of commerce and business for trading, investment, and profit-
making have always been of great interest in the Shari’ah especially the 
structure of partnership. This was based on the Prophet Muhammad’s (PBUH) 
statement (Hadith) that: 
“God will become a partner in a business between two partners, so 
long as they do not indulge in cheating or breach of trust” 
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This also reflects the practice of the Prophet (PBUH), who was a great trader. 
When he started his prophethood in Mecca, he found that people practised a 
form of partnership, whereby an individual with surplus capital would entrust a 
person who had business talent with money to do business with, on the basis 
that any profits gained would be shared according to an agreed percentage. 
This is the origin of what is known today as mudarabah in Islamic finance. The 
Prophet sanctioned this practice, and it thus became Islamic by virtue because 
of his approval.218 With this beginning, mudarabah has become one of the 
widely used methods of investment carried out in the Muslim world. Muslim 
scholars and jurists of the past discussed detailed rules governing this type of 
investment mode, especially those relating to the rights and obligations of the 
parties in a mudarabah contract and the ways the profits are to be divided.   
Another form of partnership known in Islam is the Sharikah (a partnership in 
modern law) which literally means a joint venture by agreement. Sharikah is 
formed when two or more individuals agree to carry out a business venture, 
sharing income or profits from the business in accordance with an agreed ratio 
or percentage.  Sharikah has been the subject of scrutiny by Muslim jurists.219 
Although earlier juristic books provided clear law governing all aspects of 
Sharikah, there is a disagreement between modern jurists concerning the 
existence of the concept of a corporation in Islamic law. In this Part I will focus 
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on finding a settlement of this disagreement. I will also look to determine 
whether Islamic law acknowledges corporations, and if so in what form. Is the 
concept the same as recognised by the modern laws? Does a corporation in 
Islamic law have its own legal personality independent from its partners? Do the 
partners enjoying limited liability? The answer of these questions is very 
important to the study, since that if the answer is no, there will be no basis to 
proceed further to ask whether partners who are themselves company might be 
liable in Islamic law for the debts of their companies. 
The starting point must be to understand the concept of Sharikah by answering 
three questions: 
a. Is it possible to extend the concept of Sharikah to include corporations? 
b. What is the nature of partners’ liability in the Shaikah?  
c. Is the Sharikah regime fit also for modern form of corporation or there is 
a need to establish special model for Islamic corporations?  
d. Is it possible to have an Islamic corporation matching or at least 
accommodating the modern form of corporations including groups of 
companies? 
1. The Concept of Sharikah (Partnership) in Islamic Law  
Sharikah in Islamic law is a generic term meaning participation of any type, and 
jurists consider every form of business organization as a Sharikah, the concept 
being thereafter subdivided into different forms of organization.220  It is a flexible 
concept covering many different situations, including not only partnership but 
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any other structure involving capital contributions and subsequent profit and 
loss sharing.221  
In literal sense Sharikah has two meanings: 
a. Mixing: the mixing of the shares contributed; the shares may be money, 
labour or anything else. Alternatively, it means mixing of shares so that 
one cannot be distinguished from another. Thus when two partners 
participate, they bring about the mingling of wealth, which is held jointly 
by them. 
b. The contract of partnership itself, because it is the cause of the mixing. 
The legal meaning assigned to Sharikah by jurists does not go beyond its literal 
meaning, because partnership arises either through a contract or through the 
mixing of wealth. Nevertheless, there are a variety of legal meanings given to 
the term. Hanafi scholars define Sharikah as "a contract between partners on 
both capital and profit". Shafi'i scholars define it as "a contract giving two or 
more people rights in common to something ". The Hanbali School, defines it as 
"the coming together of two or more people in disposal or acting." 222   
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Modern Scholars define Sharikah as “participation of two or more persons in a 
certain business with a defined amount of capital, under a contract to jointly 
carry out a business and share profits and losses in specified proportions.223  
Sharikah has the following characteristics: 
a. It is a joint venture agreement, involving two or more parties for a 
specific business activity for the sake of profit. 
b. It is an agreement to fulfillment a certain objective within a given time. 
c. Both parties will contribute capital and be involved in the management of 
that business activity.  Capital can take any form. 
d. Profit sharing is based on a specified agreed ratio. 
e. Parties shoulder any loss in proportion to their share of the finance. 
The coming sections aim to elaborate the concept of Sharikah in Islamic law in 
order to understand if this concept can also govern the concept of corporation 
as presented by modern laws. This will include explaining Sharikah’s types and 
classification in old fiqh books and in the modern laws of Islamic countries.  
1.1 Sharikah Classification 
Jurists categorize Sharikah in many ways. When the term is applied to mean 
co-ownership, it is changed to Sharikah al-milk, which emphasizes that the 
participation has arisen out of mere joint ownership. When jurists want to 
indicate that the basis of participation is a contract between two or more 
persons, they change the term to Sharikah al-aqd (contract partnership) as 
understood in the modern law.224  
                                                           
223
 Muhammad Neigatullah Siddiqui, Partnership and Profit-Sharing in Islamic law, The Islamic Foundation, London, 
UK, (1985), p.15. 
224
 Some scholars add to the Sharikah types Sharikat al-ibahah. It is defined as the “common right of the people in 
ownership by acquisition or gathering of things that are permissible for such acquisition and are not originally owned by 
anyone.” This type of partnership, then, is the participation of the people in the common right to own things that are not 
owned by anyone. In other words, all things not owned by any individual or group of individuals exist as a kind of 
partnership of the people generally, and this partnership grants the right to all the members of the community to convert 
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A. Sharikah al milk (Co-ownership) 
Sharikaht al-milk is defined as “the existence of a thing in the exclusive joint-
ownership of two or more persons, or the joint claim of two or more persons for 
a debt that is due from another individual arising from a single cause.” It is also 
defined as “the joint ownership of a number of persons in an ascertained thing 
or debt”. There is no difference in these definitions, except that the second 
definition does not elaborate that the debt arises from a single cause.225 
The origin of sharikah al milk is the joint ownership of property. This is the only 
qualification, no joint exploitation of property is necessary. It exists simply 
where two or more persons become joint owners of a property without entering 
into a partnership contract and hence any increase in the property shall be 
shared by the co-owners in proportion with the extent of their ownership. This 
type of sharikah may not be known in the Common law. Mere joint-ownership is 
generally insufficient to constitute a partnership under the Common law.226  
Sharikah al milk could be a voluntary or involuntary partnership. A voluntary 
partnership refers to a situation where two or more persons jointly buy a 
property or receive a certain property. Involuntary partnership refers to a 
situation where two or more persons acquire the ownership over something 
without any action on their part. This may happen, for example, when two or 
more persons jointly inherit a certain property. The partners have to share the 
property or its income based on their shares until they decide to divide it or to 
                                                                                                                                                                          
a thing to personal ownership. These things can pass into the ownership of individuals through two ways: actual 
gathering or acquisition, like gathering firewood or the revival of barren lands, and by bringing about the cause of 
acquisition, like placing a pan for gathering rain water or throwing a net in the water for fish. It is obvious that today such 
a partnership would be difficult to form. All things not owned by the citizens are owned by the state, except for things 
that are free like air or rain water. Today, forests, land, lakes and all other things are owned by the state, which is an 
individual in the eyes of the law—a corporation. Thus, an individual may not be permitted to throw his net into water for 
fish if the state has chosen to grant licenses for such an economic activity. 
225
 Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, Islamic Law of Business organization, Partnership, p35. 
226
 Ibid., p38. 
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sell it. Each of the owners is in the category of a stranger in regard to any action 
on the part owned by his colleague. In other words, it is not lawful for either 
partner to perform any act with respect to the other’s share except with the 
latter’s express permission. Thus, in terms of liability of the partners, they are 
quite independent of each other, except for actions based on express 
authorization by any of the partners. Their partnership relates only to ownership 
and potential sharing of any profit or increase in value of the co-owned 
property, not in term of sharing the liabilities arising from the partners’ 
actions.227  
B. Sharikah al aqd (contract partnership) 
Sharikat al-‘aqd is the most important type of Sharikah in Islamic law. Jurists 
consider it as the only type properly considered as a commercial partnership 
and hence it is necessary to elaborate its concept as follows:  
1.2 Definition of the Sharikah al aqd 
Hanafis define Sharikah al’aqd as “an agreement between two or more persons 
for common participation in capital and profits”. Malikis define it as “permission 
from each of the participants to the others for transactions in his wealth and on 
their own behalf, while retaining the right to transact personally (in such 
wealth)”.228 The Shafi school defines it as “an established undivided right in a 
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 Ariff Abd Ghadas & Engku Rabiah Adawiyah Engku Ali,  The Development of Partnership Based 
Structure in Comparison to the Concept of Musharakah (Sharikah) with Special Reference to Malaysia, 
International Islamic University Malaysia Journal of Islam in Asia, Spl. Issue,No.2 (June 2011) . 
228
 There is another definition given by this school as it is “the permission by each partner to his 
companion for transacting for the partner and for himself in wealth”, see Abdul Aziz Al-khayyat, al-Sharikat 
in Islamic Shariah,  آ*+ا (  *+ا  ا  4th edition, (1994) p.43. 
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single thing or a contract implying this”. Finally the Hanbalis define it simply as 
“participation of two or more persons in transactions.” 229 
A wider definition of Sharikah al’aqd is proposed by Modern Scholars – it is a 
contract between two or more people for participation in capital and its profits or 
for participation in profits without participation in capital”.230 Nyazee231  expands 
this definition; he defines Sharikah al’aqd as “a contract between two or more 
people for participation in capital and its profits, or participation in transactions 
in someone else’s capital and its profits, or participation in profit without 
participation in capital or transactions.”232 It can be seen from this definition that 
the structure of Sharikah al aqd may have more similarities with a normal 
partnership at Common law, where joint ownership is not an element necessary 
for the establishment of the partnership. The emphasis is rather on the joint 
exploitation of capital and the joint participation in profits and losses, based on 
the terms of the partnership contract. In other words: joint ownership is one 
possible consequence, and not a prerequisite for the formation of Sharikah al 
`aqd.233   
                                                           
229
 Since the relation between the partners in Sharikah al a al’aqd is based on a contract, then all general 
conditions regulate contract in Islamic law has to apply to the contract between the partners in  Sharikah al 
a al’aqd . For example the three essential elements for the contract namely: (i) offer and acceptance, (ii) 
the parties full legal capacity to contract, and (iii) the legality of the subject matter of the contract has to be 
also available in the contract between the partners is Sharikah al a al’aqd.  
In addition to the validation of the condition of contracts there are two main general conditions have to be 
in place in order for the Sharikah al a al’aqd to exist. Firstly, each partner should meet all the requirements 
of both muwakkil (appointer) and wakel (agent). This is because each partner acts both on his own behalf 
and on behalf of other partners. This is why he should meet the requirements of both appointer and agent, 
so that his action is legal and correct. However, if the contract includes a special stipulation or limitation, 
this has to be implemented. Secondly, partners should obtain their shares of the profit as stated in the 
contract according to the agreed rate or percentage. If the rate is not specified, the contract of the 
company is considered corrupt, as not specifying the rate in this case is a form of deceit, which is likely to 
lead to dispute; and this is against the teachings of Islam. 
230
 Ali al –Khafif, op.cit. p.18. 
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 Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, Islamic Law of Business organization, Partnership, p. 20. 
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 This expanded definition is not true for all the four schools. It applies to the views of the Hanafi school 
alone, and with slight modification to the Hanbali school as well. 
233
 Zuhairah Ariff Abd Ghadas & Engku Rabiah Adawiyah Engku Ali, op. cit.. 
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1.3 Classifications of Sharikah al aqd 
There is great disagreement between jurists in classifying Sharikah al `aqd. The 
most sophisticated classification is provided by the Hanifi School because it is 
the only school that has a developed law of partnership. According to this 
school, the subdivisions of Sharikah al aqd depend on a number of factors. If 
the underlying factor is the subject matter of capital contribution, Sharikah al 
aqd can be sub-divided into three main categories: 
a. When the subject matter of the capital is money, it becomes sharikah al 
amwal (monetary partnership).  
b. If the capital is in the form of labour, it becomes sharikah al a`mal also 
called Sharikat al-abdan (labour partnership), a type of partnership 
where two or more partners agree to work together and share their 
earnings. The partners contribute their skills and efforts without 
contributing to capital. All partners jointly undertake to render services to 
their customers, and the fees are distributed among the partners 
according to the agreed ratio. Thus two tailors may agree to undertake 
joint services for their customers on the condition that the wages earned 
will distributed between equally, irrespective of the volume of the work 
each partner has actually done. 
c. If the capital is in the form of reputation or creditworthiness, it becomes 
sharikah al wujuh (reputation or creditworthiness partnership). 
Partnership upon credit arises where two persons who do not contribute 
any property become partners by agreeing to purchase goods jointly 
upon their personal credit without immediately paying the price, and to 
sell them on their joint account. Neither partner contributes any capital. 
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They purchase commodities at a deferred price, sell them for cash and 
share the profit. It is possible that one of the partners may own a greater 
share of the goods than the others. The profits might then be distributed 
based on their respective shares, or they may distribute profit and losses 
on an agreed ratio.  
The Hanafi school further sub-divides Sharikah al aqd based on the terms of 
the contract between the parties, i.e. whether the partners are required to 
contribute equally to the capital and enjoy full equality in exploiting the capital 
and sharing the profits. Based on this consideration, Sharikah al aqd can be 
divided into two types: 234 
a. Sharikah al mufawadah, which means an unlimited investment 
partnership, whereby each partner must contribute equally to the capital, 
and enjoys full and equal authority to transact with the partnership capital 
and property. Each partner in this company is an agent for the 
partnership business and stands as surety for the other partners. Thus, 
the partners can be made jointly and severally liable for the debts of the 
business, provided they have been incurred in the ordinary course of 
business. 
b. Shaikah al inan, which can be defined as a limited investment 
partnership whereby each partner may only transact with the partnership 
capital according to the terms of the partnership agreement and to the 
extent of the joint capital. Hence, their liability towards third parties is 
                                                           
234
 In English law we find the approach of classifying business organizations into partnerships and 
companies to be similar to the Hanafi approach of giving more emphasis to the relationship established. 
See  E Scamell and R. I’Anson Banks, Lindley on the Law of Partnership, 14th Ed., (1979) Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, pp.14-16. 
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several but not joint. This liability resembles that of the modern limited 
liability partnership. 235 
Both mufawadah and inan can occur in all three types of Sharikah al-aqd 
mentioned above. This means that the Hanafi School has a six fold 
classification of Sharikah al-aqd: 
a. Sharikat al-amwal by way of mufawadah.  
b. Sharikat al-amwal by way of inan.  
c. Sharikat al-abdan by way of mufJwadah. 
d. Sharikat al-abdan by way of inan.  
e. Sharikat al-wujuh by way of mufawaçtah.  
f. Sharikat al-wujuh by way of inan.  
We shall shortly explore both mufawadah and inan further. Yet before do that, 
we need to understand that Sharikah al aqd as a partnership contact only 
explain how the profit is shared between the parties. All actual partnership 
found in another contract between the parties, the “underlying contracts”. 
Underlying contracts along with the rules of partnership regulate the entire law 
of partnership in Islamic Law. 
There are four basic contracts that can regulate partnership relationships, 
although all four never exist together in a single partnership contract. These 
contacts are: 
a. The contract of amanah (trust), 
b. The contract of wakalah (agency), 
c. The contract of kafalah (surety), and 
d. The contract of ijarah (hire). 
These contracts do not and cannot provide for the sharing profits on their own. 
This can be seen by examining a contract of wakalah (agency), which is the 
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than the relationships established. 
 Page 150 of 292 
 
basic underlying contract in a partnership. A mere agent, who is not a partner, 
is not entitled to a share in the profits through the contract of agency alone. He 
can only share profits with the principal when their relationship is further 
strengthened by a contract of sharikah.236 
It is only the Hanafi School that gives priority to the underlying contracts in 
determining the types of partnerships permitted in Islamic law and in classifying 
these partnerships. This does not mean that the types of capital or skills 
through which the partnership forms are ignored. 
A. Sharikah al mufawadah 
Basically, sharikah al mufawadah237 means an unlimited investment 
partnership, whereby each partner must contribute equally to the capital, and 
enjoys full and equal authority to transact with the partnership capital or 
property. According to the Hanafis School, each partner in sharikah al 
mufawadah is considered an wakil (an agent) for the partnership business and 
stands as kafil (surety) for the other partners. Thus, partners are jointly and 
severally liable for the debts of their partnership, provided they have been 
incurred in the ordinary course of the Sharikah business. This type of Sharikah 
clearly implies unlimited liability on the part of partners since they are both 
agents and guarantors of each other. 238  
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 Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, Islamic Law of Business organization, Corporations, p.21. 
237
 The name mufawadah is taken from the Arabic word tafawud which means equality. It may be derived 
from the word tafwid (power of attorney) since each one of the partners gives his colleague(s) the freedom 
to act in any affair. 
238 The implementation of mufawadah occurs if two persons conclude a contract and record an explicit deed between 
them to the effect that they have participated in each minor and major thing by way of mufawadah, that the capitals 
contributed is equal, and that each one of them will act according to his considered opinion. If the mufawadah contain a 
surety, each partner shall be both the surety and agent of his partner.  According to the Hanafis, the mufawadah is “a 
contract of partnership between two or more persons, with the stipulation of complete equality with respect to capital, 
profit and status, for working with their own wealth, or with their labour in another’s wealth, or in the basis of their credit-
worthiness.” This definition signifies that all partners in this kind of company are equal in terms of shares in capital, 
profits and freedom of disposing of the company's affairs, and each partner is an agent as well a helper of the other 
partners.  
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A company will be a mufawada if two conditions are met. First there must be 
equality in capital, profit, work, contractual capacity and religion. One partner 
should not be inferior to the other in any way. The second condition is that each 
partner operates on his own initiative. This form of partnership preserves and 
applies a basic business practice; namely, that none of the partners is permitted 
to carry on a similar business outside the partnership on their own account. All 
the partner’s skills in the given trade should be devoted to the benefit of the 
partnership. This explains the condition of equality mentioned above. When 
parties are not allowed to carry on the business outside of the partnership, this 
commitment requires total equality. Such commitment cannot be demanded of 
people who are not equal in every way, as it would lead to injustice. If one 
partner has some edge over the other he may feel that his superior status or 
other merits are being exploited in the name of the partnership. Mufawadah 
require equality in assets. This makes it a highly cumbersome form of 
partnership, because any inequality in wealth would lead to the vitiation of the 
partnership and its conversion to the sharika al ‘inan.  
B. Sharikah al inan: 
The inan partnership is the type mainly used in contemporary Islamic banking 
and finance. Sharikah al mufawadah is rarely chosen, due to the high degree of 
responsibility and the practical difficulty of achieving full equality between the 
partners in all aspects of the partnership. Nyazee defines inan partnership as “a 
participation of two or more persons, with the permissibility of stipulating 
equality, through their work or their wealth, or through their work on the wealth 
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of another, or through their credit-worthiness without wealth, so that the profit 
can be shared by them as agreed.” 239  
In order to highlight the underlying contracts of inan partnerships he adds that, 
“inan is a contract, based either on wakalah (agency) or on wakalah as well as 
kafalah (surety), that permits participation from both sides with wealth, or credit-
worthiness and the sharing of profits in an agreed upon ratio”. From this 
definition, the simple inan contract implies the following characteristics: 
a. In this type of partnership, equality of capital, management, or the 
distribution of profit is not a condition and hence one of the partners may 
contribute more to the capital than the others. 
b. It is allowed that one or more of the partners may manage the 
partnership, while the rest do not participate. 
c. Partners are considered agents for each other, whereby an action done 
by one in the ordinary course of business binds the other partners. When 
a partner becomes the agent of another, he possesses all the rights of 
an agent, including the right to buy and sell for the partnership. 
d. A partner is not a surety for other partners. He, therefore, does not 
possess the right to raise or build up credit through purchases, because 
this arises through express permission under a contract of surety. 
Nevertheless, there is no objection to the parties including a contract of 
surety (kafalah) in an inan contract if they so wish. 
e. An undivided share of a partner is like a deposit in the possession of the 
other partner, and is governed by the rules of trust. This means that what 
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is lost or destroyed is a loss that is borne by the partners and falls within 
their liability. 
f. The partners’ liabilities towards third parties are several and not joint. 
Each partner is liable to the extent of his contribution to the capital. 
The Hanafi School suggests that the partner who deals with a customer is the 
only person whom the customer can approach in relation to the transaction. 
The reason is that he is the agent of the other partners and only the agent can 
be approached and not the principal. If the relationship of kafalah (guarantee) is 
also established between the partners, customers have the right to approach 
and, if need be, sue the other partners as well. Liability therefore, becomes joint 
and several. Such partnerships still operate in certain Muslim countries, for 
example, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. 
2. Partnership under the Laws of Islamic Countries: 
Modern business organizations basically take two legal forms: partnership and 
companies. The distinction between them is based upon the concept of legal 
personality. Partnership is based upon the aggregate concept, while companies 
rest on the entity concept. In other words, partnerships do not have legal 
personality, but companies do. 
Partnerships are divided into two broad types: ordinary partnership and limited 
liability partnership. Ordinary partnerships are further divided into two types, 
depending upon whether they are based on general or special agency. Limited 
liability partnerships, on the other hand, have general partners who have 
unlimited liability, and limited partners whose liability is limited to the extent of 
their shares, and who do not interfere in the management of the firms. 
Companies are first divided into those that work for profit and non-profit 
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companies. They are further divided into limited liability companies and those 
with unlimited liability. The liability of the shareholders in those with limited 
liability may be limited by shares or by guarantee to the extent of the guarantee. 
Companies working for profit are divided into public and private companies 
depending upon whether the general public has been asked to subscribe to the 
shares. Companies where the liability of the members is limited to the extent of 
their shares are called corporations in the United States. 
The situation is different in some Islamic countries, for example, the laws of 
both Saudi Arabia and Egypt use the term Sharikah to include partnerships and 
corporations. The categorization of the companies is also different. More 
elaboration follows. 
2.1 Saudi Law:240  
Sharikah under Saudi law is defined as “a contract under which two or more 
persons undertake to participate in an enterprise for profit, with each 
contributing a share in the form of money or services, with a view to dividing 
any profits (realized) or losses (incurred) as a result of such enterprise”.241  
A partner's contribution may consist of a sum of money or a capital asset or 
even services, except where the provisions of the Companies Act imply 
otherwise, but may not consist solely of the partner's reputation or influence.242 
Saudi law allows shareholders to agree that the profits of a shareholder need 
not reflect his ownership of the capital of the company.243 
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 In Saudi Arabia, formation and operation of business firms and companies is regulated by the 
Companies Act which was promulgated by Royal Decree No. M/6 dated 22 Rabi I 1385 H., (1965) 
amended by Royal Decree No. M/5 dated 12 Safar 1387 H (1967) and Royal Decree No. M/23 dated 28 
Jumada II 1402 H. (1982). 
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Companies under Saudi Law are divided into eight types: 
A. General Partnerships: Called sharikat al-tadamun in Arabic and société en 
nom collectif in French, this corresponds to partnerships in common law 
jurisdictions. It is defined as an association of two or more persons who assume 
joint liability, to the extent of their entire fortune, for the partnership’s debts.244 
B. Limited partnerships: Called sharikat al-tawsiya, al basita in Arabic and 
société en commandite simple in French, this consists of at least one general 
partner, who is responsible to the extent of his entire fortune for the 
partnership’s debts, and at least one limited and unnamed partner who is 
responsible for the partnership’s debts to the extent of his interest in the 
partnership’s capital.245 The law considers a general partner to be a trader. He 
has the right to manage and run the partnership, which may take his name as 
its commercial name. A limited partner is not regarded as a trader. He cannot 
run the partnership nor add his name to its commercial name. His right is 
limited to sharing the partnership profits in accordance to the partnership 
contract, while his liability is limited to his share in the partnership capital.  
C. Joint Adventure: Called sharikat al mahasa in Arabic and société en 
participations in French, it is a company without legal personality. It may be 
formed without that formation being publicised. It is an association of which 
third parties are not aware and which neither enjoys a juristic personality nor is 
subject to the publication formalities.246 
D. Joint stock: Called sharikat al musahama in Arabic and société anonyme in 
French, this is the equivalent of the Common Law public limited company.It is 
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defined as a company capital divided into negotiable shares of equal value. Its 
members (whose number shall not be less than five) are responsible only to the 
extent of the value of their shares.247 
E. Partnerships limited by shares: Called sharikat al-tawsiya bi’l ashum in 
Arabic and société en commandite par actions in French, this company consists 
of at least one general shareholder who is responsible to the extent of his entire 
fortune for the company’s debts, and at least four limited shareholders who are 
responsible for the company’s debts to the extent of their interest in the 
company’s capital.248 
F. Limited liability companies: Called al-sharika dhat mas’uliyya al mahdudah 
in Arabic and société à responsibilité limitée in French this is the equivalent of 
Common Law limited liability companies. The law defines this as a partnership 
consisting of two or more (but fewer than 50) partners who are responsible for 
the debts of the partnership to the extent of their respective interests in the 
capital.249 
G. Variable capital company: Called al-sharika dhat ras al mal al qabil li tarir 
in Arabic and société au capital variable in French, this is a company, which 
provide in its articles of association or bylaws that its capital may be increased 
by additional payments made by the shareholders or by the admission of new 
shareholders, or that its capital may be reduced by withdrawal of shareholders’ 
shares from the capital.250 
H. Co-operative company : Called al-sharika ta’awuniyya in Arabic, this 
company is formed in accordance with cooperative principles and aims at the 
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attainment of the following objects for the benefit and through the joint efforts of 
the members (i) reduction of the cost, purchase, or sale price of certain 
products or services, by engaging in the business of producer or broker, (ii) 
improvement of the quality of products or the standard of services provided by 
the company to its members, or by the latter to consumers. A co-operative 
company can take the shape of a Joint Stock Company or a limited liability 
partnership 251 
In addition to these eight legal forms, Saudi law allows the formation of any 
other form of company known to Islamic jurisprudence252 with the exception of a 
company where a partner’s contribution consists solely of his reputation or 
influence.253  Any company not having any of the eight legal forms or otherwise 
unknown to Islamic law shall be null and void, and persons who have made 
contracts in its name shall be personally and jointly liable for the obligations 
arising therefrom.254  
Some scholars have tried to connect each Sharikah type stipulated by Saudi 
law to one and more category of Sharikah as introduced by Muslim Jurists. This 
results in these eight types matching the Sharikah as defined in Islamic law and 
hence being accepted by Islamic jurisprudence.255  
2.2 Egyptian Law  
While Saudi law derived its classification from Egyptian law, the latter offers a 
broader classification. It divides Sharikah into civil and commercial, reflecting 
the corresponding division of the courts. The Sharikah are then divided into 
Sharikst al-ashkas (companies based on the personality of partners) and 
Shariksh al-amwal (company based on finance). Sharikat al-ashkas is a 
                                                           
251
 Companies Act, Article 18. 
252
 Companies Act, Article 2. 
253
 Companies Act, Article 3. 
254
 Companies Act, Article 2. 
255
 For example of this argument, see Yousef Ahmad Al-Kasem, Liberality in Sharikah in Islam and the 
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company based on the personality and mutual trust of the partners. Such a 
company will end if one of the partners dies or goes bankrupt. Shaikat al-amwal 
does not rely on the parties’ personality, but the company capital. A partner can 
assign his shares to third parties without the other parties’ approval and the 
company will continue if any partner dies or goes bankrupt. 
Sharikat al-ashkas are of several types:  
a. General Partnerships  sharikat al-tadamun,  
b. Limited partnerships: sharikat al-tawsiya, al basita,  
c. Joint Adventure sharikat al mahasa,  
Sharikat al-amwal includes  
a. Joint stock: sharikat al musahama, 
b. Partnerships limited by shares: sharikat al-tawsiya bi’l ashum, 
c. Limited liability companies: al-sharika dhat mas’uliyya al mahdudah,  
3. Concept of Liability in Sharikah 
The relationship between the right to enjoy benefit from a property and the 
liability to incur loss due to proprietorship is governed by a number of rules that 
carry great significance in transactions of commercial nature. In cases, where 
commercial considerations are involved, the rule provides that: “Damage and 
benefit go together. That is to say that a person who obtains the benefit of a 
thing, takes upon himself also the loss from it”. This general rule is based on 
the Prophet’s (PBUH) saying: “Al-kharaj bi’d-daman"(“Revenue goes with 
liability”). 
Another legal maxim that also has the same bearing is: “The blessings of a 
thing are in proportion to the evils thereof and vice versa”. Thus when the thing 
used is destroyed while in the possession of the user compensation for use will 
be included in relation to its value; for example, if the buyer of an animal returns 
it because of a defect, after using it for a period, he is not liable to pay for the 
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use of the animal, since if it had died before being returned, it would have died 
as his property. These rules imply that if the merchandise not yet possessed by 
the buyer is lost, it is the seller but not the buyer who would have to bear the 
loss because the former enjoys possession or, in case the price of purchased 
goods still in possession of the seller increases, the increase will benefit the 
one who is deemed to be liable to suffer from an adverse fluctuation in price of 
the goods. 
Contrarily, in a contract of Shirkah a condition under which one party is entitled 
to a share in profit only while the other party is made liable to the entire loss 
along with his share in profit would contradict the above rule. Similarly, renting 
out one's house on the condition that the tenant would be liable to the value of 
the house if the same is damaged due to flood or earthquake is also a 
contravention of the rule because the owner who is earning its rent should also 
bear the loss. These rules are to be made applicable to all situations where an 
owner earns benefit from the property which he has transferred or intends to 
transfer fully or partially to others under a contract of sale, hire, lease, tenancy, 
agency, etc; or joins with another person with a view to earning through 
partnership (Shirkah or Mudaraba) or sharecropping (Muzaraa). 256 In all forms 
of business organization in Islamic law, the liability of an investor is unlimited. 
This applies to all types of 'inan and mufawadah partnership. The only 
distinction is whether the liability is jointly and several or merely joint. Joint 
liability means that all partners are jointly liable to pay the debts of the 
partnership. Several liabilities mean that each one of the partners may be sued 
separately for the entire debt and be liable for it individually. After making 
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payment he will have recourse against the other partners, that is, he may sue 
them if necessary for the recovery of their shares of the debt. To understand 
the topic more clearly, liability in Islamic law will be divided into liability for lawful 
transactions and liability for unlawful transactions.  
3.1 Liability for Lawful Acts   
Hanafi law in the case of contracts based on wakalah (agency), like the 
ordinary inan as well as mudarabah (contract of partnership and sharing of 
profits in which the investor provides all the capital and is liable for the loss), 
has a unique way of permitting dealing with liability. Liability is neither several 
nor joint. It is only the person managing the business who is liable. This 
happens where the partners leave the business to one person. As he deals with 
all third parties, only he can be sued. This does not mean, however, that the 
other partners have limited liability. The managing partner has recourse against 
the other partners for the recovery of payments to the extent of their individual 
liability. In a mudarabah, the investor (rab al-mal) will be fully liable for all the 
lawful debts of the partnership, even though it is the worker (the worker) who is 
being sued by the creditors.  Likewise, in an inan, the sleeping partner will be 
liable to the extent of his share even if it is the managing partner who is being 
sued for the debt.  
When the contract of kafalah (surety) is introduced into a contract, each partner 
becomes a surety for the others. This contract enables the creditors to sue all 
partners jointly or severally. Each partner, being a surety of the others, is liable 
for the entire debt with a right of recourse against the others to the extent of 
their liability. Such liability is, therefore, both joint and several.  
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In the above cases, it has been assumed that all the partners are acting 
lawfully, i.e. within the authority granted to them by the contract of partnership. 
In such cases the liability of the partners for the debts of the business is 
unlimited. But, what if the managing partner involves the partnership in a 
transaction that he had no authority to conclude? This can take place when 
there is no wilayat al-istididanh (authority for buying on credit) available to the 
managing partner.  
3.2 Liability for Unauthorized Acts of the Managing Partner  
In contracts that are based on agency alone, like mudarabah and the ordinary 
'inan, the managing partner, according to Hanafi law, has the authority to buy 
on credit for the partnership. This authority, however, is not unlimited. The 
managing partner can buy on credit only to the extent of the capital of the firm. 
Thus, if the investor has given £1,000 to the worker, the worker can buy on 
credit only to the extent of £1,000 As long as he does this, the liability of the 
investor will remain unlimited, and their sharing of profits will remain lawful. But 
what if the worker buys goods worth £3,000 on credit? The investor may ratify 
the transaction, in which case a new partnership is created between the two to 
the extent of the excess £2,000. This will be sharikah al-wujuh (partnership 
based on credit worthiness) whose profits will be shared according to different 
rules.  
If the investor chooses not to ratify the transaction, the act of the worker or the 
managing partner, to the extent of the excess purchase, will become unlawful. 
He alone will be liable for the excess payment of £2,000, and he alone will reap 
the profits of this excess purchase. What about the liability of the investor? To 
understand this, a distinction has to be maintained between the lawful part of 
the business and the unlawful part. The liability of the investor with respect to 
the unlawful part of the business is limited to the extent of his capital. With 
respect to the lawful part of this business, the liability of the investor is still 
unlimited. Let us suppose that the capital of the business, the £1,000, is 
somehow lost after the worker has made a credit purchase of £3,000. The 
investor will have to pay £1,000 bound again. If the capital is lost once again, 
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the investor will have to pay once again, and must continue doing so till the 
liability for payment of £1,000 arising from the lawful part of the transaction is 
met. Thus, there are three types of liability here: two lawful cases and one 
unlawful. 
a. Unlimited liability of the investor when he grants authority for buying on 
credit to the worker.  
b. Unlimited liability for the lawful part of the business when he does not 
grant authority for buying on credit.  
c. No liability for the unlawful or unauthorized act of the worker in the 
absence of authority for buying on credit;  
4 Does the Sharikah regime equate to the modern concept of a 
corporation? 
A corporation in English law is an artificial person with its own legal personality. 
It can carry on business, acquire rights, incur obligations, hold property, and 
sue and be sued in its own name. It has perpetual existence, something that is 
not available to partnerships under most laws. Such characteristics show there 
are clear differences between the features of partnerships and corporations, 
inviting the conclusion that corporations require a special legal regime distinct 
from that governing partnership.257 More specifically, 
a. A corporation has a legal personality whereas a partnership does not.258 
Thus corporations may enjoy all types of rights and incur all manner of 
obligations, except those specific to natural persons. A Partnership does 
not have these attributes. While a corporation has the right to sue and to 
be sued in its own name, this is also true of partnerships if they are 
registered. A Corporation also has a permanent domicile and nationality. 
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b. A corporation’s capital and other assets are owned by the corporation in 
its own name. Its shareholders do not own its assets. The capital and 
assets of a partnership are co-owned by the partners. This is one of the 
basic reasons preventing partnerships having a perpetual life. 
c. Corporate debts are those of the corporation and have nothing to do with 
the shareholders personally. They are never sued for corporate debts. 
d. The shareholders of a corporation do not have contract for the corporation 
because they are not its agents. Nor is the corporation their agent. 
e. The liability of the shareholders of a corporation is usually limited, whereas 
the liability of the partners is always unlimited except in the special case of 
a limited partnership. 
f. In a corporation, a shareholder can sell his shares without the consent, or 
even knowledge, of the other shareholders. A partner has no such right. 
From the above, it is clear that corporations under common law require a 
specific legal regime distinct from that of partnership. Yet, is this also true of 
Islamic law? In order to answer this question we have to answer another, 
related question. – Does Islamic law considers corporation to be based on a 
contract between its shareholders? The reason for asking is that the legal 
regime governing partnership liability flows from the fact that partnership is 
always a contract between its partners and according to this contract the 
partners’ liability is unlimited as explained above. Yet if the corporation is not 
formed as a result of contract, then the basis of liability under sharikah in 
Islamic law will not apply to corporation and hence it will be necessary to find 
another basis for shareholder liability.  
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4.1 Are Corporations Based on Contract? 
Two different analyses of the nature of corporations in Common law systems 
have been advanced. The first stated that all corporations are creatures of the 
state, created by a public act and not merely by agreement. Because a 
corporation is an artificial person created by the state, its whole character and 
existence depends upon the state. Accordingly a corporation is not a contract, 
nor is it is a result of a contract, but the result of an act of state. This is the view 
upheld by English law. The second doctrine is that business organizations have 
existed from the earliest times, so that their formation is related to the habits of 
people and the exercise of their right of “freedom of association”. Accordingly, 
corporations are the natural product of the exercise of the right of 
association.259 
Most Arab Countries apply the second doctrine. They consider a corporation to 
be a contract, and do not distinguish between partnership and corporation on 
the basis of legal personality. Any distinction between them operates on other 
bases. Some Arab laws use the term ‘institution’ for corporations, but most use 
the term Sharikah to include both partnerships and corporations as explained in 
Saudi and Egyptian law. 
Some modern Islamic scholars oppose the idea that corporation is a contract 
and deny its contractual basis for the following reasons: 
a. a corporation from the first moment of its existence does not fulfill the 
conditions of a contract of partnership. If it is a contract then, what sort of 
contract? Who are the parties to the Contract? What is the nature of the 
offer and acceptance? What kind of legal relation is established between 
the shareholders - agency, surety or some other contract?  
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b. corporations do not come into being simply by the will of individuals, but 
are dependent on the official sanction that permits their establishment. 
The mere agreement of the parties is not enough. 260  In other words 
corporations come into being through an act of state, and are not 
associated with the contract between the shareholders or the promoters. 
A legal person born by an act of state has full legal capacity and 
personality, but does not have wealth of its own. The need for wealth and 
assets leads corporation to contract with those who are willing to 
subscribe to its capital. This contract is between two people alone: the 
corporation on the one side and the single subscriber on the other. The 
terms of this contract are listed in the subscription agreement. The 
subscriber gives money to the corporation as an investment and in return 
for this the corporation issues it as share certificate.261  
c. In a corporation, a shareholder has the right to sell his shares and thus 
move out of the group of shareholders without their knowledge. This is 
not possible in partnership contract.  
d. Calling a corporation an Institution rather than Sharikah has no real 
benefit. While precision in the use of terminology is good for clarifying 
concepts, the issue of the nature of corporations in Islamic law does not 
disappear simply by the use of different terms.  
e.
 The word Sharikah as is used in fiqh in the sense of a contract cannot be 
applied to the corporation that enjoys a legal personality of its own, just 
as the word “partnership” used in English law cannot be applied to 
corporation. Neither meaning of the word Sharikah in fiqh (mixing of 
shares, and the contract between the partners) applies to a 
corporation.262 
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It may thus be concluded that the regime applicable to partnerships in Islamic 
law cannot be applied to corporations, which should have their own regime. But 
what would be its characteristics? 
5. The Formation of Groups of Companies in Islamic Law 
Modern scholars263 argue that modern corporations including groups of 
companies can be established under Islamic law based on the general principle 
of permissibility - that all things are permissible and nothing can be declared 
illegal except on the basis of a prohibition in the Qur’an and the Sunnah. 264 
However, modern corporations must meet two main conditions in order to be 
allowed under Islamic law.265 
a. The objective of the corporation should be "Halal" (legal or permitted in 
the Shari’ah).  A company will be considered forbidden " Haram" if it is 
based on one or more of the forbidden actions such as "Riba" (usury), 
"Gharar" (uncertainty), "Qimar"  (gambling), or if it engages in 
transactions or investments involving prohibited products or services 
such as alcohol, pork-derived foods, or pornography. 
b. The corporation should be free of any reason of nullity in accordance 
with the Shari’ah.  
The corporation needs also to comply with the following four main basic 
principles of Islamic Contract law: 266 
a. The requirements of liability (al-kharaj bi-al-daman) must be 
satisfied: This principle states that profit can only be earned if the 
investor is also ready to accept the entire loss resulting from his 
investment. Jurists have applied this principle consistently throughout the 
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Islamic laws of contract and business organization. This principle 
governs the question of entitlement to profit, the issue of limited liability, 
the retention of ownership of capital by the investor, as well as the ratios 
in which the profit is shared. In short, almost every issue is directly or 
indirectly traced back to this principle.  
b. Prohibition of riba: This principle must be implemented in the 
corporation, and all its transactions, whether they pertain to financing, 
issuing of securities or any other matter, must conform with the 
requirements of this principle to be deemed valid. 
c. Ownership must subsist with liability: Islamic law constructs the 
concept of liability on the basis of general principles. The principle that 
operates here is al-kharj bi-al-daman (revenue goes with liability). This 
principle, as explained previously, maintains that a person is entitled to a 
profit on his investment to the extent that he is liable for the loss or 
liability arising from the business venture. If his liability is limited to a 
certain extent, then, his profits should be limited proportionately. An 
investor will not be entitled to the profits that may arise from the credit or 
debt for whose repayment he is not liable. It is for this reason that the 
liability of an investor is always unlimited in all lawful business 
transactions.  
d. Using Recognised Contracts: This rule requires that legal relations 
between persons, whether natural or artificial, participating in a business 
venture must be reduced to recognised forms of contract. The four 
contracts used by Muslim jurists for the law of business organization are 
amanah (trust), wakalah (agency), kafalah (surety) and ijarah (hire). If no 
such contract is identified, the legal relations between the parties 
involved and the nature of the underlying transactions are difficult to 
analyse.  
If a corporation complies with the Islamic principles mentioned above, it can 
have share characteristics with modern corporations. For example:  
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a. The concept of shares is valid because they represent ownership of the 
corporation. 
b. The return of shares is also valid as long as such return is not agreed in 
advance and the corporation does not have unlawful purposes. 
c. A shareholder has a common share of the corporate assets to the extent 
of the shares he owns. 
d. A shareholder remains the owner of his shares unless he transfers them 
to another.  
e. The corporation may borrow money, although it would be preferable if its 
financing needs are entire met by equity financing.267 
f. A corporation is prohibited from issuing privileged shares or debentures. 
g. In the event of loss of the corporation capital, partners shall bear any 
losses in accordance with their contribution to that capital. 
The attempts of modern scholars to argue in favour of the the possibility of 
forming corporations under Islamic law have been supported by the Islamic fiqh 
Academy268 which by its resolution No. 130 (4/14) issued in meeting No. 14 
during the period 11-16 January 2003 acknowledged the formation of modern 
types of corporations under Islamic law as follows.269 
First: Shariksh al-amwal (companies based on finance): The creation of such a 
company depends on the capital contributed by the partners, regardless of their 
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personality. Its shares are tradable. These companies are divided into three 
types: 
a. Sharikat al musahama
 
(Joint stock): a company with capital divided into 
negotiable shares of equal value. The shares are tradable and the 
members of the company are liable only to the extent of the value of their 
shares. 
b. Sharikat al-tawsiya bi’l ashum
 
(Partnerships limited by shares): a 
company whose capital consists of tradable shares, its partners being of 
two types: partners jointly and severally liable for company debts and 
partners who are liable only to the extent of the value of their shares. 
c.  Al-sharika dhat mas’uliyya al mahdudah
 
(Limited liability companies): A 
company whose capital is owned by a limited number of partners (the 
meximum number varies from law to law), the liability of each partners 
being determined by his share of the capital. The shares of such 
companies are not tradable. 
Second: Sharikst al-ashkas (companies which are extensions of the partners’ 
personalities): This is a company based on the personality and mutual trust of 
the partners. There are three different types. 
a. Sharikat al tadamon (Partnership): a company created by two or more 
individuals for the purpose of trading. Partners shall share the capital 
between them, and are jointly liable, to the extent of their entire fortune, 
for the company’s debts.This type of company is based primarily on the 
personal relationship of the partners. 
b. Sharikat al-tawsiya, al basita (Limited partnerships): This consists of one 
or more general partners responsible to the extent of their entire fortune 
for the Sharikah debts, and one or more limited partners who do not 
participate in the Sharikah management and are responsible for the 
Sharikah’s debts to the extent of their interest in the partnership’s capital. 
c. Sharikat al musahama (Joint stock): This is a disguised sharikah with no 
legal personality. This is created by two or more persons, each of whom 
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has a share in the capital, and who agree to share profits and losses 
arising from business done in the name of one partner or them all. 
Third: AlShirikah al kabedah (Holding Company): This is a company that owns 
shares or stakes in the capital of another company or companies. Such 
ownership shall be by a percentage enabling the holding company legally to 
control the other companies’ management, and decide their general plans. 
Fourth: Alsharikat muadedat al gensyat (Multinational company): is a company 
consists of a group of subsidiary companies. The mother company is located in 
a country whereas its subsidiaries and related companies are located in other 
countries and often acquire these countries’ nationality. The mother company is 
linked with its subsidiaries and working through an integrated economic 
strategy aims to achieve the group overall investment and financial objectives. 
 
The Academy had issued an earlier resolution acknowledged the possibility of 
forming Joint Stock Companies under Islamic law and the permissibility of 
dealing in shares. The resolution stipulated that: 270  
a. As the original rule in mu'amalat (Transactions/Agreements) is 
permissibility, the formation of Joint Stock Companies having lawful 
objectives and activities is valid. 
b. The shares of a company whose primary objective is prohibited, like 
transactions in riba, or which produces and deals in prohibited products, 
cannot be sold.  
c. The same rule applies to the shares of companies that sometimes deal 
in prohibited things, even when their primary activity is permissible.  
d. The purchaser of a share acquires an undivided share in the capital of 
the company, the share certificate being the instrument that is proof of 
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his right to the share. There is no Shariah obstacle to the issuance of 
shares or transactions in them. 
e. The subject-matter of the contract in the sale of shares is an undivided 
share in the assets of the company. The share certificate is the 
instrument of the right to this share. 
Although the efforts of the International fiqh Academy represent a revolution in 
the field of the Islamic law of business organisations, Nyazze, while accepting 
the principle of the possibility of forming corporations under Islamic law, does 
not accept the basis used by the Academy to accept modern forms of 
corporation. He argues that the Academy’s resolution and other views put 
forward by certain modern scholars are not based upon a thorough examination 
of the principles of Islamic law. They have not related their notion to true 
principles found in the traditional law of business enterprise. They rely on the 
general principle of permissibility, which itself has not been understood 
thoroughly. A better approach would be to analyse the entire structure of the 
modern business corporation in the light of the general principles of Islamic law 
and then come up with a new Islamic model of corporations. Therefore, he 
provides a proposal for modern Islamic corporation, based on the general 
principles of Islamic law, especially the Islamic law of contracts. 
 6. Proposal for a Modern Islamic Corporation  
Nyazee,271 spent the first 174 pages of his book "Islamic Law of Business 
Organization, Corporation" explaining the principles of Islamic law related to 
corporations and the defects of modern corporate structures, concluding that 
neither the common law regime nor that offered by Arab and Muslim laws 
provide a proper regime for Islamic corporations. Therefore, he calls for the 
formation of a modern Islamic Corporation having the following characteristics: 
a. The corporation will be a juristic person established in accordance with 
certain conditions and hence will have no liability for religious duties. 
b. The relationship of the shareholder and the corporation will be based on an 
agency contract alone and not on partnership, i.e. the sharing of profits. The 
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contract of agency will be based on the Hanifi school view, which presents 
different concept of agency than under modern laws. The latter concept of 
agency is based upon the principle qui facit alium facit per se (he who does 
a thing through another does it himself). Thus, the agent can do almost 
anything that the principal would be permitted to do himself. He is a mere 
servant of the principal. A partner as an agent has all the powers, unless 
expressly restricted, of the principal. Further, the principal is bound by all 
these acts, and thus can be sued by a third party for an act performed by 
the agent on his behalf. By contrast, under the Hanifi concept of agency272 
the corporation will be the managing party and the shareholders as 
principals will continue to stay in the background.  
c. The capital and assets of the corporation will belong to the shareholders as 
co-owners, but will be held in the name of the corporation, with the 
corporation having full rights of disposal on their behalf. The same dual 
ownership relationship will be established when financing is undertaken by 
banks and financial institutions. 
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affect the contract of Sharikah that is based upon the contract of Wakalah alone and is not supported by 
other contracts of partnership that include Kafalah as well. 
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d. The shareholders will grant prior permission (in the subscription agreement), 
as co-owners, to the other shareholders to sell their shares to outsiders 
without further authority. 
e. The relationship between the shareholder and the corporation will be based 
upon a strict denial of wilayat al-istidanah  - the entitlement to raise or build 
up credit through credit purchases; (other than cash loans). The 
determination of the limit for istidanah will be tied to the net assets of the 
corporation at any one time and not to the capital contributed.  
f. As the corporation will be an agent of the shareholders, they will be entitled 
to the entire profit earned by the corporation.  
g. As the huquq (rights of performance) of each contract will revert to the 
agent, on the basis of the Hanifi form of wakalah (agency), it will not be 
possible for creditors to sue the shareholders in respect of transactions 
undertaken by the corporation. 
h. If the corporation wishes to raise money from banks, it must form an inan 
partnership with the bank based on wakalah (agency) alone. This will 
provide the same features that arise from debt financing, like floating 
charges, but will be free of debt and interest. The inan will be based upon 
the Hainfi school form, especially the distinction in wakalah (agency) 
between the hukm (effects) and the hquq (rights of performance) of a 
transaction undertaking by the corporation. 
i. As limited liability is in the end a device to pass on or shift liability to 
outsiders dealing with the corporation, it may be appropriate to grant priority 
to outsiders at the time of liquidation, followed by inan claims of banks and 
then the claims of the principals. 
j. Under the proposed Modern Islamic Corporation, ordinary shares and 
preference shares are allowed.  A co-owner of property can sell his property 
to an outsider, but in a partnership this is possible only if the other co-
owners agree. The shareholders in Nyazee’s proposed model are linked to 
each other through the corporation, which has mixed their wealth in the form 
of co-ownership. On the basis of technical reasoning, this view can be 
refuted, but it is simpler to insist that the subscription or allotment agreement 
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should state that each shareholder permits every other to sell his share to 
whoever he pleases. This will enable transactions in shares in the stock 
market. No difficulty can arise as far as ordinary shares are concerned, but 
difficulty may arise in the case of preference shares and cumulative 
preference shares. In preference shares the profit is usually paid to such 
shareholders prior to other types of shares and the rate of profit may be 
fixed. In cumulative preference shares if the corporation has not made a 
profit in a given year and thus cannot pay a dividend on preference shares 
for that year, it is required to pay that dividend in following years when it 
does make a profit. Technically, there appears to be no reason why this 
cannot be done under Islamic law. It should be remembered that paying a 
fixed part to the investor out of a flexible actual dividend should not be 
considered as riba as long as the rules of al-kharaju bial-daman (Liability) 
are being satisfied. 
k. In terms of creation of limited liability, Nyazee argues that the principle of 
leverage forces corporations to raise as much debt financing as they can. In 
addition to this, the payment of interest by the corporation has certain tax 
advantages insofar as these can be claimed as expenses out of the pre-tax 
profit. Thus, if the debt of the corporation is three times the size, or even 
twice the size, of equity, there can be serious liability problems where huge 
losses are made. One unit of equity will be required to satisfy three units of 
debt at the time of liquidation, which is not possible. This is why limited 
liability is useful. In his model, the corporation will not be financed on the 
basis of debt at all.  It will either have equity paid up by the shareholders or 
equity based on inan financing by banks or financial Institutions. The only 
form of credit that the corporation can raise is through credit purchases. The 
accounts payable of a corporation may never go beyond the combined 
equity capital provided by the shareholders and banks. The reason is that so 
much market credit may not be required in practice. Even if it is required and 
a corporation is tempted to do so, it will not be permissible due to a denial of 
istidanah. 
l. The only way that the personal assets of the shareholders may be 
threatened is when the entire assets of a corporation are lost and the credit 
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outstanding extends beyond the value of the ruined assets. Such extreme 
cases may be covered by business insurance, which is a very common 
feature today. Each corporation may be asked to take up mandatory 
insurance, at least in the case of public corporations. This depends, of 
course, on what the ruling is about insurance from the Islamic point of view. 
It is assumed that some form of insurance will be possible. In certain cases, 
however, this model may prevent the need for piercing the corporate veil. 
There is, therefore, no problem in the creating limited liability for 
shareholders as well as financial institutions participating in inan financing. 
m. For the creation of unlimited liability Nyazee argues that the law arbitrarily 
denies limited liability in certain cases without determining the relationship 
between the shareholder and the corporation. In his proposed system, the 
creation of unlimited liability will be very simple. All that needs to be done is 
to establish another relationship between the shareholders and the 
corporation, besides the contract of wakalah (agency). The additional 
relationship is created through a contract of kafalah (guarantee) between 
the corporation and the shareholder, by virtue of which each shareholder 
becomes a kafil (guarantor) for the corporation, jointly with the other 
shareholders. 
7. Conclusion 
A comparison of the characteristics of Sharikah with that of partnership in the 
common law shows some similarities. 
a. The English law definition of partnership as “a relation which subsists 
between persons carrying on business in common with a view of profit” 
has some similar characteristics with Sharikah under Islamic law in terms 
of contractual relations between the parties; carrying on business in 
common, implying authorization to transact with common property; and 
in profit-sharing. 
b. An important legal effect of a contract of Sharikah is the fiduciary position 
that the partners hold in relation to the partnership property and capital, 
whereby the exercise of necessary prudence and avoidance of harm is 
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the overriding principle. This may be analogous to the common law 
concept of good faith and the fiduciary duties of partners to each other. 
c. In terms of the legal effects of the contract of Sharikah, the majority of 
the Muslim jurists agree that it is not a binding contract, meaning that the 
partners can terminate the contract at any time they wish to. This may be 
quite similar to the concept of partnership at will under English law.  
On another hand, there are many noticeable differences in focus between the 
two regimes in term of corporation and partnership. 273  
Modern Islamic scholars have found a base to accept the formation of modern 
corporations under Islamic law, including group of companies, on the condition 
that all types of investment entities should comply with Shariah principles.  
Nevertheless, all such efforts were based on individual opinions. Moreover, the 
efforts presented by academic entities were not based on a deep analysis of 
Islamic business law.274 Most notions presented are essentially based on the 
principle of permissibility in Shariah and on necessity without testing other 
Shariah principles.  
I believe that the best way to devise an Islamic corporation law is, as 
highlighted by Nyazee, to first analyse the entire structure of the modern 
business corporation including groups of companies in the light of the general 
principles of Islamic law, and then come up with a new Islamic model of the 
corporation. Failing to do this will mean many questions remain without clear 
answers such as the relation between a company and its subsidiaries. 
However, his proposal for Modern Corporation although it integrates Islamic law 
principles does not clearly explain how this proposal will work in reality. 
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 For example, the Accounting Standards Board justifies the legal personality of corporations in saing “There is no 
objection in the Shariah to setting up a company whose liability is limed to its capital, for that is known to the company 
clientele and such awareness on their part precludes deception”. Accounting Standards Board, Objectives and 
Concepts and Information about the Organization Jeddah 1994. 
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Moreover, it provides a complex relation between the shareholders and the 
corporation and its management especially in term of the requirement of 
contracts shaping such relation. The response to the requirements of modern 
economy requires simplicity rather than the complexity evident in his proposal.   
His proposal still cannot explain in terms of Islamic legal principles why limited 
liability is sometimes assigned and at other times it can be taken away 
arbitrarily. 
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Chapter III  
Allocating Liability in  
Corporate Groups  
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The origin of the problem of liability in corporate groups’ context lies in basic 
concepts of company law- namely limited liability and separate legal 
personality. Under limited liability, shareholders have no obligations to the 
company or its creditors beyond the obligations on the par value of their shares, 
or under their guarantees in the case of a company limited by guarantee. Under 
this tradition, a corporation’s liability is also limited to the amount of its 
investment, and a parent or any other company in a group cannot be held liable 
for a subsidiary’s non-performed obligations.275 
This approach collides with the principle of fair allocation of risks between 
creditors and debtors and exposes creditors to risks arising from the power of 
shareholders to manipulate limited liability and to use the group structure for 
abusive, self-serving, fraudulent, and even criminal conduct. The scale of the 
problem is now firmly entrenched in the realms of international law, triggering 
the negotiation of a number of significant multilateral treaties and involving 
domestic courts in international legal challenges that only a generation or two 
ago would have been inconceivable.276  
The unfair effects of limited liability in a corporate group context have forced 
courts and litigators in common law countries to search for techniques to 
reduce these unjust effects and protect corporate groups’ creditors.  
The position in Islamic law cannot be simply comparable with the Common law 
because there is still ongoing debate between Muslim scholars concerning 
some basic principles of the corporation in Islamic law, most importantly, the 
concepts of separate legal personality and limited liability. This situation forces 
                                                           
275
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 Some concern has been expressed on occasion at the potential abuse of the group form. For example, the Cork 
Committee devoted chapter 51 to the discussion of the problem. Yet, it declined to make any significant proposals to 
deal with the issue of groups as it considered it raised issues which were outside its terms of reference which were 
confined to insolvency law. The committee felt that it was outside its terms of reference to propose any change as this 
would require fundamental changes to company law and not merely the law on insolvency.  
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us to first settle the debate about these fundamental principles before 
addressing the liability of groups of companies in Islamic law. 
Therefore, in Part I of this Chapter I will examine the sufficiency of the 
techniques presented by Common law systems to allocate liability within group 
of companies and assess if these techniques provide a sufficient solution. Part 
II will investigate the concept of the corporation in Islamic law, the possibility of 
creating modern forms of corporation including groups of companies, and finally 
the Islamic law position on the liability of groups of companies. 
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Part I  
Groups of Companies’ Liability in Common Law 
The economic forms of company organization have evolved in the direction of 
group structures, benefiting from the principle of limited liability which not only 
assists small businesses, but encourages entrepreneurial activity in corporate 
groups. Without it, corporate group managers might be reluctant to expose the 
funds of the parent to risky new business activity.277 However, legal separation 
and accompanying limited liability of company members, coupled with 
integrated control and management of group members, accentuate agency 
conflicts within the group, may lead to misrepresentation of the limited risk of 
the group’s member, and/ or greater levels of debtor opportunism.278  
In order to reduce the risk of debtor opportunism, Courts and legislators have 
used various techniques to allow creditors to recover debts from entities within 
a corporate group other than the entity with which they have contracted. 
Examples of these techniques are as follows:    
a. Looking behind the separate corporate personality of a company - “lifting 
the corporate veil”.  
b. Techniques empower courts to order a subsidiary’s directors (who might 
be the parent company), to contribute to the assets of a company which 
has gone into insolvent liquidation. 
c. Trading while insolvent 
d. Pooling of assets. 
e. Substantive Consolidation 
f. Directors’ Duties to creditors  
g. The Single Economic Unit Theory.  
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 Jennifer Dickfos, Enterprise Liability for Corporate Group, a safeguard for Creditors, CLTA conference, 
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In this Part, I will explain the above mentioned techniques and assess if they 
are sufficient to provide a comprehensive solution to issue of the liability of 
corporate groups. 
 1. Lifting the Corporate Veil  
1.1 The General Principle 
Although the Salomon case had firmly established the principle of the separate 
legal personality of a company, the court in that case did however recognise 
that there could be "occasions" where the courts would have to deviate from 
this principle. On these occasions the court would be ready to disregards the 
separateness of the corporation and hold a shareholder liable for the actions of 
the company. In other words, the court would strip away the corporate mask, 
and ascribe directly to those in the corporation who have caused it to act in a 
particular way the legal consequences of such actions. This situation is 
generally described or known as ‘lifting the veil’ or ‘piercing the veil’. Staughton 
L.J separated the meaning of the two phrases in Atlas Maritime Co SA v Avalon 
Maritime Ltd279: 
“To pierce the corporate veil is an expression that I would reserve for 
treating the rights and liabilities or activities of a company as the 
rights or liabilities or activities of its shareholders. To lift the corporate 
veil or look behind it, on the other hand, should mean to have regard 
to the shareholding in a company for some legal purpose.” 
A court may refer to lifting or looking beyond the corporate veil at any time it 
want to examine the operating mechanism behind a company. For example, in 
                                                           
279
 Atlas Maritime Co SA v Avalon Maritime Ltd (No 1) (The Coral Rose) [1991] 4 All ER 769, at 779. 
 Page 183 of 292 
 
Dennis Willcox Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation280, Jenkinson J 
stated that: 
“The separate legal personality of a company is to be disregarded 
only if the court can see that there is, in fact or in law, a partnership 
between companies in a group, or that there is a mere sham or 
facade in which that company is playing a role, or that the creation or 
use of the company was designed to enable a legal or fiduciary 
obligation to be evaded or a fraud to be perpetrated”. 
Other Factors that may lead to a piercing of the corporate veil can be grouped 
as follows:281 
a. To prevent the use of a company for fraudulent purposes or to evade a 
legal obligation or liability,282 
b. If a company is in effect the agent of a shareholder, regardless of 
whether that shareholder is a natural or corporate person,283 
c. Where the veil is lifted in compliance with a court order,284  
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 For example, In Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1933] Ch.935; H worked for G, but then left. His contract 
stated that he was not allowed to sell to G’s customers for a period after leaving. H set up a company 
which then approached his former customers. He argued that his company was approaching the 
customers, not him; and if there was wrongdoing, his company was liable and not him. The Court of 
Appeal held that the company was a sham, and granted an injunction against both H and the company. 
Similarly, in Catamaran Cruises Ltd v Williams (1994)  W was employed by C. W then set up a company 
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all other employees of C. C ended their contract with W’s company, but the courts held that this was the 
same as dismissing W directly, and W was able to sue for unfair dismissal. 
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 In Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd v Birmingham Corporation [1939] 4 All E.R. 116; SSK owned some land, 
on which a subsidiary company operated. BC purchased the land compulsorily. BC was obliged to 
compensate the owner for the business they ran on the land. Since the subsidiary company did not own 
the land, BC claimed they were entitled to no compensation. It was held that the subsidiary company 
was the agent of SSK, so that BC must pay compensation. 
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 The courts have the power to order enforcement of their judgments or orders against any party whom they think will 
ensure compliance with the order should they be named therein. In exceptional cases the courts have lifted the 
corporate veil in exercising this power and have issued an order against the directors or controllers of a company in 
addition to the company itself. An example is found in Dublin County Council v Elton Homes Limited [1984] ILRM 297; 
where the court issued a planning injunction against the directors of a company in addition to the company itself. 
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d. In the case of a ‘sham’ or ‘facade’, when the corporate form was used as 
a ‘mask’ to hide the real purpose of the corporate controller,285 
e. When piercing of the corporate veil will bring about a fair result,286 
Some scholars argue that in spite of the importance of the principle, it is not 
possible to distil any single principle from the decided cases as to when the 
courts will lift the veil, and that no two commentator categorise the case law in 
precisely the same way.  Thus Farrar287 describes Commonwealth authority on 
piercing the corporate veil as ‘incoherent and unprincipled’. Similarly Rogers 
AJA stated in Briggs v James Hardie & Co Pty,288 that: 
“There is no common, unifying principle, which underlies the 
occasional decision of the courts to pierce the corporate veil. 
Although an ad hoc explanation may be offered by a court which so 
decides, there is no principled approach to be derived from the 
authorities”. 
One should not expect to find such a principle or coherent categorisation, as 
the cases are extremely diverse and, although they may all be termed lifting the 
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veil cases, the courts are being requested to undertake a variety of different 
processes.289 
To conclude, the application of the veil piercing principles by the courts differs 
from one jurisdiction to another. Sometimes courts ignore the rigid principles of 
company law; but most of the cases simply repeat the Salomon principles. The 
courts have never taken an evolutionary step in creating alternatives, as they 
did when establishing the principle of separate corporate personality in 
Salomon. This rigid commitment to the Salomon principles has prevented the 
courts from creating sound reasons for intervention where the corporate 
structure was ignored. 290 
1.2 Parent/Subsidiary 
Courts have attempted to develop a basis for lifting the veil of incorporation so 
as to ignore the separate identities of companies within a group.291 Some 
scholars believe the veil of incorporation may be lifted between a parent 
company and a subsidiary in the same way as it can between an individual and 
a company. 292 Other scholars argue that courts should be more willing to pierce 
the corporate veil in the parent/subsidiary context than with respect to individual 
shareholders on the basis that the application of the Salomon principle to 
corporate groups offers greater potential for harm, because of the greater 
economic impact it may have.293  
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Bainbridge294 distinguishes between the liability of individual shareholders and 
corporate group liability. While the liability of individual shareholders may 
demand veil piercing, corporate group liability issues should be dealt with as a 
species of enterprise liability, because veil piercing is a vertical form of liability, 
providing a mechanism for holding a shareholder personally liable for the 
corporation’s obligations, while enterprise liability provides a horizontal form of 
liability, offering a vehicle for holding the entire business enterprise liable. The 
single business enterprise theory will not allow one to reach a shareholder’s 
personal assets, whereas enterprise liability can be a useful remedy in some 
settings. If correctly (and successfully) invoked, enterprise liability does permit a 
creditor to reach the collective assets of all of the corporations making up the 
enterprise. According to this view, the law of fraudulent misrepresentation and 
fraudulent conveyance are adequate to the task of policing abuse of limited 
liability and therefore obviate the need for veil piercing.  
Practically, courts in common law countries have devised a number of 
mechanisms to pierce the corporate veil between a parent company and its 
subsidiary. There are a number of cases in which the courts have been willing 
to pierce the corporate veil and hold a parent liable for the debts of its 
subsidiary. However, it is exceptional for the courts to do so; as a rule, they 
adhere strictly to the corporate entity principle.295 On another hand there are 
numerous statutory provisions that, one way or another, have the effect of lifting 
the veil. These provisions operate to negate the effect of corporate personality 
and limited liability. 
In the main, the courts have been unprepared to lift the corporate veil merely 
because a group has conducted some of its business through subsidiaries or 
has arranged the group structure to ensure that any legal liability in respect of 
particular activities will fall only on one group member. Adams v Cape Industry 
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plc296 is a very good illustration of this position. A class of plaintiffs sought 
compensation for personal injury caused by the defendant. The injury was 
caused by asbestos mined in South Africa and distributed in the United States 
by corporations in which C had a controlling shareholding, although latterly it 
had taken steps to eliminate its connection with the American subsidiary by 
disposing of its shares. C refused to appear before the court in Texas where the 
personal injury suit was successfully brought. Thus an action raised in England, 
where C was registered, to have the judgment of the Texas court enforced 
against it. The Court of Appeal refused to find C liable, holding that it was an 
independent legal entity, and therefore not responsible for the debts of other 
entities, even entities with which it had enjoyed a close association. The court 
rejected all three arguments by which it was sought to make C liable. First, it 
was not willing to treat the group as a single economic unit. Secondly, it refused 
to treat a subsidiary as its parent company’s agent in the absence of an 
agreement to this effect.297 Thirdly, it did not regard the subsidiary as a mere 
facade. The court declined to attempt a comprehensive definition of what a 
company a façade, other than to say that a company was a facade when it was 
‘no more than a corporate name’. It continued, 
 “We do not accept as a matter of law that the court is entitled to lift 
the corporate veil as against a defendant company which is the 
member of a corporate group merely because the corporate group 
structure has been used so as to ensure that the legal liability (if any) 
                                                           
296
 [1990] BCLC Ch 433 at 544. 
297
 If it can be shown that the subsidiary acted as an agent for its parent company, then under general 
agency principles liability will attach to the principal. But the principal-agent relationship only exists if 
consent between the two can be established. Under English law, there is no presumption that a 
subsidiary acts as the agent of its parent. 
 Page 188 of 292 
 
in respect of particular future activities of the group (and 
correspondingly the risk of enforcement of that liability) will fall on 
another member of the group rather than the defendant company. 
Whether or not this is desirable, the right to use a corporate structure 
in this manner is inherent in our corporate law.”  
In Yukong Line Ltd of Korea v Rendsburg Investments Corporation of Liberia298 
the court refused to lift the corporate veil in the context of a corporate group, 
notwithstanding its finding that the purpose of an asset transfer within the group 
was to put those assets beyond the reach of an external plaintiff in the event of 
litigation. The court took a narrow approach to lifting the corporate veil:  
“In the main the concept that a duly incorporated limited liability 
company, if not a real thing, is at least not to be identified with its 
shareholders has been faithfully followed by British and other 
Commonwealth courts ever since Salomon’s case. But there has 
been some gnawing away at the edges of the doctrine, a process 
commonly described as piercing or lifting the corporate veil. I believe 
that there is only one broad class of cases where this is truly 
consistent with the Salomon reasoning. They are all cases where, 
under the enactments such as those against fraudulent or wrongful 
trading, or on the permissible interpretation of an enactment or 
contract, or for the purposes of common law or equitable principles 
against fraud or oppression or relating to agency it is necessary to 
look at what has happened in fact rather than in form”  
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Additionally, English courts have been unwilling to accept that under-
capitalisation of particular group companies "alone" justifies lifting the corporate 
veil. They refuse to lift the veil between a parent and subsidiary merely because 
the latter has a small paid-up capital and has a board of directors all or most of 
whom are also directors or senior executives of its holding company.299  
However, this rule has been departed from on a number of occasions. The 
English courts have indicated that where the justice of the case so requires, the 
separate legal personality of companies within a group may be disregarded and 
the companies may be treated as being a single economic entity. This 
approach is not considered to be a departure from the principle as laid down in 
the Salomon case as much as an application of that principle.300 Courts limit the 
remedy of piercing the corporate veil to situations where parents so control and 
dominate their subsidiaries that corporate independence is lacking and the 
parent and its subsidiary are effectively alter egos. Even then, veil piercing is 
only appropriate where the subsidiary is improperly used, causing damage or 
harm – such as preventing the subsidiary’s creditors from being repaid.301 
A major indication that the courts might be willing to disregard the separate 
legal personality of companies within a group came in the judgment of Lord 
Denning MR in Littewoods Mail Order Stores Ltd v Inland Revenue 
Commissioners 302, where he lifted the veil between parent and subsidiary in an 
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income tax case. In declining to treat a subsidiary company as a separate and 
independent entity from the parent, he stated: 
The doctrine lay down in Salomon ... has to be watched very 
carefully. It has often been supposed to cast a veil over the 
personality of a limited company through which the courts cannot 
see. But that is not true. The courts can and often do draw aside the 
veil. They can, and often do, pull off the mask. They look to see what 
really lies behind. The legislature has shown the way with group 
accounts and the rest. And the courts should follow suit. I think we 
should look at the [subsidiary] and see it as it really is – the wholly-
owned subsidiary of Littlewoods. It is the creature, the puppet of 
Littlewoods in point of fact: it should be so regarded in point of law. 
In DHN Food Distributors Limited v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council303 
D was a holding company, which operated a business from land that was 
owned by its wholly owned subsidiary. When the local authority compulsorily 
acquired the land, D was only offered nominal compensation on the basis that it 
only occupied the land on licence and its subsidiary was not losing business as 
a result of the acquisition of the land. The Court of Appeal held that D was 
entitled to proper compensation for the disturbance, as it held an equitable 
interest in the land.  The court therefore did not require disregarding the 
separate legal personality of the companies. However, Lord Denning M.R. 
observed,  
“These subsidiaries are bound hand and foot to the parent 
company and must do just what the parent company says. ... This 
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group is virtually the same as a partnership in which all the three 
companies are partners. They should not be treated separately so 
as to be defeated on a technical point. ... The three companies 
should, for present purposes, be treated as one, and the parent 
company DHN should be treated as that one.  
DHN, although not holding an appropriate interest in the property acquired, 
could therefore claim compensation for disturbance. This is probably the 
strongest English case, regarding the creation of group liability, because it was 
arguable that the court there did not base itself on the particular statutory 
provisions but on a more general approach founded on the idea of single 
economic entity.304 The parent and subsidiary were treated as a single 
economic unit when there was evidence indicating that the parent could make 
any arrangements it pleased in regard to the management of the business of 
the subsidiary, that every step taken by the subsidiary was determined by the 
policy of the parent, that the subsidiary had to do just what parent said, and that 
the parent controlled the purse strings, on an item-by-item basis.305  
Lord Denning's view was adopted by Costello J in the Irish case of Power 
Supermarkets Limited v Crumlin Investments Limited and Dunnes Stores 
(Crumlin) Limited.306 P was a tenant which operated a large supermarket in a 
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shopping centre of which C was the landlord. The lease contained a covenant 
that the landlord would not permit the sale of grocery or food produce by any 
party from a unit exceeding 3000 square feet within the shopping centre for the 
duration of the lease. When the shopping centre failed to be a financial 
success, C disposed of its interest to Cornels Court Shopping Centre Limited, a 
member of the Dunnes Stores group of companies, by way of a transfer of all of 
its shares to that company. The Dunnes Stores group wished to establish its 
own outlet in the centre. A separate company – D - was set up and Cornels as 
controlling shareholder caused C to convey the freehold of a large unit in the 
centre to D, which then set up in competition with P. P succeeded in obtaining 
an injunction restraining D from trading in the shopping centre. Costello J found 
that D was bound by the terms of the lease even though they had not formally 
been a party to it, on the basis all the companies involved were part of a single 
economic entity. In the course of his judgment, Costello J. stated:  
"It seems to me to be well established that a court may, if the justice 
of the case so requires, treat two or more related companies as a 
single entity so that the business notionally carried on by one will be 
regarded as the business of the group or another member of the 
group if this conforms to the economic and commercial realities of 
the situation".  
He went on to describe D as a ‘mere technical device......a company with a £2 
issued capital which had no real independent life of its own’.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
rights would ensure beneficially to the same person or corporate body irrespective of the person or body 
in whom those rights were vested in law. It is perhaps permissible under modern commercial conditions 
to regret the existence of these principles. But it is impossible to deny, ignore or disobey them".  
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The two decisions mentioned above and the comments of Lord Denning M.R. in 
DHN were cited with approval by the Irish Supreme Court in Re Bray Travel 
and Bray Travel (Holdings) Limited.307  
Yet, and in contrast to the above, in Allied Irish Coal Supplies Limited v Powell 
Duffryn International Fuels Limited both the Irish High Court and Supreme 
Court reaffirmed the significance of the Salomon principle, and firmly rejected 
arguments that the separate legal personality of companies within a group 
should be disregarded merely because there was a close relationship between 
the companies. In refusing the application to join the parent as a co-defendant 
in the proceedings, the High Court held that to allow such an application would 
be in contravention of the principle of separate personality. Laffoy J stated that: 
 ‘it cannot be used to render the assets of a parent company 
available to meet the liabilities of a trading subsidiary, to a party with 
whom it has not traded. The proposition advanced by the plaintiff 
seems to me to be so fundamentally at variance with the principle of 
separate corporate legal personality laid down in Salomon v 
Salomon & Co., and the concept of limited liability, that it is wholly 
un-satiable. 308  
The Supreme Court upheld his decision, Murphy J. noting:  
"While it would be impossible to say that there are no circumstances 
in which the members of a company, whether corporate or individual, 
could not conduct, or purport to conduct the business of a company 
in such a way as to render their assets liable to meet claims in 
respect of the business normally carried out by the company, I 
believe that this would be an altogether exceptional state of affairs 
                                                           
307
 13 July 1981, unreported, Supreme Court. 
308
 [1998] 2 ILRM 519 at 61 (High Court), [1998] 2 IR 529 (Supreme Court). 
 Page 194 of 292 
 
and difficult to reconcile with the seminal judgment in Salomon v 
Salomon & Co…" 
Moreover, in The State (McInerney & Co Limited) v Dublin County Council309 
the Irish High Court held that the justice of the case did not necessitate the 
lifting of the corporate veil where two subsidiaries of the same holding company 
sought to be regarded as a single economic entity so that one of them could, 
when it was refused planning permission, require the defendant to purchase 
lands owned by the other company. Carroll J stated:  
"...the corporate veil is not a device to be raised and lowered at the 
option of the parent or group. The arm which lifts the corporate veil 
must always be that of justice......it appears to me that here is a 
group of companies operated so as to maximise the benefits to be 
gained from the individual corporate identity of each subsidiary...... It 
is not for the corporate group to claim that the veil should be lifted to 
illuminate one aspect of its business while it should be left in situ to 
isolate the individual actions of its subsidiaries in other respects"  
1.3 Evaluation of Court Position 
Some scholars criticize the approach of courts to lifting the corporate veil 
between a parent company and its subsidiary. Prentice 310 argues that the 
cases fail to articulate any clear principles from which it is possible to predict 
when the court will or will not pierce the corporate veil. Judges seem to decide 
whether to pierce the corporate veil based on their own personal notions of 
fairness and equity, or the extent of impropriety. He does not expect any 
significant judicial creativity in lifting the corporate veil on the part of the English 
courts. He feels this is due to (a) the extent to which the corporate entity 
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doctrine is entrenched in English company law (pre-dates the evolution of the 
group form), (b) judicial conservatism, (c) and policy considerations which are 
considered to make this an area which is more suitable for legislative than 
judicial intervention.  
Austin311 argues the corporate veil is generally only disregarded where this 
confers some benefit on the companies (as in DHN) rather exposing them to 
liability. This subjective focus leads to inconsistencies in the manner in which 
the veil is pierced.312 
 
The English and Irish courts are keen to reaffirm the importance of the Salomon 
principle and will not easily disregard the separate legal personality of a 
company. They are reluctant to treat a group as a single legal entity, but may lift 
the veil if the interests of justice required them to do so.  
2. Imposing Liability on the Directors of Subsidiaries  
One way of minimising any incentive which a company may have to continue 
trading where it is in financial difficulties is to impose liability on the 
shareholders and/or directors with respect to losses incurred by creditors in 
such circumstances. When a company is insolvent, the value of the 
shareholders’ interest is zero. The value of continued trading to directors will, of 
course, not is being zero since they will have a continued interest in receiving 
remuneration.313 Thus the legislative response to directors continuing to trade 
when the company is insolvent or on the verge of insolvency has been to 
impose liability on directors for fraudulent or wrongful trading. 
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 2.1 Fraudulent Trading 
Statutes in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom have long provided 
that directors responsible for reckless or fraudulent trading can be ordered 
without limit of liability to contribute to the asset pool should the company go 
into insolvent liquidation. Broadly, these provisions apply where directors, or 
others who participated in the management of a company, did do in a reckless 
manner or so as to defraud the members or creditors.314 Thus s.213 of the UK 
Insolvency Act 1986, known as the ‘fraudulent trading’ provision, provides that, 
if, in the course of the winding up of a company, it appears that any business of 
the company has been carried on with intent to defraud creditors of the 
company or creditors of any other person, or for any fraudulent purpose, then 
the liquidator can apply to the court for a declaration that any persons who were 
knowingly parties to the carrying on of the business in this way be liable to 
make such contributions to the company’s assets as the court thinks proper.  
Section 213 sets out three elements that must be established before liability will 
attach. First, the company must be in the course of winding up. Second, the 
company’s business must have been carried on with the intent of defrauding 
creditors. Third, to be liable, the persons must have knowingly been parties to 
the carrying on of the business. Section 213 raises three main questions. The 
first is what is the meaning of ‘fraud’ in this context? On Re Patrick & Lyon 
Ltd,315 the court suggests that the words ‘defraud’ and ‘fraudulent purpose’ 
connote actual dishonesty involving real moral blame. Thus in that case the test 
was satisfied when the company had never made a trading profit and the 
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directors’ secured money owed to them by the company by causing the 
company to issue debentures to them. In Re Gerald Cooper Chemicals Ltd,316 it 
was held that an insolvent company could be carrying on a business 
fraudulently where it accepted an advance payment for the supply of goods in 
circumstances where the directors knew that there was no prospect of the 
goods being supplied or the payment being repaid. Similarly, in Re William C 
Leitch Brothers Ltd,317 the court held that, if a company continues to carry on 
business and to incur debts at a time when there is, to the knowledge of the 
directors, no reasonable prospect of the creditors ever receiving payment of 
those debts, it was, in general, proper to infer that the company had been 
carrying on a business with intent to defraud. 
The second question is who might be defrauded? It has been held that the 
provisions apply not only where all the creditors of the company have been 
defrauded but where only one has been so affected. Also, it is no defense to 
argue that a person supplying goods on credit to a company is not a creditor 
but, at that time, only a supplier with a possible future claim against the 
company. The courts will construe the wording so that creditors include 
potential creditors.318  
The third question is who is carrying on the business of the company? It has 
been held that to be a party to the carrying on of the business’ of the company, 
a person must be involved in taking positive steps towards that end or 
exercising a controlling or managerial function and not just ‘advising on’ or 
‘concurring in’ or even ‘participating in’ the business. Nevertheless, in Re 
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Gerald Cooper Chemicals Ltd,319 it was held that it was possible for an outsider 
to be a party to the carrying on of the company’s business for the purpose of 
s.213.  
There is also the possibility that criminal liability could follow, with a term of 
imprisonment as the ultimate penalty. While the criminal penalty was intended 
to act as a strong deterrent to fraudulent behavior, it proved to have the 
unfortunate effect of neutralising the effectiveness of s.213 as the courts set a 
very high standard of proof for ‘intent to defraud’ because of the possibility of a 
criminal charge also arising.  
 2.1.1 Parent/Subsidiary Case   
The implementation of fraudulent trading principle in the context of 
parent/subsidiary is rare. The decision in Re Augustus Barnett & Son Ltd 320 is 
a good example. A was a subsidiary of R. A had operated at loss, and its 
auditors had only agreed to certify its accounts because R had provided a letter 
of comfort. Furthermore, R transferred money to A and assured A’s suppliers 
that it would continue to support it. Later, R withdrew support and A went into 
insolvent liquidation. The liquidator sought to make R liable for fraudulent 
trading under s. 332 of the Companies Act 1948. It was alleged that, although 
the directors of A had carried on the business, R had induced A’s directors to 
do so with the intent of defrauding A’s creditors and thereby had been a party to 
the fraud. The argument failed because the directors of A honestly believed in 
the continuing support of R, so that there was no fraud to which R could be a 
party. The court also considered if R itself could have been carrying on the 
business with fraudulent intent. It found it is possible that a parent company 
might be considered as carrying on its subsidiary’s business. However, the 
evidence did not support any contention of intent to defraud creditors.  
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The difficulties and inadequacies of the law relating to fraudulent trading were 
examined by the Cork Committee Report in 1982. It thought that the main 
problems with the interpretation and application of the fraudulent trading 
provisions, which prevent them from operating as an effective compensatory 
remedy, are the reluctance of the courts to declare civil liability except in cases 
where there has been dishonesty, and the courts’ insistence upon a strict 
standard of proof. Both of these problems were seen as stemming from the fact 
that fraudulent trading has both criminal and civil aspects, with the courts 
maintaining the same requirements in relation to each. The Committee was of 
the view that concept of fraudulent trading should be abolished, and that a new 
provision be enacted which did not require dishonesty to be proven and which 
would apply in cases of not only fraudulent but also unreasonable trading. This 
new concept was to be known as ‘wrongful trading’. The legislature adopted 
this proposal and enacted the wrongful trading provision in s.214 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986.321 
2.2 Wrongful Trading 
Section 214 provides that the court, on the application of the liquidator, may 
declare  that a person who is or has been a director of the company is to be 
liable to make such contribution (if any) to the company's assets as the court 
thinks proper if (a) the company has gone into insolvent liquidation,(b) at some 
time before the commencement of the winding up of the company, that person 
knew or ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that 
the company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation, and (c) that person 
was a director of the company at that time. 
Section 214 operates on the basis that at some time before the company 
entered insolvent liquidation there will have been a point where the directors 
knew it was hopeless and the company could not trade out of the situation. In 
deciding whether a director ought to have concluded that a company could not 
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avoid insolvent liquidation, a director is deemed to have the general knowledge, 
skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out 
the same functions that director carries out for the company.  
To avoid liability under this section, a director must:  
a. exercise the knowledge, skill and experience that he possesses.  
b. prove there was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid 
going into liquidation, and 
c. prove he took every step he should have taken to minimise the potential 
loss to the company’s creditors.322 
Where a person has been found liable to make a contribution under s.214, this 
can constitute grounds for disqualifying him from acting as a director of a 
company for up to a period of fifteen years.323 The prospect of personal liability 
for the debts of the company, coupled with the threat of disqualification is a 
strong incentive for directors to bring the affairs of a company to an end where 
the company can no longer trade at a profit.324 
2.2.1 Parent/Subsidiary case 
The most important contribution of s.214 to the liability of corporate group is 
when the parent company is a "shadow directors". S.251 of Companies Act 
2006 defines shadow director as "a person in accordance with whose 
instructions the directors of the company are accustomed to act". This obviously 
has important implications for parent company liability, as in many situations a 
parent company will instruct its subsidiary as to how to carry on its affairs. 
Where this is the case, the parent company will be potentially liable under s.214 
as a shadow director. Therefore, wrongful trading may well be able to provide a 
remedy in situations similar to that in Re Augustus Barnett Ltd.325 However, The 
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Cork Committees’ proposal that a parent should be presumed to be a shadow 
director if it is responsible for the appointment of the directors of the subsidiary 
has not been implemented. 
Morris LJ in State for Trade and Industry v Deverell 326 suggested taking a more 
inclusive view of who might be a shadow director. He held that a shareholder 
may be treated as a shadow director if he exercises "real influence" over the 
board of the company’s management; total dictatorial control over every aspect 
of management does not have to be established. However, the latest authority 
on the subject, namely Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Becker327 
offers a more conservative view. The court emphasized that the there must be 
a consistent pattern of board compliance with instructions. Therefore, it is not 
sufficient if the directors followed such instructions in an isolated event at the 
end of the company’s life.  
Liability can also be extended to a ‘de facto director’, a person who presumes to 
act as a director. He is held out as a director by the company, claims and 
purports to be a director, although never actually or validly appointed as 
such’.328 To establish that a person was a de facto director of a company, it is 
necessary to prove that he undertook functions in relation to the company 
which could properly be discharged only by a director. Where a parent company 
is alleged to be the director of the subsidiary, whether de facto or as a shadow 
director, it will not necessarily follow that the directors of the parent company 
will, ipso facto, be the de facto or shadow directors of the subsidiary. Evidence 
will need to be adduced on this point.329 
The concept of a parent company being held liable because it is a shadow or 
de facto director of a subsidiary is also found in a number of European 
countries.  
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Three main features need to be appreciated when using the concept of Shadow 
director under s. 214:330 
a. being a shadow director is a matter of evidence and is not automatically 
assumed where one company has majority control of another company, 
or even where the other company is its wholly owned subsidiary. 
However, in many situations it will be difficult for a parent to deny that it 
does not control its subsidiary’s affairs. As companies are legally 
required to maintain extensive records of their affairs (minutes of 
meeting, accounts, etc), it will be difficult for a parent company to 
conceal the reality of control if it is at all being exercised. In the case of a 
wholly owned subsidiary, or where the directors of the parent company 
also act as the subsidiary directors, the inference of control will be 
virtually irrefutable. 
b. liability under s.214 is not absolute. A parent company considered to be 
a shadow director can yet show that it took every step to minimise the 
potential loss to the company’s creditors. There are no decisions spelling 
out what this defence entails, but it is reasonably clear that the standard 
imposed is a demanding one. However, the possibility of this defense 
means that a parent which has acted as a shadow director of its 
subsidiary is not made automatically liable for the debts of its subsidiary. 
c. Section 214 designed primarily to protect creditors and not shareholders. 
Thus it does not deal with the situation where a parent company causes 
damages to its subsidiary to the prejudice of minority shareholders in the 
subsidiary but which does not ultimately result in the insolvent liquidation 
of the subsidiary. 
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2.3 Evaluation of the Wrongful Trading Provisions 
The application of the provisions on fraudulent and wrongful trading in the 
context of groups of companies relies upon evidence demonstrating that the 
parent company exercises some degree of managerial control over its 
subsidiary. The limited liability of the parent is lifted either where the parent was 
knowingly party to the carrying on of its subsidiary’s business with intent to 
defraud creditors (fraudulent trading) or where the parent was a shadow 
director of its insolvent subsidiary (wrongful trading). Although s.214 does not 
directly make a parent company liable for the debts of its subsidiary, the 
extension of s.214 to shadow directors entails that parent companies will, in 
many situation, have to come to rescue of their failing subsidiaries.331 
Some scholars believe that the introduction of the fraudulent and wrongful 
trading provision can be seen as the most important statutory exception to the 
separate legal entity doctrine.332  The major advance brought about by the 
introduction of the notion of wrongful trading is that considerable personal 
liability can be imposed on those persons who have run a company which has 
gone into insolvent liquidation, even where they have not acted dishonestly.333 
Yet others argue that the provisions do not properly apply in cases of 
parent/subsidiary, and that they are subject to very strict conditions similar to 
those required for veil piercing.334 Moreover, several problems attend the 
‘shadow directors’ doctrine in some countries. First, under some of the laws 
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there is a need to show that the interests of the subsidiary were undermined for 
the purpose of ensuring that the interests of the holding company prevailed. 
However, it is often difficult to show that the subsidiary has a separate interest 
when the affairs of the holding company and the subsidiary have been merged 
for a significant period. Second, in some jurisdictions liability depends upon a 
breach of fiduciary duty by the shadow or de facto director. The definition of 
fiduciary duty requires reference to an independent interest of the subsidiary. 
Because of this holding company liability will only established in the most 
egregious cases of holding company misconduct. Finally, some jurisdictions 
require breach of fiduciary duty by the de facto director to be enforced 
derivatively. Derivative litigation presents significant problems because of the 
lack of incentives to commence litigation.335 
Finally, the requirements for successfully establishing the liability of parent 
corporations indicate that the Insolvency Act in only an enacted equivalent of 
the veil piercing principles laid down in case law. Therefore, it cannot be 
claimed to have removed the negative effects of limited liability principles in the 
groups of companies’ context.336  
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3. Trading while Insolvent  
In Australia, the Corporate Law Reform Act 1992 amended the Corporations 
Act to expose parent entities to liability for insolvent trading of their subsidiaries. 
A subsidiary’s liquidator may raise recovery proceedings against its holding 
company if the specific provisions of ss.588V and 588W of the Corporation Act 
are met. A holding company contravenes s.588V if a subsidiary is insolvent 
when it incurs a debt, or becomes insolvent by incurring the debt, and at that 
time there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the subsidiary is 
insolvent, or would so become insolvent, and,  
a. the holding company, or one or more of its directors, is or are aware at 
that time that there are grounds for so suspecting; or  
b. having regard to the nature and extent of the holding company’s control 
over the affairs of the subsidiary and to any other relevant 
circumstances, it is reasonable to expect that either a holding company 
in the company’s circumstances would be so aware or one or more of 
such a holding company’s directors would be so aware. 337 
Section 588W provides that where a holding company contravenes s.588V in 
relation to the incurring of a debt by a subsidiary, and the person to whom the 
debt is owed has suffered loss or damage in relation to the debt because of the 
subsidiary’s insolvency, and the debt was wholly or partly unsecured when the 
loss or damage was suffered, the subsidiary’s liquidator may seek to recover 
from the holding company an amount equal to the amount of the loss or 
damage. Yet where the court is satisfied that, at the time when the subsidiary 
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incurred the debt, the creditor who suffered the loss or damage knew that the 
subsidiary was insolvent or would become insolvent by incurring the debt, 
s.588Y provides that the court may order that the compensation paid by the 
holding company is not available to pay the debt unless all the subsidiary’s 
other unsecured debts have been paid in full.  
The approach of s.588V is commendable. It is reasonable to expect a holding 
company and its directors to be aware that the subsidiary is facing the risk of 
insolvency of a subsidiary’s insolvency, at least where the holding company 
exercises control over the affairs of the subsidiary. In other words, there are 
grounds for imputing an awareness of the subsidiary’s plight to the holding 
company or its directors if it is reasonable to do so having regard to the control 
relationship.338 
Section 588X gives a holding company a defense if it can establish that: 
a. At the time when the debt was incurred, it and each relevant director (if 
any), had reasonable grounds to expect, and did expect, that the 
subsidiary was solvent at that time and would remain solvent even if it 
incurred the debt.  
b. At the time when the debt was incurred, it and each relevant director (if 
any):  
i. had reasonable grounds to believe, and did believe that a 
competent and reliable person was responsible for providing to 
the holding company adequate information about whether the 
subsidiary was solvent and that the person was fulfilling that 
responsibility; and  
ii. expected, on the basis of the information provided to the holding 
company by the person, that the subsidiary was solvent at that 
time and would remain solvent even if it incurred that debt.  
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c. Because of illness or for some other good reason, a particular relevant 
director did not take part in the management of the holding company at 
the time when the subsidiary incurred the debt.  
d. It took all reasonable steps to prevent the subsidiary from incurring the 
debt.  
3.1 Evaluation of the Trading while Insolvent Provisions 
Section 588V seems to focusing cases where parents and subsidiaries are 
managed separately, as in the case of a local subsidiary of a foreign parent. 
The provisions are apt to deal with a local wholly owned group where assets of 
group entities are intermingled and the affairs of the entities are intricately 
intertwined. In such a case, it may be possible to prove the ingredients of 
holding company liability under s.588V. However, the very complexity which 
creates problems in the liquidation of group entities will also generate problems 
in the proof of the ingredients of liability. The establishment of a judicial power 
to order that one entity should contribute to the debts of the other and that 
liquidation should proceed together would be a much easier way of solving the 
problem. 339 
4. Pooling of Assets  
Section 271 of New Zealand Companies Act 1993 340  entitles the court on the 
application of the liquidator, a creditor or shareholder, and if the court satisfied 
that it is just and equitable to do so, to order that: 
a. a company that is, or has been, related to the company in liquidation 
must pay to the liquidator the whole or part of any or all of the claims 
made in the liquidation. This is a ‘Contribution Order’.  
b. Where two or more related companies are in liquidation, the liquidations 
in respect of each company must proceed together as if they were one 
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company to the extent that the court so orders and subject to such terms 
and conditions as the court may impose. 
Section 272 (1) sets out the guidelines for making such order. In deciding 
whether it is just and equitable to make such order, the Court must have regard 
to the following matters:  
a. the extent to which the related company took part in the management of 
the company in liquidation;  
b. the conduct of the related company towards the creditors of the company 
in liquidation;  
c. the extent to which the circumstances that gave rise to the liquidation of 
the company are attributable to the actions of the related company;  
d. such other matters as the Court thinks fit.  
In deciding whether it is just and equitable to make such order under s. 
271(1)(b), the court must have regard to the following matters as stipulated in s 
272(2), 
a. the extent to which any of the companies took part in the management of 
any of the other companies;  
b. the conduct of any of the companies towards the creditors of any of the 
other companies;  
c. the extent to which the circumstances that gave rise to the liquidation of 
any of the companies are attributable to the actions of any of the other 
companies;  
d. the extent to which the business of the companies have been combined;  
e. such other matters as the Court thinks fit.  
Section 272 (3) stated that the fact that creditors of a company in liquidation 
relied on the fact that another company is, or was, related to it is not a ground 
for making an order under s.271 of the Act. 
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The circumstances under which the court will grant such a pooling order were 
set out in the case of Mountfort v Tasman Pacific Airlines of NZ Ltd.341 In July 
1999, Tasman Pacific Airlines Limited (Pacific), an Ansett Australia subsidiary 
set up to compete with Air New Zealand, acquired Tasman Pacific Regional 
Airlines Limited (Regional). Regional provided regional “feeder” flights for 
Pacific’s main domestics’ routes under an agreement which ensured that 
Regional produced profits irrespective of the number of passengers carried. 
Pacific however had made multimillion dollar losses over several years and had 
been supported by injections of funds from its Australian holding company in 
the hope of achieving a turnaround. The holding company had also provided 
Pacific’s bank with a substantial guarantee which ensured that Pacific remained 
solvent. In March 2000, Zazu Limited (Zazu), owned by several New Zealand 
investment companies, acquired Pacific and the previous owner’s withdrew 
their guarantee. Zazu lacked sufficient assets to continue to fund Pacific’s loses 
and looked to Qantas to secure an injection of additional equity. In the interim, 
Pacific procured Regional to transfer $650,000 from Regional’s bank account to 
Pacific. This transfer would have been legitimate if both companies had been 
solvent as the resulting debt would simply have replaced a debt of the same 
amount owed by Regional’s bank. A heavily undercapitalised Pacific continued 
to make substantial losses and in July 2000 the value of Pacific’s debt to 
Regional was discounted to nil. The removal of the $650,000 from Regional 
effectively rendered that company insolvent. Qantas ultimately decided not to 
support Pacific and unable to secure additional finance both Pacific and 
Regional were placed into liquidation.  
The liquidator for Regional applied for a pooling order under ss.271 and 272 of 
the Companies Act 1993 on the basis that Pacific had wrongfully caused 
Regional’s losses and should be required to disgorge the benefits received at 
the expense of Regional’s creditors. The Court affirmed that a subsidiary 
company is a separate legal entity from its parent and must be treated as such. 
The Court also indicated that solvency is the premise on which distinct 
corporate identity is accorded to the parent and subsidiary. Once the previous 
owner’s had withdrawn their guarantee, Pacific had become insolvent. Pacific’s 
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insolvency was more than a mere paper position; Pacific had no prospect of 
generating sufficient income from reasonably minor expenditure which might 
justify continued trading. Pacific had adopted a policy of trading while insolvent 
and had caused Regional to trade while insolvent by knowingly providing it with 
bad debt. The Court found that Regional had been a slave of Pacific and that 
Pacific had abused the potential creditors of Regional by sweeping money from 
its subsidiary in circumstances where there was a real risk of inability to repay 
the debt it owed. The Court was cognizant that a pooling order would increase 
the assets available to Regional’s creditors while diminishing the assets 
available to Pacific. The Court held that this consideration was relevant as to 
whether an order would be equitable and to what its terms ought to be but was 
not be a bar to exercise of the statutory power. The Court affirmed the equitable 
principal that a party will not be permitted to take advantage of its own wrong.  
An example of the operation of s 271(1)(b) is presented in Re Pacific 
Syndicated (NZ) Ltd. 342 Two related companies had solicited funds for 
contributory mortgages and had set up schemes, but had not set up the 
nominee companies which were to act as trustees for the scheme investors. 
Consequently, the funds received under each scheme had been mingled in the 
same bank account. Additionally, a mortgage was granted to a director of one 
of the companies to secure an advance from that company’s bank account; that 
director stated that he held the mortgage on behalf of scheme investors. The 
companies had brought an action to recover monies allegedly misappropriated 
from them, and their claim was settled by payment of a global sum. The 
liquidator of the companies obtained an order permitting the proceeds of the 
settlement to be pooled, on the basis that it was not feasible to apportion the 
fund between the two companies. This was clearly a much more satisfactory 
outcome than having to apportion on some more or less arbitrary basis and 
treat the claims of investors in the two companies separately.343 
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4.1 Evaluation of the Pooling of Assets Provisions 
Sections 271 and 272 potentially create a charter for the New Zealand courts to 
discard the Salomon principle in relation to groups of companies where some or 
all of the members of the group have been placed in liquidation. This model 
also enables the courts to overcome some of the difficulties of corporate group 
liquidation, saving time and expense and ultimately improving returns for 
creditors.344 However, these provisions and their predecessors appear to have 
been little used, and the extent to which they will be used in the future courts is 
unclear.  
Goddard,345 believes that contribution to an insolvent company’s debts by a 
solvent related company is still more problematic. Where a parent company is 
called on to contribute to the debts of a subsidiary, in particular, the Salomon 
principle is clearly challenged. If the creditors of the insolvent company knew 
who they were dealing with, what is the case for contribution? How can it be 
relevant that the solvent company “took part in the management of the 
company in liquidation”, if it did not commit any breach of duty to the company 
in so doing and is not liable for losses suffered as a result? If an individual 
shareholder who took part in the company’s management would not be liable, 
why impose liability on corporate shareholders? Goddard is convinced that an 
economically rational case for contribution by a related company is made out 
only if, and to the extent that: 
a. creditors were led to believe they were giving credit to the surviving 
company, or that some assets of the surviving company were in fact 
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assets of the insolvent company, and such representations were material 
to those creditors; or 
b. a parent company is a deemed director under s.126 of the Companies 
Act 1993, due to the control it exercises over a subsidiary’s affairs, and is 
liable for losses caused by insolvent trading on the basis applicable to 
directors generally. 
He finally mention that ss.271 and 272 go far beyond these bounds and require 
careful review if Salomon is to survive in the corporate group context. 
On another hand, it is suggested that there is a clear conceptual distinction 
between pooling and contribution. A pooling order is an example of 
disregarding separate legal personality in order to divide an existing pool of 
assets among the creditors, while a contribution order is an example of 
disregarding separate personality by imposing liability upon a related company 
and so swelling the pool of assets available for the creditors of the company in 
liquidation. Yet this distinction is curiously submerged in the guidelines to which 
a court must have regard in deciding whether it is just and equitable to make a 
pooling or a contribution order.346  
5. Substantive Consolidation 
Substantive consolidation is similar to the concept of pooling of assets although 
it goes further than the New Zealand legislation in that consolidation is available 
to merge the assets and liabilities of individual debtors with affiliate companies 
as well as merging the assets and liabilities of related companies.347 Its effect is 
that intercompany debts and liabilities under guarantees are eliminated, the 
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assets of the debtor companies are treated as common assets, and they are 
applied to the claims of creditors against any or all of the companies. The 
concept of substantive consolidation was developed by the US courts in 
exercising their general equitable powers. A court commonly orders 
consolidation where the affairs of the companies in question are inextricably 
entangled, or at least so entangled that the cost of unraveling them is likely to 
absorb the assets in the liquidation. Less commonly, consolidation may also be 
ordered on the basis that the creditors have dealt with the debtor companies as 
a single economic unit and did not rely upon the credit of a particular company 
within the group. In such cases, difficulty in separating the affairs of the 
companies may be only one factor in determining whether consolidation should 
be ordered. In an appropriate case, consolidation may be ordered even where 
the affairs of the debtor companies are readily separated, as in Re Flora Mir 
Candy v R.S Dickson&Co.348  
The American courts have cautioned that consolidation should be used 
sparingly because of possible prejudice to creditors of a debtor company who 
have dealt solely with that company in isolation from others in the group. This 
occurs where the likely distribution by company A within a group of companies 
would substantially exceed a distribution following consolidation of all 
companies in the group. The solution is to order consolidation of the debtor 
companies excluding company A. Here the courts rely upon the doctrine of 
separate corporate personality, not for the usual purpose of shielding corporate 
participants (directors and shareholders) from liability, but to protect creditors. 
For this reason, Landers argues that the reliance by a creditor upon the credit 
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of a particular entity should not be emphasised in considering whether 
consolidation should be ordered: the doctrine of separate incomparability was 
not designed as a protection for creditors. Consolidation is available in the 
United States between a solvent and an insolvent company. The non-debtor 
company is said to be ‘collapsed’ into the debtor company.  It appears to be 
only rarely ordered, and has the effect that all the assets and liabilities of the 
collapsed company are brought into the liquidation of the debtor company. 349  
6. Directors’ Duties to Creditors 
Directors are appointed by shareholders to manage the company ultimately for 
the benefit of the latter. Although directors must act only in the interests of the 
company rather than the shareholders, the interests of shareholders must be 
taken into consideration, as it is ultimately for their benefit that the business of 
the company is being conducted. However, the concept of the interests of the 
company has undergone significant development.  
In Teck Coproration Ltd v Millar,350 Berger J suggested expanding it to include 
the interests of employees and the community, while the Australian High Court 
decided in Walker v Wimborne351 to oblige directors to have regard to creditors’ 
interests.352 
The common law traditionally did not recognise that a director owed any duties 
to a company’s creditors. The Jenkins Committee Report stated that a director 
owed fiduciary duties only to the company itself rather than individual members 
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of the company, and a fortiori owed no duties to a person who is not a 
member.353   
More recently, however, courts have been willing to find ways to impose 
fiduciary duties towards a company’s creditors on directors where the company 
continues to trade at a time when it is insolvent. The conceptual apparatus for 
achieving this is relatively straightforward. Once a company goes into insolvent 
liquidation, the shareholders cease to have any interest in the assets of the 
company. In insolvency, the shareholders ‘come last’ and drop out of the 
picture. In this situation, the courts have held that the interests of the company 
are the interests of the creditors and the directors must act so as to maximise 
creditor welfare.354 
Accordingly, in Winkworth v Edward Baron Development Ltd355, Lord 
Templeman stated that: 
“a company is not bound to pay off every debt as soon as it is 
incurred, and the company is not obliged to avoid all ventures which 
involve an element of risk but the company owes a duty to its 
creditors to keep its property inviolate and available for the 
repayment of its debts. The conscience of the company, as well as 
its management, is confided to directors. A duty is owed by its 
directors to the company and to the directors of the company to 
ensure that the affairs of the company are properly administered and 
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that its property is not dissipated or exploited for the benefit of the 
directors themselves to the prejudice of the creditors. ” 
The clearest recognition of this doctrine is found in the decision of Court of 
Appeal in West Mercia Safetywear Ltd v Dodd.356 The court held that a director 
of a company which was insolvent had to repay moneys which he had used to 
pay the debts owed by the company to its parent, but which he should not have 
so used, as this breached the duty which he owed to the company’s creditors 
as a class. In Kinsella v Russell Kinsela Pty,357 Dillon L.J. stated that: 
 “In a solvent company the proprietary interests of the shareholders 
entitle them as a general body to be regarded as the company when 
questions of the duty of directors arise. If, as a general body, they 
authorise or ratify a particular action of the directors, there can be no 
challenge to the validity of what the directors have done. But where a 
company is insolvent the interests of the creditors intrude. They 
become prospectively entitled, through the mechanism of liquidation, 
to displace the power of the shareholders and directors to deal with 
the company’s assets. It is in a practical sense their assets and not 
the shareholders’ assets that, through the medium of the company, 
are under the management of the directors pending entire 
liquidation, return to insolvency, or the imposition of some alternative 
administration.”   
A company’s obligations towards creditors are primarily contractual. However, 
even while the company is a going concern, directors must consider the 
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interests of the creditors, as a failure to do so will result in certain 
repercussions, of which the most obvious will be a legal action being taken 
against the company, and the harm inflicted to the company’s reputation and 
credit rating. Yet while the interests of creditors are relevant, directors will be 
under no obligation to actively advance those interests. Nevertheless, where 
the company is insolvent or nearly so, the creditors replace the shareholders as 
the primary corporate constituent.  This is because the shareholders can no 
longer benefit from the company and it is the creditors who will stand to lose or 
gain the most, depending on how the business of the company is conducted 
and its assets utilised.358 
Although this doctrine is in an embryonic stage, the following points can be 
tentatively made about its possible operation:359   
a. It only applies when the company is insolvent and thus its principal purpose 
is to protect creditors and not shareholders.  
b.  the duty, although expressed to be owed to the creditors, will be mediated 
through the company. There are a number of reasons for this. First, it 
avoids the difficulties of double recovery which could arise were a director 
to be held to owe his duty to the creditors directly. Secondly, it is an 
important principle of insolvency law that all creditors of the same class 
should be treated equally. If a creditor could sue a director directly for an 
alleged breach of duty, this principle could be subverted. Also, if a direct 
action against director were to be permitted, difficult problems could arise 
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as to ‘how any recovery obtained by a creditor from a director should be 
treated in a winding up. 
c. the effect of channeling claims through the company means that if the 
company has ceased to exist, then the creditor will in all probability have no 
enforceable claim with respect to any breach  a of duty owed to him by the 
director through the company.  
Some commentators argue that having regard to creditors’ interests does not 
necessarily mean that the directors owe a duty to creditors. This is because the 
notion of directors’ duties to creditors is inconsistent with the doctrine of 
separate legal personality. Furthermore, as the relationship between a 
company and its creditors is purely contractual, there is no basis for finding that 
directors owe any duties, fiduciary or otherwise, towards the creditors. In 
addition, even if a duty can be said to exist, there are no remedies that the 
creditors may obtain and a supposed duty which is not matched by a remedy is 
nonsensical.360 
The effect of this common law development in the parent/subsidiary context is 
that where a parent company is the director of its subsidiary and as a director, it 
breaches the duty that it owes to its subsidiary’s creditors, this will give the 
creditors a claim against the parent.  This rule should as a matter of principle 
applies where the parent is a de jure or de facto director.  In addition, it will 
operate to prevent a parent company in breach of this duty from making certain 
claims in the insolvency of its subsidiary in competition with the subsidiary’s 
creditors.361   
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7. The Single Economic Unit  
Although the EU failed to agree a unified notion for group of companies, 
especially in relation to the liability problem, the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) has used the single economic unit theory to impose liability on a parent 
company in the context of competition practice. The ECJ decided that where a 
company and its subsidiaries form as a single economic unit, the subsidiaries 
cannot enjoy any real autonomy in determining their operations.362 Consequently, 
the most established basis in EC competition law for asserting jurisdiction over 
foreign companies is the doctrine of the group as a ‘single economic unit’. This 
doctrine features the foreign parents’ responsibility for the anti-competitive 
activities of a subsidiary that is active in Europe, and over which they 
supposedly exert control.  Owing to that supposed control, the parent and other 
relevant members of the group may be brought within the jurisdiction of 
European Law.363 The court has emphasised the corporate structural 
relationship between the parent and the subsidiary, and merely considered the 
parent’s ability to control the latter, rather than asking whether that control was 
actually exercised. The court has stated that: 
‘the fact that a subsidiary has separate legal personality is not 
sufficient to exclude the possibility of imputing its conduct to the 
parent company… in the circumstances, the formal separation 
between these companies, resulting from their separate legal 
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personality, cannot outweigh the unity of their conduct on the market 
for the purposes of applying the rules on competition’.364  
Accordingly, the ECJ has held that where a subsidiary does not enjoy real 
autonomy in determining its course of action in the market, the prohibitions set 
out in article 81(1) of EU Treaty might be considered inapplicable in the 
relationship between it and the parent company with which it forms one 
economic unit.365  
The application of single economic unit theory in EC competition judgment 
requires certain conditions. First of all, the parent and subsidiaries should form 
an economic unit as explained in the Viho case366: 
 ‘an economic unit with in which the subsidiary has no real freedom 
to determine its course of action in the market because the parent 
company permanently supervises the making of decisions by, and 
the administration of, its subsidiary…’  
Second, the parent company should exercises “decisive influence” over the 
conduct of the subsidiary. Decisive influence may be establish where the 
subsidiary, despite having a separate legal personality, does not decide 
independently its own market conduct but rather is considered to operate in 
accordance with the will of its parent company.367   
Examination of the principles established by ECJ case law indicates that the 
requirements can only be met by vertically organised corporate groups because 
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clear control established by a parent over its subsidiaries is apparent only in 
such groups. Thus in the Viho case found that Parker Pen Ltd controlled its 
subsidiaries in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, France and Spain, taking 
all key decisions. Examination of other cases where the ECJ has found that a 
corporate group constitutes a single economic unit demonstrates similar 
characteristics of control or supposed control by a parent over its subsidiaries. 
Thus, the analysis of competition case law demonstrates that the single 
economic entity theory applied in anti-trust cases by ECJ has some similarities 
to the veil piercing doctrine.368 In the cases the separate legal personality of a 
subsidiary is ignored in order to reach its corporate shareholders. However, the 
single economic unit argument in the EU competition law is more advanced 
than the veil piercing theory, because the required nature of control in groups of 
companies is less strict than that required in veil piercing cases, as the Court 
looks for supposed rather than actual control by the parent. However, a liability 
regime designed according to a theory of vertical control in corporate groups 
cannot be applied to complex structures of multinational corporate group under 
which there is a horizontal organisational structure and cultural control. 369 
8. Conclusion to Part I  
1. There are difficulties associated with the imposition of liability because of the 
fact that a group exists. It is important that the law when providing solutions 
to these difficulties should at the same time provide a necessary degree of 
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flexibility in the organization of the affairs of the group of companies. In this 
regard, Prentice370 proposes the following: 
i. While the privilege of limited liability can be abused by the parent 
company, the mere fact that risk is ‘hived of’ is not in itself 
considered evidence of abuse. Company law should be 
sufficiently flexible to enable a company to arrange its activities to 
limit its risk by the use of subsidiary companies without using this 
device to impose unreasonable risks on others. 
ii. Difficult problems concerning the treatment of various classes of 
creditors arise if a parent is to be answerable for the liabilities of 
its subsidiary. Such liability would entail that the whole assets of 
the group would, in the last resort, be made available to meet the 
liabilities of any individual member of the group. If a creditor deals 
with a group member on the basis that the member’s assets are 
to be made exclusively available to meet its own debts, any form 
of group liability could result in such a creditor finding that the 
creditors of other group members possessed a potential claim on 
those assets. 
iii. Imposing liability on a parent company for the debts of a 
subsidiary gives rise to some special problems in the case of a 
subsidiary which is not wholly owned. If such liability is imposed, 
this could provide the minority shareholders in the subsidiary with 
a windfall. The potential liability of the parent company could be 
seen as operating virtually as a guarantee for which the subsidiary 
would not have to pay, and this would benefit the minority 
shareholders in the subsidiary. It would in effect result, by 
operation of law, in a wealth transfer from the shareholders in the 
parent to the minority shareholders in the subsidiary for which the 
former were not compensated. 
iv. If a parent company is to be made answerable for the debts of its 
subsidiary, difficult questions arise in determining the extent of 
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such liability where a new member joins or an existing member 
leaves the group. For example, where a member leaves a group, 
does the liability of the parent cease at this point or does it in 
some way continue? 
Finally, it is important to mention that the techniques used by the courts and 
jurisdictions to protect group’s creditors have two main important features. First, 
there is no presumption of liability on the part of a parent company following 
from the mere existence of the group form. Status does not determine liability or 
obligation unless the parent company shown to have ‘abuse’ its position. The 
second feature of these principles is that they normally only operate in the 
context of insolvency.371 However, efforts to reach a sound level of liability have 
been wiped out by judges’ rigid devotion to the restrictive characteristics of the 
doctrine of veil piercing. Basic liability principles are still attached to a traditional 
piercing the corporate veil doctrine, which requires a situation of parent 
company’s control over the subsidiary together with some form of unlawful 
action. 372 
From the above, I believe the solutions presented by the Common law are not 
sufficient to protect creditors, especially as they ooperate after loss has already 
occurred, and the possibility of compensating the creditors for that loss is minor. 
Therefore, it is important to think about a proactive approach to protect creditors 
and, while keeping the privilege of the form of groups of companies. Such 
approach will be elaborated at the final chapter of this work. 
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Part II 
The Liability of Groups of Companies in Islamic law 
The main conclusion of Part II of Chapter II was that modern Islamic scholars 
had found a basis in Islamic law allowing the formation of modern corporations 
including holding companies and group of companies, subject to certain 
conditions. Nevertheless, they had not yet found comprehensive solutions for 
problems related to modern forms of corporations, such as the liability of 
shareholders for the debts of their companies.  
In my opinion, the starting point to discover this solution is to appreciate the 
principle of “juridical person” and corporate personality under Islamic law. 
Although it is a fundamental principle in modern company law that a corporation 
is a “juridical person” enjoying a distinct legal personality separate from its 
shareholders, the opinions of modern scholars concerning the existence of this 
concept in Islamic law are divided. On one view there is no reliable evidence in 
Islamic law to support the validity of this concept. Another view suggests that 
Islamic law does acknowledge the concept and quotes examples of various 
institutions in support. Settling this argument is vital to my study because the 
scholars who affirm the existence of the concept of juridical person in Islamic 
law argue that all applications of this concept will automatically become valid, 
especially the concept of limited liability. Taking this view will not solve the 
problem, because even if it is proven that the concept of limited liability has an 
Islamic basis; it does not mean that its implementation will correspond to that in 
common law system.  
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The presentation of this dilemma cannot start without first understanding the 
concept of debt in Islam and why paying debts is a highly important obligation in 
Islam.  
Therefore, the structure of Part III will be as follows: 
1. The Concept of debts in Islam, 
2. The concept of juridical person in Islamic law,  
3. The concept of limited liability in Islamic law, and 
4. Liability of Groups of Companies in Islamic Law. 
1. The Concept of Debts in Islam: 
There are different ways in which funds may be raised to meet the needs and 
funding requirements of individuals and organisations. Raising a loan is one 
such various way. In Islamic terminology "qard" (loan) and "dayn" (Debt) relate 
to the giving or taking of loans. However, the word "dayn" has a broader 
connotation, depicting anything payable by a person either to another person or 
to God, based on a commitment towards that person or God. By contrast, 
"qard" could be defined as an interest-free loan for needy borrowers extended 
on a goodwill basis.  
Islam encourages Muslims to help each other including grating dayn or qard. 
The Prophet (PBUH) stated:  
 ‘A Muslim is the brother of another Muslim. He should not oppress 
his brother or hand him over to the enemy. The individual who fulfils 
the need of his Muslim brother, Allah will fulfill his need. That 
individual who removes a difficulty from his Muslim brother, Allah will 
remove his difficulty on the Day of Judgment.’ 
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In Islam to give a loan is better than to give charity. Thus one who takes and 
repays a loan is better and respected than those who receive charity. However, 
Islam has commanded Muslims to give and take debt that is interest free, 
"Qardh Hasan".  
Debt in Islam should be written down properly as God says,  
"O ye who believe! When ye deal with each other, in transactions 
involving future obligation in a fixed period of time, reduce them into 
writing, let a scribe write down faithfully as between the parties; let 
not the scribe refuse to write: as God has thought him…" (Qur'an 
2:282). 
It is the order of the Holy Qur’an, when money is borrowed in whatever amount, 
that this should be the subject of a written contract. Also, if possible this 
transaction should take place in front of two witnesses, so that there is no 
dispute at a later stage. If for any reason, in the future there is a dispute; the 
written document can be produced as proof. The Prophet (PBUH) warned 
debtors to pay their debts. As a result, Muslims should be careful to write down 
their debts, so that if they fail to repay, their heirs or next of kin will settle the 
debits on their behalf. 
The fulfillment of one's contractual obligations is a religious duty in Islam. 
Therefore, the Shari’ah defines specific rights and responsibilities of debtors 
and creditors. The most important duty of the debtor is to repay the loan in 
fulfillment of the promise or contract made with the creditor. God’s punishment 
of borrowers who do not intend to repay will be severe. The main duty of the 
creditor is not charge interest on the principal amount of the loan, because 
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those who do are compared in the Quran to those controlled by the devil's 
influence. More elaboration will follow.373 
1.1 Creditors’ Rights and Duties  
Authentic traditions have greatly emphasised the rewards promised for the one 
who lends to his Muslim brothers. Sometimes it is obligatory to lend and 
sometimes not prohibited. Sometimes it is recommended to lend and 
sometimes detestable not to lend. Indeed under certain circumstances it is 
obligatory to borrow, e.g to save one’s life or honor. A Muslim’s motivation to 
lend to his brothers is based on the Sunnah where the Prophet (PBUH) said:  
“One who lends to his believing brother and gives him respite till he is 
capable of repaying it, the amount that he has lent is considered as 
Zakat and the Angels pray for him and seek Divine mercy for him till 
this (amount) is returned.”  
He also remarked:  
“If one lends to his Muslim brother, it is for his own (good). Every 
Dirham that he lends will qualify him for a reward equivalent to Mount 
Ohud (a mountain in Mecca) and Mount Sinai. And if he is lenient in 
collecting his debt he shall cross the bridge of Sirat like a stroke of 
lightning. And if a Muslim brother relates his woes before a person 
and this person does not lend him any money, the Heaven shall be 
denied to him on the Day of recompensing good doers". 
Although a debtor may sell off his unnecessary belongings to repay his debts, a 
creditor is under divine obligation not to cause undue trouble to the debtor. He 
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should give respite so that the debtor can easily repay. Thus if the creditor 
condones his loan altogether, it will be considered a Sadaqah (alms) for which 
he will continue to benefit from forever. God says in the Holy Qur’an:  
“And if (the debtor) is in stringency, then let there be postponement 
until (he is in) ease, and that you remit (it) as alms is better for you, 
if you knew.” (Surah al-Baqarah 2:280).   
Two important points can be derived from this Surah. One, it is obligatory to 
give respite to a debtor who is incapable of repaying the loan. Secondly, it is 
more meritorious for the creditor to condone the loan completely.  
If a person dies before he has repaid his debt, and the creditor has not been 
compensated from deceased’s estate nor forgiven the debt, provided the debtor 
has not been negligent about repaying, nor was the loan taken for an illegal 
purpose, and also debtor had every intention of repaying but was unable to do 
so, God by His Grace will compensate the creditor on the Day of Judgment. 
In the case of a debt with a settlement date, the creditor is not entitled to ask for 
earlier repayment, so long as the debtor does not transgress the debt’s terms 
and conditions. But, if a creditor is not disposed to give more time for 
repayment, he cannot be compelled to do so, and the debtor would then be 
liable to repay the debt at the due date from whatever assets he has beyond his 
basic needs.  
Shari´ah allows creditors to ask for collateral to ensure recovery of the amount 
loaned should debtors fail to repay. Pledge is permissible in the Shari´ah even 
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim. The ownership of the pledged goods 
remains with the pledgor, who takes on the risk of losing the pledged 
commodity, while the pledgee holds the goods on trust. Hence, if the pledged 
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goods are lost without any fault of the pledgee, the loss is that of the debtor. If 
the due debt is not paid, the pledgee can apply to the court to have the pledged 
good sold and the debt recovered out of the proceeds of sale. 
1.2 Debtor Obligations 
If a person knows that he will not be able to repay a loan, then he should refrain 
from borrowing, unless he is in dire need. Yet a person who is not in a position 
to repay his debt must necessarily have the intention to repay it as soon as he 
is capable of doing so. This intention should have the first priority with him. In 
fact the intention to repay should be there right at the outset. In this regard the 
Prophet (PBUH) stated:  
‘The person who takes wealth from people with the intention of 
repaying it, Allah will assist him in the repayment of that loan. The 
person who takes wealth from people with the intention of 
squandering it, Allah will cause him destruction." 
The Companions of the Prophet (PBUH) being aware of the warnings issued by 
the Prophet were thus very concerned to repay loans as soon as possible. If for 
some reason, they were unable to pay back a loan in their lifetime, they would 
request their relatives to repay any specific loan immediately after their passing.  
Persons, who do not repay a loan in full, having the means to do so, are guilty 
of a Major sin; The money obtained will be accursed and a means of 
destruction in the debtor’s temporary life in this world as well as the Hereafter. 
The Prophet (PBUH) stated:  
‘The individual who has the means to repay a loan but does not do 
so, this is oppression.’  
and also stated that :  
‘Jibrail informed me (the Prophet) to not pray the funeral prayer of 
that person who has outstanding debts.’ The Prophet then stated: 
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‘The debtor remains imprisoned in his grave until his debts are 
settled.’ 
This means that if a person dies before paying his debts he will not achieve 
salvation till they are repaid or condoned. His good deeds are given to the 
creditor, or if there are no good deeds, the sins of the creditor are transferred to 
the debtor. Therefore, his heirs, after paying for funeral expenses, should try to 
pay his debts. In this regard God says:   
"In what your wives leave, your share is a half, if they leave no 
child; but if they leave a child, ye get a fourth; after payment of 
legacies and debts…" (Qur'an 4:12). 
Islam prescribes that debts to individuals are more important than that debts to 
God. God will not forgive debts to individuals it they are paid or condoned by 
the creditor. The Prophet (PBUH) says: 
“Nothing is more serious after the Greater sins than the fact that a 
person dies while he is in debt to people and there is nothing to (sell 
to) repay his debt.”  
The Prophet also stated that:  
‘All the wrongs of a martyr are forgiven, except his debts.’ 
The Prophet told his companions after prayers one day:  
“Such and such person who was martyred is still waiting outside 
Paradise. He cannot enter it because he still owes Three Dirhams 
to a Jew.” 
Debtors should not only pay debts on time, but express gratitude to the creditor 
while repaying and repay the loan in a beautiful manner. The Prophet (PBUH) 
took a camel from an individual by way of a loan. The Prophet stated:  
‘The best person is he who repays his loan in a beautiful manner.’  
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In Islam the person who delays payment without valid cause could be 
admonished, disgraced or even jailed. If necessary his assets could be 
disposed of to pay the debt. A monetary fine, on the other hand, would not be a 
lawful option, since this would amount to a monetary penalty for delayed 
payment, which is Riba (interest).  
1.3 Conclusion on the Concept of Dept in Islam 
It is clear that a Muslim’s obligation to pay his debts is a mandatory obligation. 
Liability for debt can last beyond this world into the hereafter. However, Islam 
makes a distinction between debtors who default by procrastination and those 
who default by necessity. The latter deserve compassion and must be given 
respite until able to pay. The mandatory obligation to pay debts should be 
appreciated as a main feature of Islamic law, where there no distinction 
between an individual’s personal and business behavior. He should act well in 
both. This principle should always kept in mind when studying the liability of 
shareholders for their company’s debts. 
2. Juridical Persons in Islamic Law  
Salmond,374 defines a juridical person as “any being whom the law regards as 
capable of rights or duties.” Such a being may be a natural person (human 
being) or a legal person (an artificial being like a corporation). God is the 
creator of the former while man is the creator of the latter by the instrumentality 
of law. Blackstone,375 says, “Persons also are divided by the law into either 
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natural persons, or artificial person. Natural persons are such as God of nature 
formed us. Legal or artificial persons are created and devised by human laws 
for the purposes of society and government.”  
A living human being, from birth to death, is a natural person. Such a person 
will considered a legal person if he/she can hold rights or duties. Thus neither a 
slave nor a dead man is a legal person. Artificial persons may also hold rights 
and duties.376 The law personifies something and attributes rights and duties 
thereto. The law can create as many legal persons as it wishes. The first and 
most popular category of legal person was a corporation, a personification of a 
number of individuals who constitute the corpus. The second category of legal 
person includes institutions such as churches, hospitals, universities… etc. The 
institutions form the corpus of such personalities. The third type of legal person 
takes as its corpus a fund or estate dedicated to a particular purpose such as a 
trust or charitable fund.  
A corporation, as a legal person, is born through a legal process such as 
registration or creation by royal charter or statute. It is an entity separate from 
its shareholders. Like other legal persons it has capacity to hold property, to 
sue and to be sued. Its property is not legally the property of the shareholders. 
Nor are its liabilities attributed to them. Shareholders, being distinct and 
separate from the corporation, can enter into contractual relations with it. Any 
change in the life of its corpus (the shareholders) shall not affect its life. Thus 
the insolvency or death of any particular member shall not impact on its life, 
even if it is a single member company. Shareholders may come and go, but the 
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corporation goes on until law puts an end to its life by dissolution. The essence 
of a body corporate consists of its legal personality, not the corpus of its 
members.377  
As a corollary of corporate personality, the liability of shareholders in a limited 
liability company is limited to the amount of their shares. They are not liable for 
all of the debts of the company. It is liable for its own debts. Thus if a company 
fails to pay its debts and is declared insolvent, that will not affect the 
shareholders. The company may be insolvent while the shareholders are rich 
and vice versa. This is so because shareholders are distinct and separate from 
the company. This is the principal advantage of corporate personality, which 
encourages business and commerce in any given society. 
While concepts such as juridical persons, corporate personality and limited 
liability have long been recognised in western jurisprudence, and are now 
common phenomena, there is no unanimity regarding these concepts in Islamic 
Jurisprudence. Opinion is divided among Islamic scholars concerning the 
existence of the concept of a juridical person in Islamic law. Some contend that 
Islamic law does acknowledge this concept and quote examples of various 
institutions in support. Others cannot find reliable evidence in Islamic law for the 
validity of this concept. An investigation of this concept in Islamic law would not 
be complete without a brief appreciation of the legal capacity of natural persons 
in Islamic Law and if such capacity can extend to artificial persons. 
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2.1 Natural Persons in Islamic Law. 
Natural persons from birth to death have legal personality (ahliyyah).378 It is 
defined as “a description presumed in a person rendering such a person a 
possible candidate to receive a legislative injunction”,379 and as “the ability of a 
person to oblige, be obliged and conduct his affairs”.380 Thus legal personality is 
capacity to acquire rights and bear obligations, and power to take actions and 
engage in transactions that have legal effects.381 Such basic capacity is 
inherent in every natural person until death. 
Legal personality in Islamic Law consists of two aspects, ahliyyat al-wujup 
(capacity to acquire rights) and ahliyyat al-ada’ (capacity to execute) The first 
aspect - the ability of a person to acquire rights and bear obligations exists in 
every living human being regardless of sex, colour, race, age, creed, mental, 
and physical ability or disability. The second aspect is defined as “the ability of 
a person to initiate actions, the consideration of which depends on a sound 
intellect” or “the ability to effect actions that are recognized by Law”. The 
presence of a sound intellect, comprehension and discernment are, therefore 
the main attributes of ahliyyat al-ada’. Once these conditions exist the person 
attains the level of full legal capacity and becomes able to receive the Shari’ah 
injunctions and be accountable for actions involving obligations and use of 
rights. Full ahliyyat al-ada’ can be attributed to every human being upon 
attaining the age of maturity and satisfying its requirements, namely, attaining a 
sufficient level of mental and physical maturity, a sound mind, comprehension 
and discernment. Any person who lacks one of these qualities is presumed to 
have restricted ahliyyat al-ada’. 
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Earlier jurists are very clear in their view that legal personality cannot be 
assigned to a non-human for the simple reason that only humans have the 
intellect which is the primary condition for legal capacity. Without this intellect, a 
person cannot perform his Islamic duties to God and other people. In other 
words, personality cannot be granted to non-humans because it is required for 
the performance of duties expected of a Muslim, which duties can only be 
understood and performed by human beings, because they partly pertain to the 
hereafter. Accordingly, we cannot find any mention of the term juridical person 
in early writings. Does this mean that early jurists did not recognise this 
concept? If so, how can legal personality be assigned to a corporation under 
Islamic law? Modern scholars are divided in their opinions concerning the 
existence of the concept of juridical person in Islamic law as follows:  
2.1. First Opinion: The Concept of Juridical Persons Exists in Islamic Law  
Proponents of this opinion argue that the concept of a juristic person had been 
acknowledged in the Shariah from the beginning. For example, the Holy Qur’an 
explains that pre-Islamic idols had a sort of legal personality, by saying that 
infidels, while distributing the products of agriculture and cattle, treated their 
idols as co-sharers beside Almighty Allah (Surah al Annaam: 136). If some kind 
of legal personality is imputed to idols in this verse, then Islamic jurists should 
obviously be aware of the concept of juridical person.  
The concept was recognized by the early jurists such as “al Ramli” and “al 
Mawardi” who stated that:382  
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“the will in favour of a Mosque is lawful although the intention is to make 
it owner of the property. Mosque is like a free natural person and can 
hold property".   
 “Baitual Mal (the exchequer of an Islamic state) is a head of states 
assets and not mere a place of storage it can be noted that all kinds of 
state assets, immovable property, animal herds, ammunition depots 
and water reservoirs are property of Baitul Mal”.  
Scholars relying on these statements thus assume that the Sharia'h from the 
outset has acknowledged juristic persons. These jurists considered both the 
Baitual Mal and the waqf as institutions, that is, juristic persons. Likewise, 
schools and hospitals were considered institutions and juristic persons, with the 
capacity to own and dispose of property.383 
The strongest argument presented in favour to the acceptance of the juridical 
person concept in Islamic law was presented by Justice Usmani, who supports 
his view by citing four examples of institutions considered by jurists to be 
juridical persons. 384 
A. Waqf  
Waqf is a legal and religious institution wherein a person dedicates property to 
a religious or a charitable purpose. Property, after being declared as Waqf, is 
no longer owned by the donor. The beneficiaries of a Waqf can benefit from the 
corpus or the proceeds of the dedicated property, but are not its owners. Its 
ownership vests in Allah Almighty alone. Muslim jurists have treated the Waqf 
as a separate legal entity and ascribed to it some characteristics similar to 
those of a natural person. This can be understood from two rulings of early 
Muslim jurists. First, if a property is purchased with the income of a Waqf, the 
purchased property cannot become a part of the Waqf automatically. Rather, 
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the jurists say, property so purchased shall be treated as a property owned by 
the Waqf. This clearly means that Waqf, like a natural person, can own 
property.  
Secondly, jurists have clearly mentioned that ownership of money given to a 
Masjid (Mosque) as a part of Waqf does not form part of the Waqf, but passes 
to the Mosque. Here again the mosque is accepted as capable of being the 
owner of money. The capacity of the Mosque is constructive, while the capacity 
enjoyed by a human being is physical. Equally bequests can be made in favour 
of mosques, because mosques can own properties. The principle may also 
extend to an inn or a bridge, provided that they are Waqf. In addition, jurists 
explain that waqf may incur debts with the permission of a judge. The Mutawali 
(the Waqf Administrator) can ask a judge to allow him to borrow money on 
behalf of the waqf in order, for example, to provide the necessary maintenance 
for the waqf properties. A loan may be proved against the waqf without the 
intervention of the administrator. It is therefore clear that early jurists accepted 
that a Waqf can own property. Obviously, a Waqf is not a human being, yet 
they treated it as such in the matter of ownership. Once capacity for ownership 
is established, it logically follows that it can sell and purchase, become a debtor 
or creditor, and sue and be sued. In short all the characteristics of a juridical 
person can be attributed to it. 
B. Baitul-Mal  
Baitul-mal (the exchequer of an Islamic state) enjoys financial independence 
and has a special system for the distribution of Zakat resources, taxes, booty, 
tribute …etc. Bait al-mal enjoys legal rights and has financial legal capacity. It is 
independent, subordinate neither to the head of state or to any administrator. 
Being public property, all the citizens of an Islamic state have some beneficial 
right over Baitul-mal, yet nobody can claim to be its owner.  
Hanafi jurists explain that if the head of an Islamic state needs money to pay his 
army, but finds no money in the Kharaj department of the Baitul-mal, he can 
draw on the Sadaqah (Zakah) department, with amount so taken being deemed 
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to be a debt owed by the Kharaj department. It follows from this that not only 
Baitul-mal but the different departments therein can borrow money from each 
other, with liability resting on the concerned department. This means that each 
department is a separate entity, with the same capacity to be a debtor or 
creditor, and thus sue and be sued in the same manner, as a juridical person. 
C. Joint Stock  
The fiqh of the Shafi‘i School maintains that if persons run their business in 
partnership, whereby their assets are mixed with each other, the Zakah will be 
levied on each of them individually, and will be payable on their joint-stock as a 
whole. Thus even if one of them does not own the amount of the Nisab (the 
minimum amount on which Zakah is due), but the combined value of the total 
assets exceeds the prescribed limit of the Nisab, then Zakah will be payable on 
the whole joint-stock including the share of that person. Accordingly, he must 
contribute to the levy in proportion to his ownership in the total assets, whereas 
he would not be subject to the levy of Zakah, had it been levied him in his 
individual capacity. This means that the joint-stock has been treated as a 
separate entity, and the obligation of Zakah has been diverted towards the joint-
stock as an entity. 
D. Inheritance under Debt 
Property left by a deceased person whose liabilities exceed the value of that 
property is known as ‘inheritance under debt’. According to jurists, this property 
cannot be owned by the deceased, because he is dead nor it is owned by his 
heirs, as the creditors of the deceased have a preferential right over the 
property. It is not even owned by the creditors, because the settlement has not 
yet taken place. They have their claims over it, but it is not their property unless 
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it is actually divided between them. Being the property of nobody, it has its own 
existence and can be termed a legal entity. The heirs of the deceased or his 
nominated executor will look after the deceased’s properties as managers, but 
do not own them. If the process of the settlement of debt requires expenditure, 
this will be met by the properties. Looked at from this angle, this inheritance 
under debt is an entity which may sell and purchase, become a debtor or 
creditor, and has characteristics very much similar to those of a juridical person. 
Not only this, the liability of this juridical person is certainly limited to its existing 
assets. If the assets do not suffice to settle all the debts, there is no remedy left 
with its creditors to sue anybody, including the heirs of the deceased, for the 
rest of their claims. 
F. Additional Examples 
Scholars add to Usmani’s examples other minor examples from fiqh to support 
the existence of the concept of a juridical person in Islamic law. For example, 
the Head of State case. Under Islamic Law, a Head of State has a specific 
personality besides his natural being. The Prophet (BPUH) affirms that a Head 
of State would be wali (responsible) for those who have no other wali. For 
example, the Prophet (BPUH) arranged the marriage of a woman on behalf of 
her wali. Although these traditions are specifically applied to marriage, a Head 
of State also has a financial responsibility towards his subjects. During the 
Prophet’s (BPUH) life if someone died in a state of indebtedness he (the 
Prophet), as Head of State, would pay his debts. This proves that a Head of 
State in Islamic law has a personality other than his own, which allows him to 
stand in the shoes of a wali not only for conducting marriages but for repayment 
of loans for those who died in indebtedness. 
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The examples mentioned above show that the concept of juridical person is not 
totally foreign to Islamic jurisprudence. The essential characteristics of juristic 
persons: (i) perpetuate existence; (ii) capacity to own property; (iii) responsibility 
for its legal obligations; and (iv) the power to borrow, are exhibited in the 
mechanisms of Bait al-mal and waqf.385 If the juridical existence of a company 
is accepted on the basis of these precedents, no serious objection is likely to be 
raised against it.386 
2.11.2 Second Opinion: Islamic Law Does not Recognize Juridical 
Persons  
The proponents of this opinion doubt whether early jurists did recognize this 
concept and argue that fictitious personality does not find support in the Islamic 
heritage. They do not find any convincing evidence in fiqh that the concept of a 
juridical person was acknowledged. 387 Early jurists388 insist that only human 
beings are capable of incurring liabilities. Therefore, no artificial person can be 
held liable, and a corporation has no capacity to engage in any commercial 
transaction.389 Moreover, scholars who take this view criticize the examples 
cited to prove that the early jurists acknowledge the concept of juridical person. 
They argue that even if these examples may help in proving the existence of 
the concept of a juridical person in Islamic law, they are not applicable to 
corporations, because all of them relate to entities for which it is difficult to trace 
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human owners. These institutions also exist for the public benefit and not for 
individual profit as in a corporation. There are difficulties, therefore, in fully 
translating existing Islamic doctrines of independent entities to the corporate 
arena.  
In addition to the above condemnation, such scholars criticize each example 
provided by Justice Usmani as follows: 
a. Waqf & Baitul Māl cannot become precedents for a corporation for the 
following reasons: 
i. In Waqf and Baitul Māl the administrators do not own the 
assets, whereas in a company shareholders own the assets.  
ii. In case of bankruptcy, a company’s assets are returned to the 
shareholders pro rata, whereas in Waqf & Baitul Māl there is 
no particular share for anyone, so assets are not returned to 
anyone.  
iii. A trustee of Waqf and director of Baitul Māl are basically 
voluntary posts, whereas directors of company are salaried 
employees of the company and have an intrinsic interest in its 
affairs. 
iv. Waqf and Baitul Māl are created and work for the welfare of 
people, whereas the company, under the shadow of a juristic 
person, only protects the interests of a few people and is 
usually based on dishonoring human values. 
b. The example of inheritance under debt cannot be a precedent for a 
juristic person because it is the deceased and not the debt itself which is 
liable. The reason why creditors are directed to the deceased’s property 
is because first debt is a monetary liability of the deceased which should 
attach to his property, and secondly because no claim can be preferred 
against the deceased as a person after his death. This does not mean 
that the deceased has ceased to be the debtor. 
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c. The Joint Stock example also cannot be a precedent because contrary 
to Zakāt in joint stock, the tax on a company is levied on individuals and 
not on the company. This makes it clear that there is a difference 
between joint stock and a company. The reason why Zakāt is payable on 
joint stock is that according to the Jurists (other than hanafī school) 
Zakāt is payable as a monetary liability and has nothing to do with the 
capabilities of the individual shareholders. Moreover, levying Zakāt on 
the joint stock, and not on the shareholders, is more beneficial for needy 
people. 
To conclude, the juridical personality of corporations cannot be established by 
clutching at odd examples of institutions that may or may not appear similar to 
fictitious legal persons. Thus it is important to find solid basis for the concept in 
Islamic law.  
2.11.3 Assessment of Juridical Persons in Islamic law 
It is clear from the above that there are wide differences of opinion regarding 
whether juridical persons other than real persons are recognised, although such 
bodies had been so recognised by early Muslim jurists. The arguments on 
either side have their strengths. However, I favour accepting the concept of 
juridical persons in Islamic law, even if it lacks a sound historical basis, for the 
following reasons: 
a. Although the term juristic person is not mentioned specifically by the 
classical texts of Islamic jurisprudence, it is untrue that Islamic legal 
system does not recognize the concept. Early jurists recognized the 
concept based on Islamic practice rather than specific definitions and 
explicit terms. It could be implied from the cases that are cited in their 
writing. Personalization of institutions including companies would not 
have been necessary in most cases.390  
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b. The non-existence of nomenclature does not negate the existence of the 
concept.  Early jurists were fully aware of the idea of assigning legal 
personality to a non-human, but were not ready to do so, as it did not fit 
into the system of law they had developed. They never intended to 
exclude it entirely from Islamic law. The jurists were dealing with a 
system that combined religious duties with worldly affairs. They were 
responsible for developing the system that emerged directly from the 
texts or could be extended from such texts by methods such as strict 
analogy. This system was intended to be stable over the ages, and to be 
practised by Muslims wherever they were, and whether or not they were 
subjects of an Islamic state. There were certain areas of the law that the 
jurists did not touch, leaving these for the Islamic state and the ijtihad of 
the ruler. Most of the topics they did not touch would require further 
development and reform over the ages. The state was expected to 
develop these areas of the law in accordance with ijtihad based upon 
general principles of Islamic law. 391  
c. The concept of juridical person falls purely within the muamalat 
(transactions/ agreement) area and Islamic states are entitled to employ 
it to achieve benefits for the state and people. Should a better concept 
be discovered tomorrow, Islamic states would be free to adopt that too, if 
it conformed to the general principles of Islamic law.  
d. The acceptance of the concept of corporate personality can be 
accommodated in Shariah simply on the basis of needs and necessity. 
The modern economy and trading cannot work without this concept and 
hence the Muslim benefits could not be achieved without 
accommodating this concept in Shariah.  Moreover, there is no need to 
decide whether the concept of juridical person exists under Islamic law or 
not simply because there is nothing in the main sources of the Shariah 
that denies the assignment of legal personality to a non-human. 392  
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e. Finding dissimilarities between Waqf and Baitul Māl on the one hand and 
corporations on the other is of no consequence, because according to 
the classical fiqh precedents are not necessarily required to be the same 
in all respects. In addition, the institutions have different purposes and 
aims and hence are governed by different sets of laws, rules and 
regulations. If the minute details of the two do not match, it does not bar 
the former becoming precedent for the latter. 
f. It cannot be denied that only humans are capable of holding 
responsibility. That is why when corporate liability is apportioned only 
human beings i.e. directors, are held responsible. Moreover, when a 
juristic person is made party to court proceedings, it is cited in the name 
of its head. This means that as long as purely religious duties are not 
expected from an organization, limited legal personality may be assigned 
it as long as human intelligence is present to direct its acts.393 
Having said that, the question of whether the concept of legal personality is 
acceptable to Islamic law is not the real issue. The main problem is the way this 
concept manifests itself in its modern applications, especially the modern 
business corporation. Some of these applications, if accepted, may require 
drastic changes in the Islamic law of contract to the extent that some of its basic 
principles may have to be abandoned. 394 On another words, the focus and 
intension should paid to the consequences of accepting the concept of a 
juridical person in Islamic Law. The most important consequence is that the 
shareholders will not be liable for the debts of their company because the 
concept of limited liability is the natural result of corporate personality. Or does 
the special character of Islamic law suggest a different logic? This will be 
considered in the next chapter. 
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3. Limited Liability in Islamic Law 
Limited liability denotes the situation where a shareholder of a business is 
protected from bearing a loss greater than the amount he has invested. If the 
business incurs a loss, the worst a shareholder can suffer is the loss of his 
entire original investment. The loss cannot extend to his personal assets, and if 
the assets of the company are not sufficient to discharge all its liabilities, the 
creditors have no claim on the personal assets of shareholders. While the 
concept of limited liability is beneficial to the shareholders of a company, it may 
be injurious to the creditors. If a company becomes insolvent and is 
consequently liquidated, the creditors may lose a considerable amount, 
because they can only receive the liquidated value of the assets of the 
company, and have no recourse to its shareholders for the rest of their claims. 
Even the directors of the company who may be responsible for such an 
unfortunate situation cannot be held responsible for satisfying the creditors’ 
claims.395 
There is no elaborate discussion of the liabilities of shareholders for corporate 
debts in Islamic law literature. All that is mentioned is the general principle that 
liabilities follow the amount of capital contribution. This lack of detailed 
discussion is understandable because the way Islamic economics and business 
works (ensuring a built in mechanism against excessive mismatch of asset and 
liability ratio). In addition, the traditional concept of partnership liability under 
Islamic law, as described part II, applies to corporations because of a simple 
reason. While Islamic law does not treat a partnership as a separate entity 
independent from its partners, corporations under modern laws enjoys a 
separate personality from its partners. Therefore, due to the absence of rules 
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governing shareholder liability in classical Islamic law literature, modern 
scholars disagree on accepting the concept of limited liability in Islamic law. 
One strand of opinion totally refutes the concept, because it has no basis in 
Islamic law, and because its economic disadvantages outweigh its benefits. 
Another insists that limited liability should be acceptable to Islamic law, as it is 
the natural result of the acceptance of the concept of corporate personality. Its 
principles do not contravene any injunction of Islam.396 Moreover, limited liability 
can be regarded as approved by analogy in certain Islamic cases.  
In the following sections, I will examine these arguments and then offer my 
conclusion and recommendation.  
3.1 In Support of the Existence of Limited Liability in Islamic law 
Scholars arguing that Islamic law accepts the concept of limited liability base 
their argument in the fact that Islamic law recognizes the concept of juridical 
persons. Since this concept cannot be isolated from that of limited liability, 
Islamic law should therefore accommodate the latter concept. Thus Justice 
Usmani states, 
 “Once the concept of juridical person is accepted and it is admitted 
that, despite its fictive nature, a juridical person can be treated as a 
natural person in respect of the legal consequences of the transactions 
made in its name, we will have to accept the concept of limited liability 
which will follow as a logical result of the former concept. The reason is 
obvious. If a real person i.e. a human being dies insolvent, his creditors 
have no claim except to the extent of the assets he has left behind. If 
his liabilities exceed his assets, the creditors will certainly suffer, no 
remedy being left for them after the death of the indebted person. If we 
accept that a company, in its capacity of a juridical person, has the 
rights and obligations similar to those of a natural person, the same 
principle will apply to an insolvent company. A company, after becoming 
                                                                                                                                                                          
they are merely creditors sharing profits on the basis of the money they have advanced. Islamic law of 
Business Organization, Corporations, p.166. 
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insolvent, is bound to be liquidated, and the liquidation of a company 
corresponds to the death of a person, because a company after its 
liquidation cannot exist anymore. If the creditors of a real person can 
suffer, when he dies insolvent, the creditors of a juridical person may 
suffer too, when its legal life comes to an end by its liquidation”. 
Kelsen397 similarly argues that the concept of limited liability arises from that of 
legal personality. A corporation as a legal person distinct from its shareholders 
deals independently with creditors. It is not the shareholders’ agent, nor do they 
act as sureties for its debts. The money the shareholders have paid to it in the 
form of share capital is attached to the personality of the corporation. It has to 
be repaid like the claim of any other creditor. When a corporation becomes 
insolvent, as with a natural person all that the creditors can lay claim to its 
assets? As the shareholders have no relationship to these assets and are not 
sureties for the corporation, the creditors cannot satisfy their debts from the 
personal assets of the shareholders. 
The issue of limited liability of members of corporations is very important for 
Islamic economies, as modern corporations cannot conceivably function on the 
basis of unlimited liability.398 In addition, the concepts of a juridical person and 
limited liability do not contravene any injunction of Islam, and should not harm 
the creditors of a corporation, who are aware that their claims are limited to its 
assets and capital and thus deal with it on this basis. Therefore, there is no 
possibility of the shareholders or the corporation committing fraud or deception 
in such cases.399 
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Finally, and most importantly, Scholars arguing for limited liability quote cases 
from the old fiqh literature which seems to support limited liability, and then use 
analogy to grant limited liability to corporations. The most important example is 
the “authorized slave case” (al abd al mazoon). This relates to a period of 
Muslim history when slavery was in vogue. Slaves were treated as the property 
of their masters and were freely traded. Slaves were of two kinds, those 
allowed by their masters to trade and those who were not. The initial capital for 
the purpose of trade was given to the former kind of slave by his master, but he 
was then free to enter into all commercial transactions. The capital invested by 
him totally belonged to his master, and whatever the slave earned would go to 
the master as his exclusive property. If in the course of trade, the slave incurred 
debts, the same would be set off by the cash and the stock present in the 
hands of the slave. But if the amount of such cash and stock was in sufficient to 
set off the debts, creditors had a right to sell the slave and settle their claims out 
of his price. However, if their claims were not satisfied even after selling the 
slave, the creditors could not approach his master for the rest of their claims. In 
this example, the master is actually the owner of the whole business, the slave 
being merely a tool to carry out business transactions and owning nothing from 
the business. Still, the liability of the master was limited to the capital he 
invested including the value of the slave. After the death of the slave, creditors 
could not have a claim over the personal assets of the master. The case of the 
authorized slave is the clearest evidence found in the Islamic fiqh approving the 
possibility of accommodating the concept of limited liability in Islamic law. By 
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analogy, the limited liability of the shareholders of a company can be justified in 
Islamic law. 400  
3.2 Against the Notion of the Existence of Limited Liability in Islamic Law  
Modern scholars who reject the concept of limited liability in Islamic law attack it 
from two main angles, first, the connection between corporate personality and 
limited liability and secondly the social harm caused by limited liability. We can 
summarize the arguments as follows: 
a. Corporate personality and limited liability are two different things. Even in 
common law systems they do not necessarily go together. Unlimited 
companies formed under the Companies Act 2006 s.3(4), Scottish 
partnerships under the Partnership Act 1890 s.4(2), and French 
partnerships (societe en nom collectif)401 are examples of separate legal 
entities which do not involve limited liability. The law may or may not 
combine corporate personality and limited liability. 
b. The Shariah can accommodate an artificial entity for the purpose of 
commercial convenience, but Islamic standards of accountability will not 
permit shareholders limited liability.402  
c. Ownership in Islam is a trust owed to God and every individual is 
accountable in the after-life for how his/her resources are used and that 
trust met. One of the most serious obligations owed by any Muslim 
during their lifetime is debt. Even if the debt is incurred through a 
company, the owners are the ones responsible to God. With the strong 
Islamic admonition against being in debt and in adherence to the Islamic 
spirit of not separating spiritual from daily affairs, it is correct that 
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company shareholders are made practically, as well as morally, 
accountable for corporate debts.403   
d. The limited liability concept is not required in Islamic economies since all 
financial participation in business is essentially in the form of equity, the 
only exceptions being suppliers’ credits and qurud hasanah (beneficial 
loans). Thus the liability of partners is practically limited to their capital 
contributions. All other participants in the business (whether by way of 
loan or equity) would be treated as equity holders and would share in the 
risks of business. Since interest bearing loans are not allowed, the total 
obligations of the business could not be out-of-step with the total assets, 
and any erosion in their value may not exceed the total equity. Hence, in 
the ultimate analysis liability would essentially be limited to the extent of 
the total capital (including ploughed-back profits) invested in the 
partnership business.404 
e. Under limited liability if a company is declared insolvent, creditors have 
only rights over the assets of the company itself. If the assets are 
insufficient to settle the amount, the debt is simply written off and cannot 
be claimed from anyone. This goes against Islamic principles, which 
protect peoples’ rights and avoid any action which infringes such 
rights.405 
f. The situation of authorized slaves is not a good analogy for 
implementing the limited liability in Islamic law, because limited liability 
should be decided as a matter of principle rather than on odd 
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precedents. Moreover the cases of authorised slaves and corporations 
are totally different for the following reasons:406 
i. An authorised slave is an agent of the master, whereas a 
corporation is not an agent of its shareholders. 
ii. The capital and assets the slave possesses are owned by the 
master, whereas shareholders have nothing to do with the assets 
of the corporation. 
iii. When slaves earn profits from excess credit purchases, the 
master is not entitled to them; on the principle al-kharaju bi d-
aman (revenue goes with liability). As the master is not liable for 
the loss resulting from excess purchases, he is not entitled to the 
profits either. By contrast there is no restriction on corporations 
regarding excess credit purchases or in raising capital, while 
shareholders are entitled to the entire profit resulting from them as 
a residuary. 
iv. It cannot be said that the liability of the master is limited for all 
transactions of the slave. As explained in the concept of liability in 
Islamic sharikah, the liability of the investor falls into three 
categories, depending on whether he has authorized the worker 
to make excess purchases. Two of these types arise from lawful 
acts and one from the unlawful act of the worker. Applying this to 
the case of an authorized slave, the liability of the master for the 
debts of the business will be unlimited when the transactions of 
the slave involving credit purchases are lawful, and his liability will 
be limited only in the case of an unlawful act of the slave. In fact, 
the master has no liability for unlawful acts. This conclusion does 
not apply to corporations where the liability of the shareholder is 
limited even in the case of debts arising from lawful transactions. 
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3.3. My Assessment of Limited Liability in Islamic law 
I am with the opinion of that Islamic law can accommodate the concept of 
limited liability, for the reasons presented by the supporters of this opinion and 
because of three main reasons:  
a. Since Shariah will continue to govern Muslims in their personal and 
business life, and since economic developments proceed so fast, the 
Islamic fiqh has to work quickly in order to address these developments. 
I believe that the flexibility of Islamic law can accommodate such 
developments and any new concepts as long as they do not contradict 
with Shariah principles.  
b. Accommodating the concept of limited liability is necessary because it 
meets the needs and requirements of Muslim economies. The concept 
meets the needs of Muslim economies because it encourages people to 
invest their money to the overall benefit of the economy. It is also 
necessary because economies around the world including Muslim 
economies trade with each other on the basis of limited liability, so that 
foreign investors expect limited liability when investing in Muslim 
economies.  
c. The concept of limited liability has a basis in the fiqh heritage. It was 
clearly acknowledged by early jurists on their work concerning authorized 
slaves. This case is closely related to that of shareholder liability, and it is 
now the role of modern scholars to complete the task and provide a 
detailed analogy in order to provide a comprehensive Islamic concept for 
limited liability. The objection that the Authorised Slave case does not 
match that of a corporation is not relevant, because according to the 
classical fiqh, precedents are not necessarily required to be the same in 
all respects. In addition, the cases have different purposes and aims, and 
hence are governed by different sets of rules and regulations. If the 
minute details of the two do not match, it does not bar the former 
becoming precedent for the latter. 
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Nevertheless, and despite of any argument presented by modern scholars,  my 
concern is not to find evidence in Islamic law acknowledging the concept of 
limited liability rather to understand the consequences of this concept for 
Islamic law principles. I am confident that the concept of limited liability can be 
implemented and supported by Islamic law. However, the concept’s 
consequences should be well understood and mitigated in accordance with 
Islamic law principles.  
44. The Liability of Groups of Companies in Islamic Law 
The main conclusion of the previous sections was that there are no obstacles in 
Islamic law to the creation of modern forms of corporations including the 
corporate groups as long as they comply with the main principles of Islamic law. 
This leads to the conclusion that shareholders will enjoy the advantage of 
limited liability as long as they do not misuse its merit. In other words, the 
concept of limited liability should not be used by shareholders to break the law 
or escape from liabilities and should not be exploited for fraudulent purposes. 
407
  
This argument has the same logic as that of lifting the corporate veil under the 
common law. However, due to the natural differences between the Common 
law and Islamic law, the justification of the concept of lifting the corporate veil 
has a different basis in the two systems. These bases are found in Shariah 
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Maxims - the set of principles and their subordinate legal maxims which Muslim 
jurists have derived from the Quran and the Sunnah to determine the Islamicity 
of any act, institution or policy. They are the systematic exposition of the spirit 
of the text, which has guided man in different social situations throughout the 
ages. Shariah Maxims enjoy an important place in Islamic jurisprudence, 
encapsulating concepts and precepts that can help one understand the details 
of law. More importantly, they are capable of helping in arriving at the 
appropriate ruling where no explicit law exists.  
The following maxims support the implementation of the concept of lifting the 
corporate veil in Islamic law: 408 
A. Prohibition against Taking another’s Property and Prohibition of 
Oppression 
One of the main principles in Islamic law is the prohibition against taking 
another’s properties in vain. It is ordered by God and the Prophet (BPUH). God 
says in the Quran,  
[And eat not up your property among yourselves in vanity, nor seek 
by it to gain the hearing of the judges that ye may knowingly devour a 
portion of the property of others wrongfully]. (Al Baqara 2:188) 
The Prophet said that:  
"Verily your blood [i.e. lives] and your property and your honour are 
all Sacred/ Prohibited". 
and: 
"All Muslim to the Muslim is forbidden, his blood, properties and his 
honour. 
The Prophet also said that God says:  
"My servants! I have forbidden oppression for Myself, and I have 
made it forbidden amongst you, so do not oppress one another". 
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It is therefore clear that Muslims should not take another Muslim’s (or a non-
Muslim’s) money or property without legal reason (e.g. legal trade). When 
shareholders cheat creditors by intentionally not paying their debts, or use their 
company for fraudulent means or to break the law, they take another’s property 
in vain and by oppression, which is strictly forbidden in Islam. Therefore, in 
such a case shareholders should not enjoy the protection of limited liability. The 
corporate veil can be lifted.       
B. No wrong, no Wrong-doing  
This is one of the most important rules of the Shariah. It is based on a Hadith of 
the Prophet (BPUH) with similar wording. This guiding rule, read with its sub-
rule, "wrong is to be undone", provides a guideline to regulate the entire 
economic and financial system in such a way that prohibits the imposition of 
harm and discourages retaliation. This rule is treated as a pillar of Islamic law, 
forming the basis of the laws of option, inhibition, return of defective 
merchandise, pre-emption, requital, compensation and indemnity, etc. The rule 
also allows individuals to act unilaterally to protect themselves or others from 
harm. It is, therefore, necessary that an Islamic state should legislate in such a 
way as to prevent the causes of harm or damage. It is on this basis that the 
government has a right to blacklist traders who indulge in illegal and antisocial 
activities such as smuggling and adulteration. It can also take action against 
influential persons who provide support or give protection to unlawful practices 
or to miscreants. It is similarly on this basis that a landlord is not allowed to 
eject a tenant from cropped land on the expiry of the period of the lease, so that 
a cultivator is protected against the loss of his crop. The landlord is bound to 
extend the period of tenancy against the payment of standard rent till the crop 
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sown by the tenant is harvested. Also, if a buyer of perishable goods absents 
himself without taking possession of them, the seller, in order to protect himself 
and the buyer from loss, has a right to unilaterally revoke the contract of sale 
and sell the goods to some other party lest the commodity should perish. 
Based on this important rule, shareholders are bound not to abuse the privilege 
of limited liability to harm creditors or the overall community by using the 
corporation for fraud or wrongful trading. Moreover, the state, in order to 
prevent harm or damage by shareholders to creditors, is entitled to pierce the 
corporate veil and extend liability to the corporation's shareholders.  
C. Unlawful Things are to be prevented Irrespective of Benefit  
There may be situations in which an act might have certain benefits while 
producing corruption and inequity. In such a case the Shariah would ban that 
act despite any benefits it might apparently yield. For example, trading in 
unlawful items and earning in unlawful ways might provide employment to a 
large number of persons and bring substantial revenues to the government. 
Gambling might be an effective source of collecting funds for philanthropic 
objectives. Nonetheless, this behaviour must be eliminated since the removal of 
corruption has priority over the acquisition of benefits to economic, social or 
otherwise. 
Accordingly, while the concept of limited liability benefits the economy by 
encouraging people to invest their money and form corporations, if 
shareholders abuse limited liability protection by, for example, using the 
corporation to cheat creditors or in fraudulent or wrongful trading, this protection 
should be removed despite the benefits to the economy, because preventing 
unlawful action has the utmost priority.  
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D. a Greater Injury May be Avoided by Enduring a Lesser Injury 
A minor harm may have to be endured to avoid a major harm. For example, if a 
customer loses his coin in a slot-machine, his coin may be allowed to go waste 
rather than dismantling the machine which is worth much more than the coin. 
But if a very expensive piece of jewellery is lost in a washing machine in a 
laundry, its recovery justifies damage to the machine. This maxim means that in 
cases where the choice is between two harmful alternatives the one fraught 
with less harm may be chosen. If shareholders abuse the protection of limited 
liability, the law will be entitled to withdraw such protection where the resultant 
harm to shareholders is less than the harm to creditors and the general 
economy. 
 E. to Avoid Public Injury, Private Injury May be Suffered 
This rule operates in the case of conflict between a particular and a general 
harm. The Shariah is inclined to allow free market operation and, under normal 
conditions, is disinclined to price-regulation. But if traders manipulate the 
market and reap exorbitant profits so that the interest of the consumers, i.e. the 
general public, is seriously jeopardised, government action regulating prices or 
profits to protect the interests of consumers is justified. This is so because 
protecting the public interest is more important than securing traders’ interests. 
The government will be preventing general harm by tolerating a particular harm. 
It is this rule which justifies nationalization, price control, and a large number of 
similar policies.  
Thus the state can withdraw the protection of shareholders resulting from 
limited liability, when they abuse this protection. The action of the state is 
allowed, because although it causes a private injury to the shareholders, it 
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avoids injury to the public and the economy, as if creditors stop giving credit to 
limited liability corporations, the viability of corporations which drive the 
economy will be under serious risk. 
F. The Extent of Necessity Limits Action Thereunder. 
This maxim aims at restricting the scope of relaxation only to the extent 
necessary. One is not allowed to extend this relaxation to cover situations that 
are not really necessary. A person may be allowed to save his life by eating 
unclean or haram stuff, but this permission is restricted to the extent of eating a 
quantity that may save him from death. Everybody has a right to dispose of his 
property in any lawful manner he chooses. As a general principle he cannot be 
deprived of this right. But under the rule of necessity governments may freeze 
or seize the property of a defaulter who fails to discharge government claims or 
personal or institutional debts, in order to adjust the claims with the defaulter’s 
frozen accounts or seized properties. Yet, the maxim that the extent of 
necessity limits action thereunder binds a government to attach only as much 
property as is sufficient to adjust the claims and no more. It would be offensive 
to deprive the defaulter of all his property or to stop him from exercising his 
normal business operations that exceed the extent of claims. 
As shareholders’ limited liability is justified by necessity (it achieves economic 
needs and encouraging people to invest their money, while the concept is 
necessary because economies around the world trade with each other and with 
Muslim economies on the basis of limited liability), therefore it applies only to 
the extent necessary, so that shareholders should be liable for any abuse the 
concept of limited liability. 
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From the above, I argue that the concept of the liability of groups of companies 
in Islamic law has the following features:   
a. Islamic law accepts the concept of corporate personality and limited 
liability and approves the establishment of modern forms of companies 
including groups of companies. 
b. According to the Islamic law of contract, the acceptance of the limited 
liability concept is subject to one main condition - that the subsidiary’s 
creditors did not face any sort of gharar (uncertainty) when dealing with 
the subsidiary i.e. in dealing with the subsidiary they fully understood its 
legal nature whereby shareholders are not liable for the subsidiary’s 
debts except to the extent of their shares in the subsidiary’s capital.409 
Avoiding gharar in the treatment of creditors can be achieved by two 
tools. Firstly, creditors before dealing with an entity should conduct 
simple due diligence in order to understand whether its shareholders 
enjoy limited liability or not. Secondly, the law must oblige corporations to 
disclose their legal type when dealing with public. For example, Saudi 
regulations oblige corporations to publish their constitutional documents 
in the official Gazette and in local newspapers and to explain their legal 
type and capital amount in their company’s letterheads. 
c. The liability of groups of companies cannot be solved by making a parent 
automatically liable for the debts of its subsidiary. This would go too far 
by completely negating the use of subsidiaries as risk-shifting devices. 
The use of subsidiaries to provide a measure of protection for a group 
should not be, as a matter of policy, proscribed. In addition, automatic 
liability would make it difficult for creditors to assess the degree of risk 
when extending credit to the parent or any subsidiary which the parent is 
supporting by, for example, a guarantee.410 Yet, shareholders shall lose 
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the protection of limited liability if they misuse its merits by using their 
corporation to defeat creditors or minority shareholders or to break the 
law.  
d. Any techniques aiming to protect creditors and minority shareholders 
have to retain the facility to create and exploit enterprise groups, while 
preventing its use for fraudulent, abusive, and criminal purposes.411 
The above features are not far from the Common law approach. However, and 
since Islamic law is a religious law emphasizing a moral approach to 
commercial and business transactions based on the values of justice, equality 
and fairness, the liability of groups of companies must be read in light of this 
consideration.  Therefore, in the final chapter, I will provide a proposal to align 
the liability of groups of companies with the special character of Islamic law.  
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Chapter IV 
Findings and Proposal 
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Before elaborate my proposal regarding the liability of groups of companies in 
Islamic law, I would summarize my findings on the position under Common law 
as follows: 
1. The law on groups of companies has since long been the subject of 
numerous reports, studies and analyses especially among scholars of 
company and insolvency laws.412 Yet, there is a lack of a serious debate 
concerning their governance. The topic is absent from or briefly touched on 
by most company law textbooks and treatises on corporate governance.413 
2. The problem posed by corporate groups are so varied that, unless a 
common nomenclature is established, it is easy for commentators to talks 
past each other and even to confuse the real issue.414 
3. In most common law countries corporate law has traditionally applied the 
separate entity approach to corporate groups. It does not permit the 
controllers of a corporate group to treat the group as a single enterprise for 
the purpose of their entrepreneurial activities. This shows a lack of 
understanding of the nature of groups of companies and prevents scholars, 
practitioners, courts and parliaments from developing satisfactory 
regulations.415  
4. Limited liability in corporate groups is a common characteristic of 
common law countries and is usually supported by the courts. 416  
5. The fact that corporate groups have not yet been regulated in a way that is 
comparable (as regards its scope and depth) to that of other organizational 
forms (e.g. joint stock companies and limited liability companies) does not 
diminish their importance as a legal institution and the concomitant need to 
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held liable simply on the basis of errors in business judgment”. 
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provide legal answers to the questions they throw up.417 However, mean 
that the system of regulation is fragmented and highly complex.418 
6. There is no uniform comprehensive modern law or principles that can 
provide solutions to the liability problems of corporate groups.419  
7. The European Union has not managed to produce a comprehensive regime 
for group of Companies.420 Full harmonization of the law of corporate groups 
within the EU is neither feasible nor advisable. Regulation in this field is 
fragmentary and sector specific remaining controversial and problematic in 
some areas.421 The European Forum’s extensive study on corporate groups 
failed to produce a regime for the liability of group of companies, rather 
copying the existing ineffective regimes. Moreover, the European 
Commission pursued the High Level Group’s recommendations that the 
existence of a group of companies should not itself a reason to abandon the 
limited liability principle, except perhaps in the most patent cases of abuse 
on the part of the group or the parent company, leading to insolvency of 
subsidiary.422 
8. The structure of company law and insolvency law are not apt to regulate 
corporate group because the principles of company law and insolvency law 
were developed in the 19th Century, so that it is not surprising that some of 
their basic principles fit uneasily with the modern commercial realties of 
group of companies.423 For example, while modern economic reality is 
characterized by the massive emergence of large-scale enterprise networks, 
where parts of a whole business are allocated to and insulated in several 
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legally independent companies submitted to a unified economic direction, 
the company law still treats groups of companies as independent 
enterprises. 424  
9. In order to establish liability on a group basis for certain behavior, one needs 
to prove the existence of control of parent over the subsidiary and the 
intention to abuse the relationship between the subsidiary and other 
companies in the group.425  There have been some judicial efforts to ease 
the requirement of control in favor of broader liability for parent companies. 
Such efforts have been undermined because of strong resistance to 
fundamental changes in principles of company law, particularly limited 
liability principles.426 However, the domination of control theory makes 
proposals to regulate groups of companies inefficient. 
10. Courts and legislators used various techniques to allow creditors to recover 
debts from entities within a corporate group other than the entity with which 
they have contracted. These techniques, when piercing the corporate veil, 
have two main important features. First, there is no presumption of liability 
on the part of a parent company following from the mere existence of the 
group form. Status does not determine liability or obligation unless the 
parent company shown to have ‘abuse’ its position. The second feature of 
these principles is that they normally only operate in the context of 
insolvency.427 However, efforts to reach a sound level of liability have been 
wiped out by judges’ rigid devotion to the restrictive characteristics of the 
doctrine of veil piercing. Basic liability principles are still attached to a 
traditional piercing the corporate veil doctrine, which requires a situation of 
parent company’s control over the subsidiary together with some form of 
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 In this regards Hadden observes that “[c]ompany lawyers still write and talk as if the single independent 
company, with its shareholders, directors and employees, was the norm. In reality, the individual 
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Tom Hadden, Inside Corporate Groups, (1984) International Journal of the Sociology of Law 271. Bill 
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unlawful action. 428 At the same time, however, there is no evidence that veil 
piercing has been rigorously applied to effect socially beneficial policy 
outcomes. Judges typically seem to be concerned more with the facts and 
equities of the specific case at bar than with the implications of personal 
shareholder liability for society at large. Veil piercing thus has costs, but no 
social pay-off.429 
My Proposal, the Concept of Pro-active Protection  
Modern scholars when investigating the Islamic law position on a new concept 
or legal matter are keen to prove that such concept has or does not have a 
basis in Shariah. I rather suggest paying more attention to the consequences of 
concepts for Islamic law principles. It is important to understand the way a 
concept manifests itself in its modern applications, because some of these 
applications may require changes to the principles of Islamic law. In addition, 
efforts should be made to mitigate any negative impact of modern concepts on 
Muslim business and economy in general. 
Applying this approach to the subject matter of this study lead one to focus on 
avoiding harm which may result from shareholders misusing the protection 
provided to them by the concept of limited liability. A proposal for such 
avoidance will work for not only the normal form of corporation but also to 
groups of companies. It is logical that if a proposal works where the 
shareholders are natural persons, there should be no difference if one or all of 
the shareholders is a juridical person. However, the parent/subsidiary context is 
more important because a corporate group presents greater potential for harm 
because of its greater economic impact. 
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Although the solutions provided by the Common law systems can be also 
implemented in line with Islamic law principles, yet they remain are inadequate 
and insufficient. They are inadequate because they are working under the 
umbrella of company law and insolvency law. This causes discrepancies 
between the law and commercial reality threatens the creditors’ interests. For 
example: 
1. corporate law generally requires directors to act in the best interests of 
the company to which they have been appointed. However, in practice, 
this duty may conflict with a director’s actions within a corporate group 
which is managed and controlled as a single enterprise. Directors or 
controlling shareholders of the corporate group may act to maximise the 
wealth of the group as a whole and this may be at the expense of 
creditors. The Parent’s lack of any duty (as a shareholder) in dealing with 
the subsidiary means that creditors are unable to make an accurate 
assessment of the investment risk because the possible range of the 
parent’s conduct is very wide.430 
2. The gap between the law and the commercial life is shown by the fact 
that creditors look to a company’s net assets for repayment of their debt. 
Recourse against the company is generally limited to the value of such 
net assets. The use of corporate group branding and intra-group 
financing by the corporate group may mislead creditors, so that they 
cannot distinguish between each corporate group member’s ownership 
of assets or liabilities. Where creditors cannot accurately determine the 
net assets of the corporate group member they contract with, they may 
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assume greater apparent ownership of net assets than actually exists. 
Such misconception may lead creditors to inaccurately assess the level 
of limited recourse risk.    
The existing protections provided by common law for creditors are deficient 
because in real terms these protections impose few restraints on the owners or 
directors of corporate groups, at either the organizational or operational stage 
of the group’s existence. Rather the protections arise only when a group 
members’ existence is threatened, which invariably is too late to provide 
adequate protection. The existing protections work only in the case of 
insolvency. Until insolvency arises there is little if any protection for creditors 
against the dissipation of the subsidiary’s resources. Such protections are thus 
offered too late. There is no protection even when there are early indications 
that a company is nearly insolvent or of doubtful solvency. The current 
protections are confined to minor remedial action after the damage has been 
done. They do not stop misuse of subsidiaries. 431  
From the above, the solutions provided by the Common law are not in line with 
the main feature of Islamic law which relies on the justice, equality and fairness. 
Therefore, my proposal focuses on avoiding the negative consequences of 
implementing the concept of limited liability by providing prior protection to the 
creditors and minority shareholders in case a parent company or any of its 
related companies misuses the merit of limited liability, rather than waiting until 
the subsidiary is in the position of insolvency.  
Explaining the bases of this proposal requires  me to answersome fundamental 
questions. Who is to prove that a parent company or a related company is 
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misusing the limited liability doctrine so that creditors and/or minority 
shareholders deserve proactive protection? Is it the role of the State, or should 
it be left to the judgment of the courts on a case by case basis?  
I say it is the state’s obligation to provide proactive solutions and develop an 
alarm system to indicate that there is a threat to creditors and/or other 
stakeholders. The duty to consider creditors’ interests should arise where a 
company’s situation is such that there are indications by which a director can 
reasonably expect that the action, upon which the company is going to embark, 
could lead the company to be unable to perform its obligations towards its 
creditors. This might be triggered, for example, if a subsidiary’s losses reached 
50% per cent of its working capital. In such a case it is clear that the parent 
company is not properly managing the subsidiary’s business, and that creditors 
and other stakeholders face a real risk. The parent company would then be 
obliged to support the subsidiary in order to keep it running and serve the 
interests of creditors and other stakeholders.  
An example of proactive protection is provided by the Saudi Arabia Companies 
Act.432 Pursuant to Article 180 of that Act, the manager of a limited liability 
company that has losses of fifty per cent of the company's capital must, within 
thirty days, convene a meeting of the shareholders to consider whether the 
company should continue to exist or be dissolved prior to the expiration of the 
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 The Basic System of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia states that the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the 
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companies known in Islamic jurisprudence. 
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term specified in the company articles of association. A shareholders’ resolution 
must be unanimous in order to validly continue with company operations. In the 
case of a resolution to dissolve the company, the resolution must be adopted by 
a majority of shareholders that represents at least three quarters of the 
company's capital. If the shareholders have resolved to continue with the 
company, then they are deemed to be providing an undertaking to be jointly 
liable to pay all company debts on a pro-rata basis, based on their shareholding 
percentage.  Importantly it should be noted that if the company manager fails to 
convene the required shareholders meeting in accordance with Article 180, 
then each shareholder may be jointly and severally liable for all the 
company’s debts. In addition, if the shareholders are unable to reach a 
resolution on whether the company should continue to exist, then any 
interested party may request the dissolution of the company. 
This example is one of many solutions which could be devised in order to 
protect creditors and prevent the misuse of subsidiaries.  
In my proposal, imposing liability on a parent or related company outside of 
cases of insolvency would be only available where a parent or related company 
exercised "decisive influence" over its subsidiary. Decisive influence may be 
established where the subsidiary, despite having separate legal personality, 
does not act independently but rather in accordance with the will of its parent 
company. The availability of decisive influence alone would not be enough to 
make the parent liable. It must actually exercise such influence. 
In determining the existence and practice of decisive influence I propose that 
the courts apply the same criteria articulated by the European Court in 
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establishing the decisive influence test in El DuPont de Nemours and Others V 
Commission:433    
a. The conduct of a subsidiary may be imputed to the parent company 
where the former does not decide independently upon its own conduct, 
but "carries out, in all material respects, the instructions given to it by the 
parent company, regard being had in particular to the economic, 
organisational and legal links between the two undertakings". 
b. The court cannot merely find that the parent company is in a position to 
exercise decisive influence over the conduct of its subsidiary, but must 
also check whether the influence was actually exercised. It is for the 
court to demonstrate such decisive influence on the basis of factual 
evidence. 
c. A parent company may exercise decisive influence over its subsidiaries 
"even when it does not make use of any actual rights of co-determination 
and refrains from giving any specific instructions or guidelines on 
individual elements of commercial policy". A single commercial policy 
within a group may be inferred "indirectly from the totality of the 
economic and legal links between the parent company and its 
subsidiaries. For example, the parent company's influence over its 
subsidiaries as regards corporate strategy, operational policy, business 
plans, investment, capacity, provision of finance, human resources and 
legal matters may have indirect effects on the market conduct of the 
subsidiaries and of the whole group". 
d. Parent companies have a specific responsibility to ensure that all 
subsidiaries over which they hold decisive influence comply with 
applicable laws.  
I would also extend court power to award protective measures to situations 
where “it is satisfied that it is just” to do so.  
The proposed court power has two important features. First, interference or 
involvement in management could trigger liability rather than the more stringent 
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test for shadow directors where the complete domination of the subsidiary’s 
board is required. The reality of the corporate groups is that a parent company 
can leave a measure of autonomy to the boards of its subsidiaries yet, have a 
significant influence on the management policy of the group. Secondly, liability 
can arise where the parent creates a false impression of credit worthiness. To 
the extent that third parties are so misled in extending credit a parent should be 
held liable when the court is satisfied that it is just. 
The proposal might appear to provide a very wide base for holding parent 
companies liable for the debts of subsidiaries compared with common law 
systems. This could be true. Yet, the proposal should be understood on the 
basis that Islamic law is a religious and moral system, and that liability for debt 
can last beyond this world into the hereafter, while the main principle governing 
Muslims in their commercial life is that a Muslim should act as well in his 
commercial life as in his personal life. 
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Final Conclusion  
Groups of companies offer economic and practical advantages over other forms 
of business organizations. It is the only form permitting organisational control 
when companies are incorporated in different states. However, groups of 
companies may create problems in terms of antitrust law, tax law, labour law, 
corporate law, and in the case of international companies, conflict of laws. 
National laws do not provide a complete solution to these problems because 
groups of companies are still governed by traditional corporate law, which is 
designed to govern single independent companies. On the other hand, 
harmonization of the law of corporate groups across legal systems is neither 
feasible not advisable.  
Protections offered by corporate law to the minority shareholders and creditors 
of a corporation are based primarily on the concept of corporate self-interest, 
which flows from the existence of the corporation as a separate legal entity. 
These protections are adequate only so long as corporations are truly 
independent and free from external control. In company groups, however, 
different notions of protection and management are needed. The centralized 
management of a group's dominating corporation frequently gives instructions 
to one of the corporations it controls in order to benefit the group as a whole, 
and these instructions may be contrary to the interests of a dependent 
corporation. While the dependent corporations' interests are legally recognized 
and the dependent corporations' shareholders' and creditors' rights are thereby 
protected, there is no recognition of company groups themselves. There is thus 
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a disparity between the legal protection provided and the reality of corporate 
group structures. 434 
The conflict between the interests of the group and those of the corporations' 
shareholders' and creditors is not sufficiently managed by common law system. 
The techniques invented by statutes and courts aim to allow creditors to 
recover debts from entities within a group other than the entity with which they 
have contracts. However, these techniques are attached to the doctrine of veil 
piercing which requires a situation of a parent company’s control over the 
subsidiary together with some form of unlawful action. In other words, liability 
will not be determined unless the parent company is shown to have ‘abused’ its 
position. In addition, these techniques normally only operate in the context of 
insolvency. Moreover, courts tend towards a rigid adherence to these 
principles. 
When studying the position in the Islamic law, the study proves that Islamic law 
accepts the limited liability doctrine in terms of group of companies and 
stresses the important of avoiding harms which may result from parent 
companies misusing the protection granted by the concept of limited liability. In 
particular it argues that parent companies shall lose such protection if it proven 
that they have employed the device to defeat creditors or break the law. This is 
exactly the same notion provided by the common law under the concept of 
piercing the corporate veil. Yet, Islamic law as a religious legal system (where 
liability for debt can last beyond this world into the hereafter) adds to the 
concept a proactive feature i.e. the provision of prior protection to creditors 
rather waiting until the subsidiary is in an insolvency situation.               
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According to this proactive approach, legislatures, with the assistance of 
economists, accountants, scholars … etc, have the duty to invent criteria which 
indicate when a parent company is misusing the merits of the limited liability 
doctrine and exerts decisive influence over its subsidiary.  As a result, if a 
subsidiary is not able to perform its obligations towards its creditors, its parent 
company shall be obliged to support the subsidiary, otherwise it shall be liable 
for its debts. When applying the law, courts should have the full power to 
protect creditors when satisfied that it is “just” to do so. 
This proactive approach presented in this study might also be considered for 
adoption in common law systems (albeit on a different basis than a moral one) 
because current common law solutions to problems of liability within groups of 
companies’ provide inefficient protection to the creditors against the unlimited 
power of the controlling company to dictate the actions of its subsidiaries. 
It only remains to mention that when I started this study, I was aiming to use its 
outcome as a contribution towards the process of the Islamisation of Muslim 
countries. Now additionally, I will use this outcome to call on Islamic Fiqh 
institutions and modern scholars to conduct greater efforts (ijtihad) at a 
collective level, in order to devise a comprehensive solution not only for issues 
of liability within groups of companies but for the whole question of groups of 
companies generally, in order to produce an Islamic model of corporate groups 
which can respond to economic needs while complying with Shariah principles.   
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Glossary435 
• 'abd: slave; servant; 'abd ma'dhun is a slave who has been authorized by 
his master to handle business on his behalf. Some scholars have compared 
the authorized slave with the corporation, because the slave can be sold to 
meet claims if he exceeded his authority.  
• 'ahd: covenant; here it is used in the context of dhimmah (personality), 
which is considered by the jurists a covenant with the Creator. Dhimmah or 
personality is the result of this covenant.  
• ahkam: Plural of hukm (rule); the ahkam of a contract (legal effects) as 
distinguished from its huquq (rights of performance of the contract )-the 
Hanafis make a distinction between the two.  
• ahliyah: Legal capacity.  
• Ahliyat al-ada’: Legal capacity for execution or the legal ability to perform 
rights and duties.  
• Ahliyat al-wujub: Legal capacity for the acquisition of rights and obligations.  
• a'mal: plural of amal (work) that is required in a partnership or on the basis 
of which a partnership is formed.  
• amanah: trust; the contract of amanah gives rise to fiuciary relation-ships 
and duties.  
• amin: trustee.  
• amwal: plural of mal (wealth); wealth that is contributed as capital in a 
partnership.  
• 'aqd: agreement; contract.  
• 'aql: reason; fourth interest secured by the Shariah and recognized as a 
purpose of the law; the existence of 'aql is an essential condition for ahliyat 
al-ada'.  
• arkan: The elements or essential ingredients of an act, without which the act 
is not legally valid.  
• batil: Nullity; void.  
• daman: compensation; liability.  
• daman al- 'amal: liability underlying a partnership formed on the basis of 
labour, where the partner is liable for performing the contract or 
completing the work accepted by either partner.  
• daman al-mal: liability for the debts of the partnership; the usual form of 
liability underlying all partnerships, especially one formed on the basis of 
wealth.  
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 This Glossary is published at the end of Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee’s book, Islamic Law of Business 
organization, Corporations, Islamic Research Institute, and International Institute of Islamic Thought, 
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• daman al-talaf: liability for damaging or destroying property accepted by the 
partnership for value-added work.  
• daman al-thaman: liability underlying a partnership formed on the basis of 
credit-worthiness where each partner is liable, jointly and severally, for 
paying the prince of goods bought on credit.  
• darurah: Necessity. A principle used for permitting forbidden things in case 
of duress or extreme hardship.  
• dayn: receivables; the term does not apply to cash loans for which the word 
qard is used.  
• dhimmah: equivalent of legal personality in positive law; receptacle for the 
capacity for acquisition; see ahd.  
• fasid: vitiated; irregular; unenforceable; used in the sense of voidable in the 
positive law, but a contract is voidable at the option of the parties, while the 
fosid contract can become valid only if the offending condition is removed.  
• gharar: uncertainty; hazard that is likely to lead to a dispute in a contract; 
does not mean speculation in goods or currencies or the acquisition of huge 
profits.  
• ghasb: usurpation; abduction.  
• hamil: surety; the term is used by Hanbali jurists for kafil.  
• hukm: rule; command; precription; the hukm of a contract is a term for the 
legal effects of the contract.  
• Huquq: rights; the rights of performance of a contract that belong to the agent 
according to the Hanafis.  
• ibahah: permissibility.  
• ijab: obligation as distinguished from wujub (duty); offer in a con-tract.  
• Ijma: consesus of opinion of jurists on a rule of law.  
• ijma sukiiti: consensus where some jurists give tacit approval to the rule 
pronounced by others.  
• ijtihad: effort of the jurist to derive the law on an issue by expending all the 
available means of interpretation at his disposal and by taking into account 
all the legal proofs related to the issue.  
• ikhtilat: mixing of shares so that they can no longer be separated.  
• inan: rein of an animal; type of partnership; the inan partnership that is 
formed for a particular project or for trading in a particular commodity or in 
which the agency granted to the partners is restricted.  
• istidanah: raising or building up credit through credit purchases; does not 
apply to the raising of cash loans; see istiqrii¢.  
• istihsan: principle according to which the law is based upon a general 
principle of the law in preference to a strict analogy pertaining to the issue, 
the principle is used by the Hanafis as well as the Malikis,  
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• istiqrad: the raising of cash loans for business purposes, declared batil by 
al-Sarakhsi as it is against the principle of prohibition of riba.  
• jaiz: permissible; permissible contract.  
• jahalah: uncertainty; uncertainty in a contract that may lead to a later 
dispute; see gharar.  
• kafalah: contract of surety; guarantee; bail; posting a bond.  
• kafil: surety; person providing the surety; guarantor.  
• al-kharaj bi al-daman: a principle based upon a tradition; it is, perhaps, the 
most influential principle in Islamic law, applies to contracts, damages and 
even crimes.  
• khalt: mixing of shares. 
• lazim: binding; binding contract.  
• mal: wealth.  
• milk: ownership; property.  
• mu'amalaht: transactions; agreement.  
• mubah: permissible.  
• mudarabah: contract of partnership and sharing of profits in which the 
investor provides all the capital and is liable for the loss.  
• mudarib: the worker in a contract of mudiiraboh:  
• mufawadah: a basic contract of partnership based on wakalah and kafalah 
that requires full commitment from the partners and to achieve this purpose 
tries to maintain equality in the capital, labour, liability and legal capacity and 
also declares each partner to be a surety for the other-it is converted into 
the 'inan partnership if such equality is disturbed.  
• murabahah: sale at stated cost price and mark-up.  
• mutalabah: demand; demand by a creditor for the satisfaction of debts from 
the dealing partner or from the other partners.  
• muzara 'ah: contract for the cultivation of land between the owner of the 
land and the worker with the condition of sharing the produce.  
• muzari': tenant.  
• nizam: institution; term used in Saudi law for the corporation, in place of the 
usual term sharikah, in Arab law.  
• qabul: acceptance.  
• qard: loan, especially an interest-free loan in which the period of repayment 
is not fixed; a loan in which the period is fixed is permitted by Islamic law, 
even if it is without interest, because it is hit by the stipulations of the 
contract of sarf.  
• qard hasan: gracious loan without interest in which the benefit to be derived 
is gifted by the owner to the beneficiary-without this charitable act, the use 
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of the money for a period would be considered an unjustified excess 
transferred to the beneficiary also called riba al-naei'ah:  
• qiyas: analogy; syllogism.  
• rabb al-mal: investor; owner of capital.  
• rahn: pledge; mortgage.  
• riba: interest; unlawful excess in the exchange of two counter-values where 
the excess is measurable through weight or measure (called riba ai-fal) or is 
measurable through time (called riba al-nasi'ah).  
• rukn: element; part of an act without which the act is not complete or valid; 
essential ingredient or element of a contract.  
• sadaqah: charity; also used for zakat.  
• salam: contract in which an advance payment is made for a delayed delivery 
of goods.  
• Sarf: contract for the exchange of gold, silver, and currencies whether the 
currency or commodity exchanged is the same from both sides or is 
different, that is, whether dinars are exchanged with dinars or dinars are 
exchanged with dirhams.  
• shakhsiyah i'itbariyah: juristic person; artificial personality; corporate 
personality.  
• sharik: partner.  
• sharikah: partnership; in Egyptian law the term is used for joint stock 
companies and corporations as well, but is qualified with an adjective to 
indicate its nature: thus, sharikah musahamah for a public limited company 
or a corporation whose capital has been subscribed to by the general public.  
• sharikah 'ammah: general partnership; a partnership in which each partner 
is a general attorney for the other partners; a partnership that permits 
trading in all types of goods.  
• sharikah khasah: special partnership; partnership for a single venture or for 
trading in a particular item; partnership in which each partner is a special 
attorney of the other partners.  
• sharikah musahama: in Egyptian law it is the name for a corporation or for a 
public limited company.  
• sharikat a'mal: partnership in which participation by the partners is based on 
labour or skill, but the partnership has to be of the type 'inan or mufawadah.  
• sharikat al-'aqd: a partnership created through contract as opposed to co-
ownership that may be the result of a joint purchase or agreement or it may 
result from inheritance or from some other legal situation.  
• sharikat al- 'inan: a basic contract of partnership based on agency in which 
participation may either be on the basis of wealth or labour or credit-
worthiness, and in which equality of contribution or legal capacity is not 
necessary.  
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• sharikat al-abdan: another name for sharikat al-a 'mal.  
• sharikat al-amwal: a partnership in which participation is based on the 
contribution of wealth by all partners, but the partnership has to be of the 
type 'inan or mufawadah.  
• al-sharikah dhat al-mas 'uliyah al-mahdudah: the name for a private limited 
company in Egyptian law.  
• sharikat al-dhimam: a term used by the Malikis to indicate a situation where 
two or more persons are buying goods on credit-it is different from the 
Hanafi sharikat al-wujuh insofar as it requires the physical presence of all 
the partners at the time of purchase.  
• sharikat al-ibahah: a common right of individuals to gather, possess and 
own free commodities.  
• sharikat al-jabr: mandatory co-ownership created by an act of law, like 
inheritance.  
• sharikat aI-milk: co-ownership.  
• sharikat al-taqabbul: partnership for the acceptance of work, which is the 
same thing as a partnership based on labour or skill.  
• sharikat al-wujuh: partnership based on credit-worthiness of the partners 
in which the ratio of profit and loss is based on the liability borne, but the 
partnership has to be of the type 'in an or mufawadah.  
• shurut: conditions; the name given to the art of conveyancing in Islamic 
law.  
• 'urf: usage; custom.  
• urud: property that includes goods, slaves and even real estate.  
• wakiilah: agency.  
• wakalah 'ammah: general agency.  
• wakalah khasah: special agency.  
• wakil: agent.  
• wali: guardian.  
• waqf: charitable trust; testamentary trust.  
• wasiyah: bequest.  
• wilayat al-istidanah: authority granted by one partner to another to buy on 
credit beyond the limit of the capital of the partnership.  
• zakat: obligatory religious dues on wealth.  
 
